Добавить приватное S3-хранилище, вложения, presigned upload, reconciler и доказательства.
136 lines
4.9 KiB
Python
136 lines
4.9 KiB
Python
"""Attachment upload validation and serialisation.
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Design rules for laboratory 4:
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* raw bytes are streamed to an ephemeral file, never accumulated in RAM;
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* the declared MIME type must match the format sniffed from the bytes;
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* the pixel budget is checked before the image is decoded;
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* a small semaphore bounds how many full decodes run at once per API replica;
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* the object key is generated by the server and never contains the filename.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import hashlib
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import os
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import tempfile
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import threading
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import uuid
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from datetime import datetime, timezone
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from PIL import Image, UnidentifiedImageError
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from .config import settings
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from .errors import ApiError, payload_too_large, unsupported_media_type
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# Pillow's own bomb guard is a second line of defence; the explicit product
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# check below is the contract limit and runs before verify()/load().
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Image.MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS = settings.max_image_pixels
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_decoders = threading.BoundedSemaphore(settings.max_decode_concurrency)
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ALLOWED = {"PNG": "image/png", "JPEG": "image/jpeg"}
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def format_time(value: datetime) -> str:
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return value.astimezone(timezone.utc).strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S.%fZ")
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def object_key(chat_id: uuid.UUID, attachment_id: uuid.UUID) -> str:
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# Random UUIDs make the key unguessable; the client filename is display
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# metadata only. A stable prefix helps the reconciler and operators.
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return f"chats/{chat_id}/{attachment_id}"
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def attachment_json(row: dict) -> dict:
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return {
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"id": str(row["id"]),
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"chat_id": str(row["chat_id"]),
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"owner_id": str(row["owner_id"]),
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"filename": row["filename"],
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"content_type": row["content_type"],
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"size_bytes": int(row["size_bytes"]),
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"sha256": row["sha256"],
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"status": row["status"],
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"variants": [],
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"error_code": row["error_code"],
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"created_at": format_time(row["created_at"]),
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"updated_at": format_time(row["updated_at"]),
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}
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def read_to_temp(stream) -> tuple[str, int, str]:
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"""Stream the request body to a bounded temporary file.
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The caller owns the returned path and must delete it in a finally block.
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"""
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digest = hashlib.sha256()
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total = 0
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handle = tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(
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mode="wb", prefix="upload-", suffix=".bin", dir=settings.upload_temp_dir, delete=False
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)
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path = handle.name
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try:
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while True:
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try:
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chunk = stream.read(64 * 1024)
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except Exception as error:
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# Flask raises RequestEntityTooLarge when MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH is
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# exceeded on a chunked request.
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if getattr(error, "code", None) == 413:
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raise payload_too_large() from error
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raise
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if not chunk:
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break
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total += len(chunk)
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if total > settings.max_upload_bytes:
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raise payload_too_large("Файл больше 10 MiB")
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digest.update(chunk)
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handle.write(chunk)
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finally:
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handle.close()
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if total == 0:
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os.unlink(path)
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raise unsupported_media_type("Пустой файл")
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return path, total, digest.hexdigest()
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def validate_image(path: str, declared_content_type: str) -> None:
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"""Sniff the real format, enforce the pixel budget, then fully decode."""
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try:
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with Image.open(path) as image:
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actual = ALLOWED.get(image.format or "")
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if actual is None:
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raise unsupported_media_type("Поддерживаются только PNG и JPEG")
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if actual != declared_content_type:
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raise unsupported_media_type("Content-Type не совпадает с содержимым")
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width, height = image.size
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if width < 1 or height < 1:
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raise unsupported_media_type("Некорректные размеры изображения")
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if width * height > settings.max_image_pixels:
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raise payload_too_large("Слишком много пикселей")
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# verify() parses the container and checks CRCs without keeping the
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# decoded bitmap; load() below is the bounded full decode.
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image.verify()
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except ApiError:
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raise
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except (UnidentifiedImageError, OSError, ValueError, SyntaxError) as error:
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raise unsupported_media_type("Повреждённое изображение") from error
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with _decoders:
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try:
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with Image.open(path) as image:
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image.load()
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except (UnidentifiedImageError, OSError, ValueError, SyntaxError) as error:
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raise unsupported_media_type("Повреждённое изображение") from error
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def cleanup(path: str | None) -> None:
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if not path:
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return
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try:
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os.unlink(path)
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except FileNotFoundError:
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return
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except OSError:
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return
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