chore: перенос решения lab2 (src, миграции, student-tests, Dockerfile, compose, lock) без изменений

Исходная точка lab3: код из solution/bvt2302-bodanyuk лабы 2, коммит ef44e48
(PR mtusi2026/mtusi2026lab2#42 принят). README, COURSE, contracts/ и tests/
преподавателя не тронуты; к Makefile дописан студенческий раздел lab2,
.env.example — версия lab2. Исследование трека 2 lab2 (bench/track2) не переносилось.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Alexey Bodanyuk
2026-10-16 13:02:13 +03:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5.5
parent 0ab3a341aa
commit 4f6cfda37a
42 changed files with 3702 additions and 3 deletions
+13 -3
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@@ -5,9 +5,19 @@ APP_PORT=8080
APP_ENV=lab APP_ENV=lab
SESSION_TTL_SECONDS=3600 SESSION_TTL_SECONDS=3600
# Choose credentials locally. File paths contain no secret values. # Choose credentials locally. File paths contain no secret values.
# The files are created by `python scripts/init_secrets.py` and mounted by compose as secrets.
DATABASE_URL_FILE=/run/secrets/database_url DATABASE_URL_FILE=/run/secrets/database_url
# Optional on 3, required use on 4 in lab2; Redis OR Valkey: # Optional on 3, required use on 4 in lab2; Redis OR Valkey:
SESSION_STORE=postgres # valkey = sessions live only in Valkey (AOF, appendfsync always); postgres = table `sessions`.
SESSION_STORE=valkey
CACHE_URL_FILE=/run/secrets/cache_url CACHE_URL_FILE=/run/secrets/cache_url
API_REPLICAS=2 # Additional settings of this implementation (defaults shown; all optional):
IDEMPOTENCY_TTL_SECONDS=86400 LOG_LEVEL=info
DB_POOL_MIN=1
DB_POOL_MAX=10
DB_TIMEOUT_SECONDS=3
CACHE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS=0.5
PASSWORD_HASH_CONCURRENCY=2
DOCS_ENABLED=true
# Host port of the API (compose publishes it on 127.0.0.1 only)
APP_PUBLISH_PORT=8080
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# LF everywhere: identical files on Windows/Linux and inside `git archive | docker build -`.
* text=auto eol=lf
*.png binary
# cmd.exe expects CRLF in batch files.
*.cmd text eol=crlf
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@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
name: Application (lab2)
on: [push, pull_request]
permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
app:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 30
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: actions/setup-python@v5
with:
python-version: '3.13'
- name: Synthetic secrets and env (CI only, never committed)
run: python scripts/init_secrets.py && cp .env.example .env
- name: Build, migrate, start and wait for healthy services
run: docker compose --env-file .env up -d --build --wait
- name: Contract and public smoke
run: make check test PYTHON=python
- name: Persistence across restart of API and stores
run: make test-persistence ACTION_SCRIPT=scripts/restart.sh PYTHON=python
- name: Own tests (unit + stand, failures restored in finally)
run: |
python -m pip install --require-hashes --no-deps -r requirements.txt
python -m pip install -r requirements-test.txt
make student-test PYTHON=python
- name: Logs
if: always()
run: docker compose logs --tail 100
- name: Remove CI stand and its synthetic data
if: always()
run: docker compose down -v
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# syntax=docker/dockerfile:1
# Messenger API, lab 2 (PostgreSQL + Valkey). Built by compose.yaml (services api, migrate).
#
# Python is interpreted, so there is no separate compile stage; the image
# contains only the interpreter, locked dependencies and the source code.
# Base image is pinned by version AND digest (python 3.13.16, Debian 12 bookworm).
FROM python:3.13.16-slim-bookworm@sha256:a1165e272e578941b84abc79e4ab38a0305cd12803a5c4247979ac7655f4d641
ENV PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 \
PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1 \
PIP_NO_CACHE_DIR=1 \
PIP_DISABLE_PIP_VERSION_CHECK=1
WORKDIR /app
# 1. Dependencies first (layer cache survives source edits). Every package,
# including transitive ones, is pinned with sha256 hashes in requirements.txt;
# --no-deps guarantees nothing outside the lock file is installed.
COPY requirements.txt ./
RUN pip install --root-user-action=ignore --require-hashes --no-deps -r requirements.txt
# 2. Unprivileged runtime user. Code stays owned by root, so the process
# cannot modify its own code.
RUN groupadd --system --gid 10001 app \
&& useradd --system --uid 10001 --gid app --no-create-home --shell /usr/sbin/nologin app
COPY src/ ./src/
# Versioned SQL migrations, applied by `python -m messenger.migrate` (compose service migrate).
COPY migrations/ ./migrations/
# Course contract, served read-only at /openapi.json for Swagger UI (/docs).
COPY contracts/openapi.json ./contracts/openapi.json
# Non-secret defaults; compose.yaml passes the rest. Passwords come only as files
# (DATABASE_URL_FILE / CACHE_URL_FILE -> Docker secrets), never as ENV or COPY.
ENV PYTHONPATH=/app/src \
APP_HOST=0.0.0.0 \
APP_PORT=8080 \
APP_ENV=lab \
LOG_LEVEL=info \
SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT_SECONDS=8 \
DOCS_ENABLED=true \
SESSION_TTL_SECONDS=3600 \
DATABASE_URL_FILE=/run/secrets/database_url
USER app:app
EXPOSE 8080
STOPSIGNAL SIGTERM
HEALTHCHECK --interval=10s --timeout=3s --start-period=5s --retries=3 \
CMD ["python", "-m", "messenger.healthcheck"]
# Exec form: the Python server is PID 1 and receives SIGTERM directly (no shell in between).
CMD ["python", "-m", "messenger"]
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@@ -28,3 +28,38 @@ test-persistence:
test-failover: test-failover:
@test -n "$(ACTION_SCRIPT)" || (echo "Set ACTION_SCRIPT to your implemented executable stop-one hook"; exit 2) @test -n "$(ACTION_SCRIPT)" || (echo "Set ACTION_SCRIPT to your implemented executable stop-one hook"; exit 2)
$(PYTHON) tests/resilience.py --mode failover --action-script "$(ACTION_SCRIPT)" --base-url "$(BASE_URL)" $(TLS_ARGS) $(PYTHON) tests/resilience.py --mode failover --action-script "$(ACTION_SCRIPT)" --base-url "$(BASE_URL)" $(TLS_ARGS)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Student solution (lab 2, Python). On Windows without make run the commands from
