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mtusi2026lab5/student-tests/attachments_negative.py
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Vladislav Kunetskiy 01b885e846 lab5: очереди и асинхронная обработка изображений
Durable staging handoff, transactional outbox, at-least-once worker with lease fencing, idempotent versioned pipeline, three variants, operator tooling, contract tests and evidence. Includes the review fixes: reprocess source selection and failure settlement, replay guards, stale-job retirement, PNG structural/raster validation, migration rollback safety and audit events.
2026-10-31 14:34:24 +03:00

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#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Negative attachment scenarios required by lab4 level 4.
Run against a live stand:
python3 student-tests/attachments_negative.py --base-url http://localhost:8080
"""
import hashlib
import struct
import sys
import urllib.error
import urllib.request
import uuid
import zlib
from pathlib import Path
from urllib.parse import quote
sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / 'tests'))
from client import Client, Failure, arguments, check, run # noqa: E402
FIXTURE = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / 'tests/fixtures/sample.png'
def upload(client, actor, chat, content, filename='sample.png', content_type='image/png', expected=202):
path = '/api/v1/chats/' + chat['id'] + '/attachments?filename=' + quote(filename, safe='')
return client.call('POST', path, expected, actor=actor, raw=content, headers={'Content-Type': content_type})
def png_chunk(ctype, payload):
crc = zlib.crc32(ctype + payload) & 0xffffffff
return struct.pack('>I', len(payload)) + ctype + payload + struct.pack('>I', crc)
def crafted_png(width, height, interlace, raster, bit_depth=8, color_type=6):
"""PNG with correct chunk lengths and CRCs around arbitrary IDAT bytes."""
return crafted_png_extra(
width, height, raster, bit_depth=bit_depth, color_type=color_type,
interlace=interlace,
)
def crafted_png_extra(width, height, raster, pre_idat=(), bit_depth=8, color_type=6, interlace=0):
"""PNG whose IDAT is preceded by caller-supplied chunks (PLTE/tRNS/...)."""
ihdr = struct.pack('>IIBBBBB', width, height, bit_depth, color_type, 0, 0, interlace)
return (
b'\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n'
+ png_chunk(b'IHDR', ihdr)
+ b''.join(pre_idat)
+ png_chunk(b'IDAT', zlib.compress(raster))
+ png_chunk(b'IEND', b'')
)
def main():
args = arguments('Attachment negative scenarios (lab4)')
client = Client(args.base_url, args.ca_file)
alice, bob, eve, chat = client.bootstrap()
fixture = FIXTURE.read_bytes()
# Oversized body: rejected before any image parsing.
upload(client, alice, chat, b'\x00' * (10 * 1024 * 1024 + 1), expected=413)
print('10 MiB + 1 body: 413')
# Empty body is not a valid image.
upload(client, alice, chat, b'', expected=415)
print('empty body: 415')
# Corrupt PNG: flip one IDAT payload byte, CRC no longer matches.
corrupt = bytearray(fixture)
index = corrupt.index(b'IDAT') + 8
corrupt[index] ^= 0xFF
upload(client, alice, chat, bytes(corrupt), expected=415)
print('corrupt PNG (IDAT CRC): 415')
# Declared JPEG but the bytes are PNG.
upload(client, alice, chat, fixture, filename='photo.jpg', content_type='image/jpeg', expected=415)
print('MIME spoof (PNG declared as JPEG): 415')
# Structurally valid PNG (chunk layout, lengths, CRCs all correct) whose
# IDAT payload is not a zlib stream at all. Structure-checking alone must
# not accept it: the stream has to inflate. Regression for a review
# finding that used to produce 202 queued and then failed/invalid_image
# in the worker.
upload(
client, alice, chat,
crafted_png(64, 32, 0, b'this is not a zlib stream'),
expected=415,
)
print('structurally valid PNG with non-zlib IDAT: 415')
# Correct zlib stream that is not a valid PNG raster: an empty payload
# and a scanline with an undefined filter byte must both be 415, not 202.
upload(client, alice, chat, crafted_png(2, 2, 0, b''), expected=415)
print('valid zlib, empty PNG raster: 415')
invalid_filter = b'\x05' + b'\x00' * 8 + b'\x00' + b'\x00' * 8
upload(client, alice, chat, crafted_png(2, 2, 0, invalid_filter), expected=415)
print('valid zlib, invalid PNG scanline filter: 415')
# RGBA forbids bit depth 1; every chunk CRC is correct.
upload(client, alice, chat, crafted_png(1, 1, 0, b'\x00', bit_depth=1), expected=415)
print('invalid PNG color type/bit depth pair: 415')
# Duplicate IHDR is forbidden even with correct CRCs.
ihdr = png_chunk(b'IHDR', struct.pack('>IIBBBBB', 1, 1, 8, 6, 0, 0, 0))
duplicate_header = (
b'\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n'
+ ihdr + ihdr
+ png_chunk(b'IDAT', zlib.compress(b'\x00' + b'\x00' * 4))
+ png_chunk(b'IEND', b'')
)
upload(client, alice, chat, duplicate_header, expected=415)
print('duplicate PNG IHDR: 415')
