The review of track 2 found that a pass without --deep released the
quarantine of a missing or resized attachment as soon as an object of
the same size reappeared, without checking its SHA-256; that the keyset
read an empty last page, one SQL request more than the spec promised;
that the discarded intents of a pass never reached the audit journal;
that the entry point duplicated the S3 client wiring and printed a
traceback for any failure other than Unavailable; and that the cost
matrix stopped at 30k while the preregistered H2 was about 100k.
The change hashes the object of a quarantined row before releasing it,
reads page + 1 rows, assembles the reconciler with dishka and publishes
its events, turns any pass failure into reconcile.failed, links the
injected orphans to the found ones by key and measures up to 100k.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01V1d3RLHNBBMA6UqBLLJv27