# REPORT.md directly (public tests there need PYTHONUTF8=1; restart hook: scripts/restart.cmd).
.PHONY: secrets up down logs ps migrate student-test unit-test explain
secrets:
$(PYTHON) scripts/init_secrets.py
# Build, apply migrations (service migrate) and wait until every service is healthy.
up: secrets
docker compose up -d --build --wait
# Safe stop: containers stop, named volumes (data) stay.
down:
docker compose down
logs:
docker compose logs --tail 50 api
ps:
docker compose ps
migrate:
docker compose run --rm migrate
# Own tests: unit + black-box against the running stand (needs requirements*.txt in a venv).
student-test:
$(PYTHON) -m pytest student-tests -v
unit-test:
$(PYTHON) -m pytest student-tests -m "not stack" -q
explain:
$(PYTHON) scripts/explain_history.py --output evidence/explain-history.txt
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# Lab 2 stand: API + PostgreSQL + Valkey. Start from a clean clone:
# python scripts/init_secrets.py # once: random local credentials into ./secrets (git-ignored)
# cp .env.example .env # optional overrides
# docker compose up -d --build --wait
# Images are pinned by version AND digest. Passwords are passed only as secret files.
name: mtusi-lab2
x-api-env: &api-env
APP_ENV: ${APP_ENV:-lab}
LOG_LEVEL: ${LOG_LEVEL:-info}
SESSION_TTL_SECONDS: ${SESSION_TTL_SECONDS:-3600}
SESSION_STORE: ${SESSION_STORE:-valkey}
DATABASE_URL_FILE: /run/secrets/database_url
CACHE_URL_FILE: /run/secrets/cache_url
DB_POOL_MIN: ${DB_POOL_MIN:-1}
DB_POOL_MAX: ${DB_POOL_MAX:-10}
DB_TIMEOUT_SECONDS: ${DB_TIMEOUT_SECONDS:-3}
CACHE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS: ${CACHE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS:-0.5}
PASSWORD_HASH_CONCURRENCY: ${PASSWORD_HASH_CONCURRENCY:-2}
DOCS_ENABLED: ${DOCS_ENABLED:-true}
services:
postgres:
image: postgres:18.6-bookworm@sha256:afc7e2d441324c0388fa80c3d24f733b4194a4eb7f47dd8ee2b08eb1a24a647c
environment:
POSTGRES_USER: messenger
POSTGRES_DB: messenger
POSTGRES_PASSWORD_FILE: /run/secrets/postgres_password
secrets: [postgres_password]
volumes:
- pgdata:/var/lib/postgresql # PostgreSQL 18 image keeps PGDATA under this path
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "pg_isready -U messenger -d messenger -q"]
interval: 2s
timeout: 3s
retries: 30
start_period: 10s
stop_grace_period: 30s # clean shutdown checkpoint instead of crash recovery
restart: unless-stopped
valkey:
image: valkey/valkey:8.1.3-bookworm@sha256:fea8b3e67b15729d4bb70589eb03367bab9ad1ee89c876f54327fc7c6e618571
# The password goes into a config include readable only by the valkey user,
# so it never appears in the process arguments. docker-entrypoint.sh drops root.
command:
- sh
- -c
- >-
umask 077 &&
printf 'requirepass %s\n' "$$(cat /run/secrets/valkey_password)" > /tmp/requirepass.conf &&
chown valkey /tmp/requirepass.conf &&
exec docker-entrypoint.sh valkey-server /etc/valkey/valkey.conf
secrets: [valkey_password]
volumes:
- ./infra/valkey/valkey.conf:/etc/valkey/valkey.conf:ro
- valkeydata:/data
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "REDISCLI_AUTH=\"$$(cat /run/secrets/valkey_password)\" valkey-cli ping | grep -q PONG"]
interval: 2s
timeout: 3s
retries: 30
start_period: 5s
restart: unless-stopped
migrate:
build: .
image: mtusi-messenger:lab2
command: ["python", "-m", "messenger.migrate"]
environment:
DATABASE_URL_FILE: /run/secrets/database_url
secrets: [database_url]
depends_on:
postgres:
condition: service_healthy
healthcheck:
disable: true
restart: "no"
api:
build: .
image: mtusi-messenger:lab2
environment: *api-env
secrets: [database_url, cache_url]
ports:
- "127.0.0.1:${APP_PUBLISH_PORT:-8080}:8080" # only on localhost of the host
depends_on:
postgres:
condition: service_healthy
valkey:
condition: service_healthy
migrate:
condition: service_completed_successfully
stop_grace_period: 10s
restart: unless-stopped
volumes:
pgdata:
valkeydata:
secrets:
postgres_password:
file: ./secrets/postgres_password
valkey_password:
file: ./secrets/valkey_password
database_url:
file: ./secrets/database_url
cache_url:
file: ./secrets/cache_url
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# Модель данных lab2
Схема: [migrations/0001_init.sql](../migrations/0001_init.sql). Источник истины для пользователей, чатов, участников и сообщений — PostgreSQL 18. Для сессий источник истины — хранилище, выбранное через `SESSION_STORE`. По умолчанию это Valkey с AOF, его можно переключить на таблицу `sessions` в PostgreSQL.
## Таблицы и ограничения
| Таблица | Ключ | Ограничения | Зачем |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `users` | `id uuid` | `UNIQUE (username)`, `CHECK` формата username, длина `display_name` | уникальность имени держит БД, а не код: гонку регистрации разрешает уникальный индекс |
| `chats` | `id uuid` | FK `created_by → users`, длина `title` | `last_message_at` — «часы» чата для упорядочивания сообщений |
| `chat_members` | `(chat_id, user_id)` | FK на `chats` и `users`, `UNIQUE (chat_id, position)` | `position` хранит порядок `member_ids`; `chat_created_at` — копия времени чата для keyset-списка чатов |
| `messages` | `id uuid` | FK `(chat_id, sender_id) → chat_members`, длина `text` | отправитель обязан быть участником — это гарантирует сама БД |
| `sessions` | `token_hash bytea` | FK `user_id → users`, длина хеша 32 байта | хранится SHA-256 токена; сам токен не хранится нигде |
| `schema_migrations` | `version` | checksum файла | какие миграции применены; изменённую задним числом миграцию мигратор не применит |
**Почему `bytea` для текста.** Контракт разрешает символ U+0000, а тип `text` в PostgreSQL не может содержать байт NUL (`DataError`). Поэтому `display_name`, `title` и `text` хранятся как байты UTF-8. Длину в code points проверяет API, а `CHECK` в байтах — страховка (1 code point ≤ 4 байта).
## Индексы и запросы
- `messages_chat_keyset (chat_id, created_at, id)`. Первая страница — `WHERE chat_id=$1 ORDER BY created_at, id LIMIT n`, следующая — `WHERE chat_id=$1 AND (created_at, id) > ($2, $3) ORDER BY ... LIMIT n`. Сравнение строк `(created_at, id) > (...)` попадает в `Index Cond`: поиск начинается прямо с позиции cursor и читает только `n+1` строк. Запросов два, а не один с `($2 IS NULL OR ...)`: иначе при generic plan условие cursor уходит в `Filter`, и поздняя страница сканирует всю историю чата до неё.
- `chat_members_user_keyset (user_id, chat_created_at, chat_id)` — список чатов пользователя тем же keyset-способом.
- `users_username_key` — вход по username и уникальность.
- `sessions_expires_at` — очистка истёкших сессий.
## Транзакционные границы
| Операция | Транзакция | Что гарантирует |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Регистрация | один `INSERT` | `UniqueViolation` → 409; ровно одна строка при гонке |
| Создание чата | `INSERT chats` → `INSERT chat_members` (все участники одним запросом) → `COMMIT` | неизвестный участник вызывает FK-ошибку **после** вставки чата; откат удаляет и чат, и частичное членство |
| Сообщение | проверка членства → `UPDATE chats SET last_message_at = greatest(clock_timestamp(), last_message_at + 1 мкс) RETURNING` → `INSERT messages` → `COMMIT` | строка чата заблокирована до конца транзакции, поэтому писатели одного чата идут по очереди. Время сообщений строго растёт **в порядке коммитов**: страница по cursor не пропустит сообщение, закоммиченное «задним числом» |
| Вход | `SELECT` пользователя, проверка Argon2id, запись сессии | неверный пароль ничего не пишет |
| Logout | `DELETE` сессии (или `DEL` в Valkey) | повтор с тем же токеном — 401 |
Чтение истории не требует snapshot между HTTP-запросами (так в контракте): новое сообщение появится на следующей странице. Список чатов сортируется по `chats.created_at = clock_timestamp()` без блокировки. Два чата, создаваемые одновременно, могут закоммититься не в порядке времени. Тогда у обхода, который уже начался, такой чат может оказаться «до» cursor; новый обход его увидит. Чаты создаются редко, поэтому мы не сериализуем их глобальным замком; это ограничение описано в REPORT.md.
