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mtusi2026lab7/security/THREAT_MODEL.md
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HellsTomatoandCopilot 2ef0299e34
Skeleton contracts / contracts (pull_request) Canceled after 0s
Complete lab7 grade 4 implementation
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-11-06 15:35:53 +03:00

2.4 KiB

Модель угроз

Активы: password hashes, Bearer sessions, messages and attachments, PKI keys, OpenBao tokens and telemetry. Actors: chat member, outsider, a client with a certificate from the local CA, compromised worker and operator. Public boundary is HTTPS nginx; each compose service and OpenBao are separate trust boundaries. The exact links are in the trust matrix.

Threat / path Invariant and control Reproducible negative check Residual risk
outsider reads another chat or attachment membership check before metadata/content/S3 stream smoke ACL cases and tests/attachments_negative.py authorised member may copy content
forged X-User-Id changes principal principal comes only from hashed Bearer session request with forged header stays denied stolen Bearer token works until expiry/logout
password database leak enables cheap cracking Argon2id (19 MiB, t=2, p=1), salt/params in PHC hash inspect new password_hash prefix $argon2id$ parameters should be raised on stronger hardware
login flood exhausts Argon2 CPU Redis-wide 10/min/user budget, 429 + Retry-After 11 bad logins across both replicas → 429 distributed source/usernames can still consume capacity
a trusted non-LB certificate calls API API TLS requires client cert and filter allows only DNS SAN lb no cert, foreign CA, and api-otel cert fail active LB credential compromise
compromised worker reads API credentials separate Bao policy, RabbitMQ/S3 identities and ACLs worker token reading kv/.../api is deny worker's own scoped assets remain exposed
telemetry leaks content/token structured logs only, session keys hashed, no bodies inspect Collector/Loki records after smoke third-party agent upgrade needs review
malicious image consumes worker resources pixel, CPU/RAM and job-time limits; non-root worker oversized/malformed upload negative tests valid expensive images occupy bounded worker capacity

Lifecycle: CA key and unseal shares stay with the operator and are never committed. AppRole tokens renew/re-auth before 15-minute expiry. A sealed Bao makes new secret reads fail closed; already-open connections continue only until their bounded credential/session lifetime. Scan findings are triaged by reachability, fixed image version and runtime exposure rather than CVE count alone; scripts/scan.sh records the command and reviewed findings without secrets.