# Bytes after the zlib stream inside IDAT are not part of a valid raster.
trailing = (
b'\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n'
+ png_chunk(b'IHDR', struct.pack('>IIBBBBB', 1, 1, 8, 6, 0, 0, 0))
+ png_chunk(b'IDAT', zlib.compress(b'\x00' + b'\x00' * 4) + b'junk')
+ png_chunk(b'IEND', b'')
)
upload(client, alice, chat, trailing, expected=415)
print('trailing bytes after PNG zlib stream: 415')
# tRNS is forbidden for alpha color types and has fixed lengths otherwise.
rgba_trns = crafted_png_extra(
1, 1, b'\x00' + b'\x00' * 4,
pre_idat=(png_chunk(b'tRNS', b'\x00'),), color_type=6,
)
upload(client, alice, chat, rgba_trns, expected=415)
print('tRNS on RGBA PNG: 415')
rgb_trns = crafted_png_extra(
1, 1, b'\x00' + b'\x00' * 3,
pre_idat=(png_chunk(b'tRNS', b'\x00'),), color_type=2,
)
upload(client, alice, chat, rgb_trns, expected=415)
print('short tRNS on RGB PNG: 415')
# A 1-bit palette cannot address three entries.
palette_overflow = crafted_png_extra(
1, 1, b'\x00\x00',
pre_idat=(png_chunk(b'PLTE', bytes((255, 0, 0, 0, 255, 0, 0, 0, 255))),),
bit_depth=1, color_type=3,
)
upload(client, alice, chat, palette_overflow, expected=415)
print('PLTE entries exceed palette bit depth: 415')
# Palette transparency cannot describe more entries than PLTE provides.
palette_trns = crafted_png_extra(
1, 1, b'\x00\x00',
pre_idat=(
png_chunk(b'PLTE', bytes((255, 0, 0))),
png_chunk(b'tRNS', b'\x00\x00'),
),
bit_depth=8, color_type=3,
)
upload(client, alice, chat, palette_trns, expected=415)
print('palette tRNS exceeds PLTE entries: 415')
# Dangerous display names.
for name in ('../x.png', 'a/b.png', 'a\\b.png', 'a\x00.png', 'a\n.png'):
upload(client, alice, chat, fixture, filename=name, expected=400)
print('dangerous filenames: 400')
# A member of one chat cannot read an attachment of another chat.
other = client.call(
'POST', '/api/v1/chats', 201, actor=alice,
body={'title': 'Другой чат', 'member_ids': [alice['id'], eve['id']]}, schema='Chat',
)['json']
foreign, foreign_content = client.attachment(eve, other)
client.call('GET', '/api/v1/attachments/' + foreign['id'], 404, actor=bob)
client.call('GET', '/api/v1/attachments/' + foreign['id'] + '/content', 404, actor=bob)
print('foreign attachment metadata/content: 404')
# Message rules: empty text without attachments, attachment from another chat.
client.call(
'POST', '/api/v1/chats/' + chat['id'] + '/messages', 400, actor=alice,
body={'text': ''}, headers={'Idempotency-Key': uuid.uuid4().hex},
)
print('empty text without attachments: 400')
client.call(
'POST', '/api/v1/chats/' + chat['id'] + '/messages', 404, actor=alice,
body={'text': 'чужое', 'attachment_ids': [foreign['id']]},
headers={'Idempotency-Key': uuid.uuid4().hex},
)
print('attachment from another chat: 404')
# Contract limits: 11 unique IDs and duplicate IDs are rejected by the schema.
client.call(
'POST', '/api/v1/chats/' + chat['id'] + '/messages', 400, actor=alice,
body={'text': 'много', 'attachment_ids': [str(uuid.uuid4()) for _ in range(11)]},
headers={'Idempotency-Key': uuid.uuid4().hex},
)
print('11 attachment ids: 400')
duplicate = str(uuid.uuid4())
client.call(
'POST', '/api/v1/chats/' + chat['id'] + '/messages', 400, actor=alice,
body={'text': 'дубликат', 'attachment_ids': [duplicate, duplicate]},
headers={'Idempotency-Key': uuid.uuid4().hex},
)
print('duplicate attachment ids: 400')
# Lab5 exposes the derived variants after ready; queued content is a conflict.
own, content = client.attachment(alice, chat)
client.call('GET', '/api/v1/attachments/' + own['id'] + '/content', 409, actor=alice)
own = client.wait_ready(alice, own)
client.call('GET', '/api/v1/attachments/' + own['id'] + '/content?variant=thumbnail', 200, actor=alice)
# Attachment-only message is valid.
client.message(alice, chat, '', attachments=[own['id']])
print('attachment-only message: 201')
# Object keys are server-generated; anonymous direct access must be denied.
key = 'attachments/' + chat['id'] + '/' + own['id'] + '/original'
request = urllib.request.Request('http://127.0.0.1:8333/messenger-attachments/' + key, method='GET')
try:
urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=5)
except urllib.error.HTTPError as error:
check(error.code == 403, 'anonymous S3 GET must be 403, got ' + str(error.code))
else:
raise Failure('anonymous S3 GET unexpectedly succeeded')
print('anonymous direct S3 GET: 403')
check(hashlib.sha256(content).hexdigest() == own['sha256'], 'fixture checksum mismatch')
print('PASS: lab4 attachment negative scenarios')
if __name__ == '__main__':
run(main)