## Сессии
- Токен: `secrets.token_urlsafe(32)` — 256 бит случайности, в ответе 43 символа. В хранилище лежит только SHA-256 токена. Для случайного 256-битного значения быстрого хеша достаточно, медленный KDF нужен только для низкоэнтропийных паролей.
- `SESSION_STORE=valkey` (по умолчанию): ключ `session:<sha256-hex>`, значение `{user_id, expires_at}`. Срок жизни задаётся абсолютным `PXAT expires_at`, поэтому рестарт его не продлевает. Включён `appendonly yes` + `appendfsync always`: подтверждённые вход и logout сохраняются до ответа клиенту. Valkey — **единственное** хранилище сессий, это не кэш над PostgreSQL. Поэтому нет второй копии, которая могла бы «оживить» отозванный токен после отказа. Если Valkey недоступен, проверить сессию нельзя: защищённые запросы и logout получают 503, анонимный доступ не открывается.
- `SESSION_STORE=postgres`: таблица `sessions`, проверка `expires_at > now()` в запросе.
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# Шпаргалка к защите ЛР 2
Отчёт с доказательствами — [REPORT.md](../REPORT.md), модель данных — [DATA_MODEL.md](DATA_MODEL.md).
## Что изменилось по сравнению с lab1
| Было в lab1 | Стало в lab2 | Где |
| --- | --- | --- |
| словари в памяти (`store.py`) | PostgreSQL 18, данные переживают рестарт | [repo.py](../src/messenger/repo.py), [migrations/0001_init.sql](../migrations/0001_init.sql) |
| `X-User-Id` | вход по `Basic` → opaque `Bearer` с expiry, logout | [authhdr.py](../src/messenger/authhdr.py), [sessions.py](../src/messenger/sessions.py), [app.py](../src/messenger/app.py) |
| нет паролей | Argon2id (m=19 MiB, t=2, p=1) в отдельном потоке | [passwords.py](../src/messenger/passwords.py) |
| `threading.Lock` + свой счётчик времени | блокировка строки чата `UPDATE chats … RETURNING` в транзакции | `add_message` в repo.py |
| `bisect` по списку | индекс `(chat_id, created_at, id)` и row-comparison в `Index Cond` | `HISTORY_AFTER` в repo.py |
| один контейнер | `compose.yaml`: postgres, valkey, migrate, api; secrets-файлы; named volumes | [compose.yaml](../compose.yaml) |
Что осталось из lab1: формат ошибок и `X-Request-Id`, строгая валидация, cursor (теперь с проверкой диапазона времени), JSON-логи, graceful SIGTERM, healthcheck, Swagger на `/docs`.
## Путь запроса `GET /chats/{id}/messages?cursor=…` в lab2
1. `parse_bearer`: в заголовке ровно `Bearer <43 символа>`, иначе 401 с `WWW-Authenticate: Bearer`.
2. `sessions.user_id_for`: в Valkey ключ `session:<sha256(token)>`, проверка `expires_at`. Valkey недоступен — 503, нет ключа — 401.
3. `path_uuid` → 400; `ensure_member` (`SELECT 1 FROM chat_members …`) → 404 для чужого чата.
4. `cursor.decode` → `(время в мкс, id)`, привязка к чату → иначе 400.
5. `HISTORY_AFTER`: `WHERE chat_id=$1 AND (created_at, id) > ($2,$3) ORDER BY … LIMIT 51` — индекс начинает чтение прямо с cursor.
6. Каждая работа с БД — `db.run(...)`: отдельная задача, транзакция, дедлайн 3 с. Отказ или зависание БД → 503 ровно через дедлайн.
## Вопросы из README
**Что подтверждает COMMIT и какие гарантии зависят от настройки durability?**
COMMIT возвращается клиенту, когда запись транзакции в WAL сброшена на диск (`fsync=on`, `synchronous_commit=on`, это значения по умолчанию). Транзакция переживёт падение процесса PostgreSQL или ОС: при старте PostgreSQL проиграет WAL. От настроек зависит:
- `synchronous_commit=off` — ответ приходит раньше сброса, и последние ~0,6 с подтверждённых транзакций могут пропасть (база при этом останется целой);
- `fsync=off` — после сбоя возможна порча данных;
- кэш записи диска, который «врёт» о сбросе, ломает и то, и другое.
COMMIT на одном узле не защищает от потери самого диска или хоста: для этого нужны реплики (`synchronous_standby_names`) или резервные копии с архивом WAL (трек 2).
У Valkey свой аналог — `appendfsync`:
- у нас `always`: fsync до ответа, ничего не теряется;
- `everysec`: можно потерять до 1 с записей;
- `no`: когда сбросить на диск, решает ОС.
**Где хранятся сессии и что будет после flush/restart Redis (Valkey)?**
По умолчанию (`SESSION_STORE=valkey`) сессия существует **только** в Valkey: ключ `session:<sha256>`, значение `{user_id, expires_at}` и абсолютный срок `PXAT`.
- **Restart:** Valkey перечитывает AOF с volume, сессии на месте (тест `make test-persistence`). TTL не продлевается.
- **FLUSHALL** или потеря volume: все сессии исчезают, все пользователи получают 401 и входят заново. Отказ безопасный: доступ не выдаётся никому.
- **Valkey недоступен:** 503 на защищённые запросы и на logout. Анонимный доступ не открывается.
Почему не кэш над PostgreSQL: у одной копии нечему расходиться. У студентов с кэшем отозванный токен «оживал» после восстановления Redis, у нас такой ситуации быть не может (тест `test_logout_during_valkey_outage_is_never_lost`). Альтернатива `SESSION_STORE=postgres` хранит сессии в таблице `sessions`.
**Чем аутентификация отличается от доступа к конкретному чату?**
- **Аутентификация** — кто ты: действительная Bearer-сессия → `user_id`. Нет или недействительна → 401.
- **Авторизация доступа** — можно ли этому пользователю этот чат: есть ли строка в `chat_members`. Нет → 404, а не 403, чтобы не раскрывать существование чужого чата.
Сначала всегда аутентификация, потом доступ. Отправитель сообщения берётся из сессии, а БД сама проверяет `FOREIGN KEY (chat_id, sender_id) → chat_members`.
**Почему hash пароля и быстрый checksum имеют разные задачи?**
- **Checksum или быстрый хеш (SHA-256)** — контроль целостности и быстрый поиск. Он должен быть быстрым.
- **Хеш пароля** — защита низкоэнтропийного секрета на случай утечки базы. Он должен быть медленным, с солью и memory-hard (Argon2id), чтобы перебор словаря стоил дорого и не ускорялся на GPU.
Токен сессии — 256 бит случайности, перебрать его невозможно. Поэтому для токена хватает SHA-256: храним хеш, чтобы утечка базы не дала готовых токенов. Для пароля SHA-256 нельзя: миллиарды попыток в секунду на GPU.
## Частые ловушки (на чём преподаватель ловил других) и наш ответ
| Проверка преподавателя | У нас | Тест |
| --- | --- | --- |
| logout при упавшем Redis → после восстановления токен снова 200 | logout при упавшем Valkey = 503 (ничего не отозвано); после восстановления logout → 401, и после рестарта Valkey и API тоже 401 | `test_logout_during_valkey_outage_is_never_lost` |
| истёкшая сессия живёт в кэше | expiry проверяется при каждом чтении, ключ живёт до абсолютного `PXAT` | `test_short_ttl_expires[valkey/postgres]` |
| `docker pause postgres` → запрос висит 8+ с | клиентский дедлайн в отдельной задаче: 503 через 3,0 с | `test_postgres_failure[pause]` |
| БД упала → 401 вместо 503 | 503 `unavailable`, анонимный — 401 | `test_postgres_failure`, `test_postgres_session_store` |
| cursor в `Filter` при generic plan | два запроса без `IS NULL OR`, cursor в `Index Cond` | `test_explain.py`, `evidence/explain-history.txt` |
| `\u0000` → 500 | текст в `bytea`, NUL сохраняется | `test_unicode_limits_are_code_points_and_nul_is_stored` |
| пароль из пробелов, `Basic é` → 500 | 400 и 401 | `test_bad_password_on_registration_is_400`, `test_malformed_basic_is_401_not_500` |
| гонка регистрации считает любые ошибки за 409 | проверяются коды: ровно `[201] + [409]*7`, в БД 1 строка | `test_registration_race_exactly_one_201_and_seven_409` |
| rollback «до первого INSERT» | чат вставляется первым, FK участника падает после; `n_tup_ins` вырос, строк нет | `test_create_chat_rolls_back_after_the_chat_row_was_inserted` |
| `SESSION_TTL_SECONDS` не доходит до контейнера | compose передаёт его из `.env`, тест читает `printenv` внутри контейнера | `test_short_ttl_expires` |
| нет команды создания secrets | `python scripts/init_secrets.py` (идемпотентно) | раздел «Запуск из чистого clone» |
## Трек 2 — коротко
- **Гипотеза.** С индексом `(chat_id, created_at, id)` и keyset-запросом стоимость страницы не зависит от размера чата и позиции. С индексом только по `chat_id` нужна сортировка всего чата, с OFFSET — чтение всего префикса. Каждый индекс удорожает запись.
- **Методика.** Отдельный PostgreSQL (2 CPU / 2 GiB), 121 120 сообщений, чаты 60 000 / 15 000 / 2 000 / 80. pgbench с prepared statements; генератор нагрузки — в своём контейнере. 3 повтора. Плюс EXPLAIN для поздней страницы.
- **Backup.** `pg_dump -Fc` живой БД во время записи через API → новый контейнер и новый volume → `pg_restore` → сверка MD5 по каждому чату и по первым/последним сообщениям → наше же API на восстановленной БД читает чат после нового входа.
- **RPO и RTO.** `pg_dump` — снимок на момент старта. Всё подтверждённое после старта дампа в копию не попадает; это и есть граница потери данных (на практике — время с последнего дампа). RTO — время `pg_restore` с перестройкой индексов плюс переключение приложения. Чтобы уменьшить RPO до секунд, нужен архив WAL и PITR или реплика.
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# Запуск на ноутбуке с Windows и сценарий защиты
Все команды — в **PowerShell**, из папки проекта. Внутри одного окна PowerShell переменные `$env:...` действуют до его закрытия.
## 1. Что установить один раз
| Программа | Зачем | Важно |
| --- | --- | --- |
| [Git for Windows](https://git-scm.com/download/win) | clone и Git Bash | ставить в путь по умолчанию `C:\Program Files\Git`: оттуда `scripts\restart.cmd` запускает `restart.sh` |
| [Docker Desktop](https://www.docker.com/products/docker-desktop/) | PostgreSQL, Valkey, API | backend WSL 2; в BIOS включена виртуализация; после установки перезагрузка |
| [Python 3.12+](https://www.python.org/downloads/windows/) | secrets, публичные тесты, свои тесты | галочка **Add python.exe to PATH**. Если `python` открывает Microsoft Store — отключить «Псевдонимы выполнения приложений» для python в настройках Windows |
Проверка:
```powershell
git --version; docker version --format '{{.Server.Version}}'; docker compose version; python --version
```
Docker Desktop должен быть **запущен** (кит в трее не мигает).
## 2. Развернуть проект (дома, заранее — нужен интернет)
```powershell
git clone https://gitea.privcloud.tech/wfa/mtusi2026lab2 mtusi2026lab2
cd mtusi2026lab2
git checkout solution/bvt2302-bodanyuk
python scripts\init_secrets.py
Copy-Item .env.example .env
docker compose --env-file .env up -d --build --wait
```
Первый запуск скачивает образы (~700 МБ) и собирает API — 3–10 минут. Сделайте это **дома**: в аудитории сеть может быть медленной. Последняя команда завершается, когда все сервисы `healthy`.
Проверка в браузере: http://127.0.0.1:8080/health/ready → `{"status":"ok"}`, Swagger — http://127.0.0.1:8080/docs.
Окружение для своих тестов (один раз):
```powershell
python -m venv .venv
.venv\Scripts\python -m pip install --require-hashes --no-deps -r requirements.txt
.venv\Scripts\python -m pip install -r requirements-test.txt -r requirements-dev.txt
```
Активировать venv не нужно: везде вызывается `.venv\Scripts\python` напрямую, поэтому политика выполнения PowerShell не мешает.
## 3. Перед защитой (в аудитории)
```powershell
cd mtusi2026lab2
docker compose up -d --wait # если стенд был остановлен
$env:PYTHONUTF8 = "1" # публичные тесты читают UTF-8 JSON
python tests\smoke.py # PASS: lab2 public API scenario
```
## 4. Сценарий защиты из README — команды по шагам
**Шаг 1. Миграции к пустому volume, пользователи, вход, сообщение.**
```powershell
docker compose down -v # стереть учебные данные (volumes)
docker compose up -d --wait # postgres и valkey пустые -> migrate применяет схему
docker compose logs migrate # "0001_init: applied"
docker compose run --rm migrate # повтор: "already applied, skipped"
```
Дальше в Swagger (http://127.0.0.1:8080/docs):
1. `POST /api/v1/users` — создать двух пользователей (пароль 12+ символов).
2. **Authorize → basicAuth**: логин и пароль первого; `POST /api/v1/auth/sessions` — скопировать `token`.
3. **Authorize → bearerAuth**: вставить токен.
4. `POST /api/v1/chats` (в `member_ids` — оба id) → `POST /api/v1/chats/{chat_id}/messages` → `GET` истории.
**Шаги 2–3. Перезапуск API и хранилищ с сохранением volumes, тот же токен; logout → 401; короткий TTL.**
```powershell
python tests\resilience.py --mode persistence --action-script scripts\restart.cmd # PASS
docker compose ps # у api, postgres, valkey свежее время запуска
```
В Swagger тот же токен по-прежнему работает. `DELETE /api/v1/auth/sessions/current` → 204, затем любой запрос → 401.
Короткий TTL:
```powershell
$env:SESSION_TTL_SECONDS = "2"; docker compose up -d --wait api
docker compose exec api printenv SESSION_TTL_SECONDS # 2
# в Swagger: войти, сразу GET /users/me -> 200, через 3 секунды -> 401
Remove-Item Env:SESSION_TTL_SECONDS; docker compose up -d --wait api # вернуть 3600
```
**Шаг 4. Роль Valkey, план SQL, ошибка зависимости.**
```powershell
# Сессии лежат только в Valkey: ключи session:<sha256 токена>, самих токенов там нет
# (без двойных кавычек внутри: PowerShell 5.1 ломает их при передаче в docker)
docker compose exec valkey sh -c 'REDISCLI_AUTH=$(cat /run/secrets/valkey_password) valkey-cli --scan --pattern ''session:*'''
# План: поздняя страница по индексу (Index Cond) против IS NULL OR и OFFSET, 20 000 сообщений
.venv\Scripts\python scripts\explain_history.py
# Ошибка зависимости: с действующим токеном -> 503, без токена -> 401, после старта всё работает
docker compose stop valkey # или: docker compose pause postgres
# в Swagger: GET /users/me -> 503 unavailable; GET /health/ready -> 503
docker compose start valkey # или: docker compose unpause postgres
```
Всё то же автоматически, с восстановлением в `finally`, около 1 минуты:
```powershell
.venv\Scripts\python -m pytest student-tests\test_failures.py -v
```
**Трек 2 вживую.**
```powershell
.venv\Scripts\python bench\track2\backup_restore.py --repeats 1 # ~1 мин: dump во время записи -> restore в новый контейнер -> сверка
```
Скрипт печатает время дампа и восстановления, `reconciled: true` и сколько сообщений записано после снимка (RPO). Полный замер планов идёт ~25 минут, поэтому на защите показывайте готовые результаты: `evidence\track2\summary.md` и `evidence\track2\plans.png`. При желании можно запустить `.venv\Scripts\python bench\track2\index_sizes.py` (~2 мин).
**Все свои тесты** (~3,5 мин): `.venv\Scripts\python -m pytest student-tests -v`.
## 5. Если что-то пошло не так
| Симптом | Что сделать |
| --- | --- |
| `error during connect … dockerDesktopLinuxEngine` | Docker Desktop не запущен — запустить и подождать минуту |
| `port is already allocated` на 8080 | в `.env` поставить `APP_PUBLISH_PORT=8081`; дальше тесты с `--base-url http://127.0.0.1:8081` (smoke и resilience), для pytest — `$env:BASE_URL="http://127.0.0.1:8081"` |
| `secrets/... not found` при `up` | не выполнен `python scripts\init_secrets.py` |
| `UnicodeDecodeError` в `tests\*.py` | не задан `$env:PYTHONUTF8 = "1"` |
| `restart.cmd`: «не удаётся найти путь» | Git установлен не в `C:\Program Files\Git` — поправить путь в `scripts\restart.cmd` |
| api `unhealthy` после сна ноутбука | `docker compose restart` и подождать `docker compose ps` |
| нужно начать с чистого листа | `docker compose down -v` (удаляет учебные данные) → `docker compose up -d --wait` |
Остановить стенд после защиты: `docker compose down` (данные сохранятся) или `docker compose down -v` (данные удаляются).
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# Valkey is the single store of sessions (SESSION_STORE=valkey), so it must be durable.
# AOF with fsync on every write: a confirmed login or logout survives a crash/restart,
# a logout can never be lost and "resurrect" a token. Sessions are small and rare
# writes, so the fsync cost is acceptable here (see REPORT.md).
appendonly yes
appendfsync always
appenddirname "appendonlydir"
# RDB snapshots are not needed on top of AOF.
save ""
dir /data
port 6379
protected-mode yes
# Sessions are never evicted silently: if memory is full, writes fail and login returns 503.
maxmemory 128mb
maxmemory-policy noeviction
# Password, generated by scripts/init_secrets.py and written here at container start.
include /tmp/requirepass.conf
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-- 0001: initial schema of the messenger (lab 2). Design rationale: docs/DATA_MODEL.md
-- Applied once by `python -m messenger.migrate`; the version is recorded in schema_migrations.
-- User-supplied free text (display_name, title, message text) is stored as UTF-8 in BYTEA:
-- the contract allows U+0000, and PostgreSQL TEXT cannot contain NUL bytes.
-- Lengths are limited in code points by the API; the CHECKs below are byte-level safety nets
-- (one code point is at most 4 bytes in UTF-8).
CREATE TABLE users (
id uuid PRIMARY KEY,
username text NOT NULL,
display_name bytea NOT NULL,
password_hash text NOT NULL, -- Argon2id PHC string, never the password
created_at timestamptz NOT NULL DEFAULT clock_timestamp(),
CONSTRAINT users_username_key UNIQUE (username),
CONSTRAINT users_username_format CHECK (username ~ '^[a-z0-9_]{3,32}$'),
CONSTRAINT users_display_name_len CHECK (octet_length(display_name) BETWEEN 1 AND 400)
);
CREATE TABLE chats (
id uuid PRIMARY KEY,
title bytea NOT NULL,
created_by uuid NOT NULL REFERENCES users (id),
created_at timestamptz NOT NULL DEFAULT clock_timestamp(),
-- Per-chat clock: created_at of the newest message. Updating this row serialises writers
-- of one chat, so message timestamps strictly increase in commit order (see DATA_MODEL.md).
last_message_at timestamptz,
CONSTRAINT chats_title_len CHECK (octet_length(title) BETWEEN 1 AND 400)
);
CREATE TABLE chat_members (
chat_id uuid NOT NULL REFERENCES chats (id),
user_id uuid NOT NULL REFERENCES users (id),
position smallint NOT NULL, -- order of member_ids sent by the creator
chat_created_at timestamptz NOT NULL, -- copy of chats.created_at for keyset listing
PRIMARY KEY (chat_id, user_id),
CONSTRAINT chat_members_position_key UNIQUE (chat_id, position)
);
-- GET /chats of one user: (user_id, created_at, id) range scan, no sort.
CREATE INDEX chat_members_user_keyset ON chat_members (user_id, chat_created_at, chat_id);
CREATE TABLE messages (
id uuid PRIMARY KEY,
chat_id uuid NOT NULL,
sender_id uuid NOT NULL,
text bytea NOT NULL,
created_at timestamptz NOT NULL,
-- The sender must be a member of this chat: enforced by the database, not only by the API.
CONSTRAINT messages_sender_is_member FOREIGN KEY (chat_id, sender_id)
REFERENCES chat_members (chat_id, user_id),
CONSTRAINT messages_text_len CHECK (octet_length(text) BETWEEN 1 AND 16000)
);
-- History page: WHERE chat_id = $1 AND (created_at, id) > ($2, $3) ORDER BY created_at, id LIMIT n
-- becomes an index range scan that starts exactly at the cursor.
CREATE INDEX messages_chat_keyset ON messages (chat_id, created_at, id);
-- Sessions for SESSION_STORE=postgres (the default store is Valkey; see docs/DATA_MODEL.md).
CREATE TABLE sessions (
token_hash bytea PRIMARY KEY, -- SHA-256 of the token; the token is not stored
user_id uuid NOT NULL REFERENCES users (id),
created_at timestamptz NOT NULL DEFAULT clock_timestamp(),
expires_at timestamptz NOT NULL,
CONSTRAINT sessions_token_hash_len CHECK (octet_length(token_hash) = 32)
);
CREATE INDEX sessions_expires_at ON sessions (expires_at);
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# Student tests (in-process, via Starlette TestClient). Runtime deps come from requirements.txt.
pytest==9.1.1
httpx2==2.13.1
jsonschema==4.26.0
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# Direct runtime dependencies. The pinned lock with hashes is requirements.txt:
# docker run --rm -v "$PWD:/w" -w /w python:3.13.16-slim-bookworm \
# sh -c "pip install -q pip-tools==7.6.1 && pip-compile --generate-hashes --strip-extras --no-emit-index-url -o requirements.txt requirements.in"
starlette==1.7.0
uvicorn==0.54.0
# Fast C parser/event loop used by uvicorn in the container (Linux only).
httptools==0.9.0
uvloop==0.23.0 ; sys_platform != "win32"
# PostgreSQL driver (libpq bundled in the binary wheel) and its async connection pool.
psycopg==3.3.6
psycopg-binary==3.3.6
psycopg-pool==3.3.3
# Valkey client (Valkey speaks the Redis protocol).
redis==8.1.0
# Argon2id password KDF.
argon2-cffi==25.1.0
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#
# This file is autogenerated by pip-compile with Python 3.13
# by the following command:
#
# pip-compile --generate-hashes --no-emit-index-url --no-index --output-file=requirements.txt --strip-extras requirements.in
#
anyio==4.15.1 \
--hash=sha256:6152fdbbf9a77fdec97731721bebf7c4c44f7c29b424b0065826173efc7ed101 \
--hash=sha256:9f28306018cbd6d329e64a36d58256edff76dd996fe423bc957326e578b82a94
# via starlette
argon2-cffi==25.1.0 \
--hash=sha256:694ae5cc8a42f4c4e2bf2ca0e64e51e23a040c6a517a85074683d3959e1346c1 \
--hash=sha256:fdc8b074db390fccb6eb4a3604ae7231f219aa669a2652e0f20e16ba513d5741
# via -r requirements.in
argon2-cffi-bindings==26.1.0 \
--hash=sha256:061a6919145bbf282ebf1f9c59d3135d4833c25313c8595c0d68cf7712ddfce2 \
--hash=sha256:0cc40f7b4050bb93eb67de95d2d759322fc7ce4930b9d645581ecf4913ec651e \
--hash=sha256:151dfaad9de753f4af2a7854e707e4784f2acc434340ade64239c5b104b2d605 \
--hash=sha256:19423e5d7ac1cc354baab59eaabf18db2ec04ef6593b5abe5a34f323c4a8f87a \
--hash=sha256:19b562b1de4b9052ef1214a2821c44b6e6f22945daa102c32ae4eff929d8b6d8 \
--hash=sha256:1a0a29ed86960e44eaace7e081bdfab4f08b012fd96ec8edba71e2ad020939e4 \
--hash=sha256:1af817e84578ef8b7295ad17de0f9896e4c8520dbf2233c7aa5aa3d487256fc4 \
--hash=sha256:1b0bcac4d490a237e18cf91f57352920c29f77f2fa39efd0813fb81298bf17ba \
--hash=sha256:1d98e33bd8bd67d7206c124e200bf2229c4cfa8c9c19f7b44a897f0fc71837eb \
--hash=sha256:21ca0396fe5ec995dd54431c32698189666f9224810acfa752e50d2bd94d9df2 \
--hash=sha256:224865cbbcb7a2bd1356741dff12b0134df726b6d44bb7b500df8e303cbd9e81 \
--hash=sha256:242bb0cda2ae3650764fc194593d9ea45fc9e72729acd89778c7cfe184cec2a5 \
--hash=sha256:27f1821903e2ceadcb88ec2b45ef190897b7682449c772f4d9b53e42c520cf29 \
--hash=sha256:28524438cd3e723f25412f63d4fd516ff5bae9ae5aa56acbe2a1404398a0cf31 \
--hash=sha256:2b741888c93147444fdfc851abd81cc207f37f7f7da42062a00deb3888e57da8 \
--hash=sha256:2c36ff87b5dfaa477d0bd51e9d7f6abdae7c8955d2983c97419085d842154b3e \
--hash=sha256:34b7d9c24a4165a2c61cc8ae11d44d48c9ce2830fb536cb7914e11fdd9962728 \
--hash=sha256:49d525938467d52c923a890153c99087c9d5a937d1f6b585dbdba34ec82e397a \
--hash=sha256:4f84cdd868978d7b7350a566c254042d44216d9e37f241f3a6d3b1dfebeede35 \
--hash=sha256:62ff20cd130c956c7c9144d5fe35228f98b51c579b2439e988b27ef93e16c02a \
--hash=sha256:63505c71542a44b68b1e38060450fb006404170da375feb31af153e7f9c6205d \
--hash=sha256:6376d4b3aca039375ca8bf92f770da0ec424a1ce3a37077a8d3c557411aa56ca \
--hash=sha256:6a4e68eed961a8de6928d1c17ff3dc2a547e0e923c17f8f1cd79fb7bc9502f98 \
--hash=sha256:6ab674f668d5962a3a4136ae0812519b0f1586874263723a32181d60d64137e1 \
--hash=sha256:7014ab7e6f5d8511af92544667a0346ea6dfc314ea9a7cad1dba9fdb5c9a6e33 \
--hash=sha256:76ae29acace5d33355344612844d588e19deaaba4639d8bb01601e4b1418ef36 \
--hash=sha256:78de2d65e0b9ea7ce9d1b1c3e87297b2d7305a02c266ee2a2d6910daddd7ee69 \
--hash=sha256:9bacedc04b0402837586a17f0919e3dfdd95291f441f1f56bd80ec274c2840a1 \
--hash=sha256:a86c069c91a747a2c4e5c51473590aeb48172fff9b2130d23729a42d98665ecb \
--hash=sha256:ac82fc756a446b6ccd7139ce70efa9d8bbe541e7ad579a12dcb52764b7175c5f \
--hash=sha256:af11ac37a7c53dc16cb7950a6190851b0870fe218b6c60c0bb7ac355234e3083 \
--hash=sha256:b70225b5fd1e0d2ef4f7fd30d24658454535f0924dff0caca5dc08efbbbadfbb \
--hash=sha256:c49e853a3bef9dd10329f31f702e7fa9b5c58229ff9c2ff6d069efaf09177c08 \
--hash=sha256:ccaf0a46cbb380f1fd102a874e32aa629fd3cb0c0e94f4943fa1f6d5edc5dac6 \
--hash=sha256:d157ddfab1e8b21f2f1dedda9c09645d98b5ed0b667b0626be600a345d426440 \
--hash=sha256:d88e5f7e60f28ae0b0cc6b2f16c43e87cd642a196a86f85e0d8bb6fe016fc16d \
--hash=sha256:db0fcd827ca61622a01b220aadfbece01939acf53888f2cb98cd93e9b1e2c97e \
--hash=sha256:df612391feca41c44d20118f3b88d1b86419465cd1f5496859f715ca60ec2210 \
--hash=sha256:f0c3103fcff20183e593459cfea6e012281c0e76ae3ed8b5565ad1b92eac3990 \
--hash=sha256:f9c4420a7a864fe1b86ce35befc95b8e39fb852493b81cf798671ddc265de638 \
--hash=sha256:ffff613aaa9ce6236766e2fc6dc560bb5abde7a2e2416e3db1f9ae395a2b4dd4
# via argon2-cffi
cffi==2.1.1 \
--hash=sha256:046bfc24911b37851ee1b51aab8bffe713d89c68c6a057b09484ce9fd5f69b4e \
--hash=sha256:06c72bb76605a4b0cd0aad6930b69d4baf7dd5d806cfc409b824191099700e66 \
--hash=sha256:0beceaabe56af686895136a2de78db54ecd8e4046b236b8fd6d6cb61389e9bf2 \
--hash=sha256:154852545011f779917b11c78db2358d095da62a9a172b78ad0a583ee5adc0d0 \
--hash=sha256:194cffa889098ced9976c3fc6340305e43f6303657d298da55366907c05c22d6 \
--hash=sha256:19ee6127ee34de7d83ce3d371ebc5ed91addbdcc39f9ab15ce4eb35a4e534971 \
--hash=sha256:1a18a57b58cfb21fc28d72e876acf10eaed67a1ed96226f92af4df681d571c4c \
--hash=sha256:1aa5645c30469b09530c4ebca77ebf8f17618293c58f8549cb1a543a50236e7d \
--hash=sha256:1dea0e4d7d4f11f619fe8c1d76caf49e24405b4b5743c0e3be16a500ecd930c9 \
--hash=sha256:208f941bb9d18e768138677f0a6d2ce01f590df56043dda1df1535ac57c88517 \
--hash=sha256:210019b6c7cf07f081b4c54635c8cf744377001350e29cc0f81c4377b4797735 \
--hash=sha256:246fa40ce8645a614ff682e0b70f37134e460eaf93a775e0cbe3cca585a67a80 \
--hash=sha256:25792eac27877609e7bb06d42ff88278a6624fff2ba9bbb523c09616b117e80f \
--hash=sha256:27350daa11d4f10c540e6e89dada4c54feb7256ad03e9a4dc075ebad7ba360d1 \
--hash=sha256:28907ab9bfb6aa13184cfc17c6b8e1023c5ab6fd7076d8c20a35e59fe04f8f29 \
--hash=sha256:2ae64be792b8966f2c69538199728b290e34726562896df1e5dc8ffd8d8188e8 \
--hash=sha256:31348097ff5bbe827ccc41795d4dd099d9f0625e7def00ee653c137a490c2a6c \
--hash=sha256:3143d81e29e1e20a9ce10901ec369012947876596f75a222235965f2b7ae832e \
--hash=sha256:3222ba5d678f80a030e6afbcc33dc1ae5cb45facabb61cee2c7016b8432fde48 \
--hash=sha256:3311ed60d36f83378794e1009ac6258bafbf81f7888b4caa7b35a521e3f95813 \
--hash=sha256:334644fbac4eff73d985a17a91226df55d0f394160c4cfb880e084c8f7161cac \
--hash=sha256:34e261f78cb6ceaaa36f42f2613f4380d94d9c759a9c73c769ee6e0247364632 \
--hash=sha256:363e05fa78e15116c3c32c210ee36884fd6b9afa6d440e47112c3bd511d64cb6 \
--hash=sha256:398aff33cee2767e3e781d2554c54bd0dff386bb437581e0d8011fde1a942ec1 \
--hash=sha256:3d22a20b1fb1632cc72c22f95f7b0d2961c3e1c235f245ba4c606c4771035659 \
--hash=sha256:42a494cee34437f05546455144f2b5d9ac09b1face62bcfce597d2e521066688 \
--hash=sha256:42e2f76b9455f5a9a844f770bf3e200ed3da0e15f5df3db9c31fe80b04b3d004 \
--hash=sha256:42f6930c31dc7f50732c9ae793c2786c7b6b044195967bbdde40bb9be81c4cc0 \
--hash=sha256:456a61fa52d579ebf9df2e9552ead5129855dbaff6c1e5a9b1bc408809bdc062 \
--hash=sha256:471cee653ae88de62096552e6d24ccb4a5adb8c8c9f10b5054d0122c15bf2779 \
--hash=sha256:49cbc70e6542d4ccccb936558d1064a8012541e78f821f955cff24e357776c94 \
--hash=sha256:4a7c934f7360e8cd64fe9efadcbd10c7c6364f531e432b9a4bf5ccbc9e0e8b50 \
--hash=sha256:4be96343e422f2dfcd12ab5c9f5aebe03f82f737c6bffeca6830b3875cb44aab \
--hash=sha256:4f42141fc14250de6dde5ee7ea4432be017252d91f19c5ad043c084cea629cac \
--hash=sha256:507a24c282e0f42f8ed737cf048572cbf580468da5555764a8331735e9c736b6 \
--hash=sha256:51b31d1c98274844cfd7838ce00bfc27c7423a4dc00fc0772fc3331c2cc90676 \
--hash=sha256:58acb8ab8e295e6c5ea12f888cbb13cf21511ef2a3303a23f4325c29d17fe5c1 \
--hash=sha256:5a59cc1c4442bc3d5c703bf720b51138d0bfc173618807c9ee2490a7541dd3d9 \
--hash=sha256:5bb4e7ea95dcd6a014a6fef62e62467d67d8e582326443f3d68e71d6320a9fcf \
--hash=sha256:5c58fe613dc5e5336357eff555824a314d8e43282600435c8d1cb6a7a2fedd13 \
--hash=sha256:5e7cecbaadb83884793e05828cee59b210b24583b9c7425d0ba6a754fe22eb4e \
--hash=sha256:616f097f2fe415bc92a247f02e11f634e1f9e9a83d327e3c915c15089c87869e \
--hash=sha256:63bbfd5ded17c4840ac07cd8f1c21ba9d9708141f840b324f422f41b207e3973 \
--hash=sha256:64faea20f4e2613363a1a9b9c7dd73058f3ecd00133a511e72ad7c511658f527 \
--hash=sha256:661c298b4821edebead0c91edd2b00374d67ad7c5a1f7a91d4442633b79d6a72 \
--hash=sha256:68e62fe11f30d5ca8289242866f0a5291402d8529ca2178ab8afc5c9694ae890 \
--hash=sha256:6a8dddef476fab96d066d578fc88526767b836ab5ab21754e1d5bf3879c31c7c \
--hash=sha256:6e192623c49c94421616a5778fba35cf0d5a8d000650c1967ef4448ee5cdd990 \
--hash=sha256:7225e4514edb64eb6740324353e0da0711954fd8d7da4576755b1c6e09b697cd \
--hash=sha256:75f80557d1389eddbd0de2681f6a390a0c5338c31ddaa821381c203fc3fd50d9 \
--hash=sha256:770de9db11e84213beec501cfcaa013b019820ca881e03344dea5844f7876d94 \
--hash=sha256:7750c6449dff7864bb9bb27ddfb0267756189201a3afc911d82b3caacd70dfc3 \
--hash=sha256:7bde5e4cc5c10140859842b9d383af292b22639a4dffb725314baf45968cef80 \
--hash=sha256:7ce713ace7c0e4520535b42b77eaa742c16dab813978064913e5a3cf82973b41 \
--hash=sha256:7da0c5eff80f0197f3b3d1232ec5a682a9325f4ae9016a78f5f5ca35f9ced1f5 \
--hash=sha256:7dbb61fe3a7699468030f71bbe5f8a0e326a151daa91beb11a6fc1f980c55e1c \
--hash=sha256:811bd1e21d32de12efca32393a0ab3f5133b54fce9bd44b8bd77ab07da14bf6a \
--hash=sha256:8ef53b2de9bcb9197d31854256575d59dbac0cba72ac627bb291ef5eceb74be4 \
--hash=sha256:937c0052c05a31ca1daf18de3158eed4dbfcb9cc107adbea227728d647be701e \
--hash=sha256:9d2055050ea716bd38b7f7f1579c275386646b4894c155a3e2f3cd62ed41b7c6 \
--hash=sha256:9f8d177621de5cb38ee3e731eda45d421db093ec0739f46a5594babda7987a98 \
--hash=sha256:a2d7755bef5a12ed488f4ef1f1b69ee9191d7396083b755a5d2295f6edb4768b \
--hash=sha256:a48d62ab9d6f4f98c983223a547af44be6ca3691074c31cecced6facd3ba2dc1 \
--hash=sha256:a4f00aa42f75d6e4595e8866e748cc1705adc0cddfeb2ca86d0d03993d63ba03 \
--hash=sha256:a6e721d4b0e45d5b65e87534470e67b18dcd092c83f68fba09f152b9cbc061af \
--hash=sha256:a730a083190634c65cca36ba5f489531576ebd79bcd5c8e172130f6453127231 \
--hash=sha256:a931079504ecc49efed7744c476a5c343a92fabf66dec2db95edb1b2fdc770e2 \
--hash=sha256:aa9511c62d14da7aacc9b4bf51f3f697a621e83b2d6919008243c3aad168eea3 \
--hash=sha256:ab36d55f9ed2d067327667c2fea18dda018eb628dd6347aa01dda6cf1f5d3836 \
--hash=sha256:ad2c86c495b899d862ea0f4b42891b8713a3bd45dd4105c7fd51c2a72f39f3a5 \
--hash=sha256:aeae0e330c9f6acd681f647d46cefd30c29f93e3392882e792e82080c9691399 \
--hash=sha256:b0431303acaea1089ad4b3e9ce4e6518193def1118d4073ca848635ee4ea2e96 \
--hash=sha256:b5bdfd1c873d4e093aabc0ca84c4ca6dbc4f752afb5c86f146d9742580c9da2e \
--hash=sha256:baed1e86cc735622097354b9d1281406caf42ff42a886d29faa8e8d1630333be \
--hash=sha256:c1453022f490d2459a11819d83ad1d586e9ff65a12ac3e705ffebd46d3685dcf \
--hash=sha256:c26608d2222fb1e94487e4a387d85f13eb55d5ed725cb25a0c589ac4ee60e7bc \
--hash=sha256:c7659f22557c5a0bc4855cd635f55edec690cc008a40768527762cb9fb263455 \
--hash=sha256:c8c69575568085ba0b1b10c0249d779a214aea6f6522e949a0fc9fb0fcb449d0 \
--hash=sha256:c8d2c9fd1f2d16f780d15127abb050d13d1a76c03a4bd87d7e4980e45e511e12 \
--hash=sha256:ca82be1a1d406ecfe1d25dc16cb33488e5a16bf4438c9fb590484ea29d92478b \
--hash=sha256:cc572dace3f60ef98d7b12ff411d20f5362feb31a0439eab0085bbfd349982d7 \
--hash=sha256:d18e5ac0f2f03f4f518d3e23db0f0cad7faa1da8620e9c09461d443bbf6e6692 \
--hash=sha256:d28630f5854ab07ab1fd4aba756de52326c82e6be15d414b12793f1975048b54 \
--hash=sha256:d9c275eaacd24aa73f94ffd6de08fc3f932424d8b6c376f4bed7cde376fe7bc3 \
--hash=sha256:da0e573f9f97159390c89d9f1a9e41908b66d408cc5b58d08cf3847d844c531b \
--hash=sha256:dd31f52ea1086513bb9df30f8fcee9b8918323ae067a3d5b78bc826a000712be \
--hash=sha256:dddad92b554513a31f272570678ba307fb9f618f05e3d4a5eacafff9eae03e1d \
--hash=sha256:df423d40ee8654634421812bc3b196da3f9bd7d32929da813f8394c4348a5358 \
--hash=sha256:df913725b79db7bcf03448f36b7bf8815363417d5b58deecf9305e3e30f0f21a \
--hash=sha256:e0bcb7e0f677f543555d2adff3bf19c05f66cdb4796e5ff602442ab2fe3c4ef7 \
--hash=sha256:e2d65b31f36619cda3999b78b2aa9632e76b78448e7a56fc4240824200e7c4fc \
--hash=sha256:e6e8cff14d6fb0be70a09c0bdc58096f501952d04624ebf867e0e56da2df8960 \
--hash=sha256:f16c709686a78c727bbbf059f92b0bf41c6fc60deec706d2dc19f529175a6125 \
--hash=sha256:f24fb43132a4c6b4cb4eb029492919b2db645be6808d738f244fd146c03c32cb \
--hash=sha256:f53e442b08449d42821fa4a4fba000095af9f62742a500f978a9f557ec44339a \
--hash=sha256:f5cfbc5fe74540d335175b656c725d74d90e3730c626d92575eea35029d9afaa \
--hash=sha256:f81b3b8f3d4e343550fa4baa0e479bba9f2d29ce9c2e9b51d1ce1718d7442fcf \
--hash=sha256:f8ec5e643a9a937f64e1999eb9f75d072263751912dc5cd06d3c85f8f44be7c3 \
--hash=sha256:fb92203a88b3d3053034db775110081c49d28be6551923805e039924093761e4 \
--hash=sha256:fcd22650c908d7b7da162bbfaab594a1227a15d1643a98c68b122ac642fa2264
# via argon2-cffi-bindings
click==8.5.0 \
--hash=sha256:255bc9599cf7748b4b1a446ccc735421bd08a2ae529a8b88597d3de5664ee360 \
--hash=sha256:ba0d2089de75ea0310e2dde03160e6ca10009947fb95a182f9b54021bb272e34
# via uvicorn
h11==0.16.0 \
--hash=sha256:4e35b956cf45792e4caa5885e69fba00bdbc6ffafbfa020300e549b208ee5ff1 \
--hash=sha256:63cf8bbe7522de3bf65932fda1d9c2772064ffb3dae62d55932da54b31cb6c86
# via uvicorn
httptools==0.9.0 \
--hash=sha256:02bc5b3dcb6394b9d825fd62a7bfa0b2943063a3c89abc4492ad45e334a20eb5 \
--hash=sha256:050f7ab098121873c8f13e35857f97ab60a76185c8302bde9a384939bb7c3b96 \
--hash=sha256:050f84b7ec46a6efe0e5f521cf8729e3397c1cef4384f62ed8d5d68ca0045776 \
--hash=sha256:06bfe7fad972a417269d8a5fc53b87e4eca970354abf5e9e24336fd06d64292e \
--hash=sha256:088de1738e1af624466a01c35d652dbe6fb825be887c76d68aa850621d81db88 \
--hash=sha256:0adc974916efe1fbf89d0363a86dcb2c746727643e362ff398de1a4b50b6bc77 \
--hash=sha256:0cc339a807c156d840b54f8bf050ba0fc265eb81692c24bca8535b52fbd797c6 \
--hash=sha256:0fd73d0bbf700a30dd87e4412adf41cfa71542a533d6b390c7244bbb8a1152bb \
--hash=sha256:130635fea6e611a6b2026120037965ddb88b3dafd11bb64e264b101a70a76630 \
--hash=sha256:13873eb8aef5972fcfee614f63d47064312ad4efbfe65ade15b8a3b77f8c8659 \
--hash=sha256:18d800aaa2d6bff7d889df810d1b19a5fde72b1f6c0ca96e8d9f28a692fe5460 \
--hash=sha256:1a4050a651e1f2faf05eb028ce9f2168abbcee9e24b209f5c1f2eb96d8c569e4 \
--hash=sha256:1a7f1df31829c258158be01bb04eb668c4fba7df1ddf2262131a972962e651b6 \
--hash=sha256:1b01c0fcd6725a8d79a164ecdc4116866282479d68bb3d6d74a909bf994656c4 \
--hash=sha256:1b95775f6292d72cb452c33e5c0f8b8551807c29a10e3c1671fef7f61361370a \
--hash=sha256:1f6da814aeecbc6cb8872d6d3e85ed16e8ab1653f9557cea8658725ce212348a \
--hash=sha256:2095207b75a83c9e947346da9c127fb7e4fb29f41589df2643764f06b750989c \
--hash=sha256:22ab1b10b06d357f01092e60f5e6856a0d479ed79b0ec2166a339ea26c699be2 \
--hash=sha256:2319858018eedd0c0b2f950a620413c0a9d1352607be4267eb28209eca8b1e3f \
--hash=sha256:268d18601feb5367885c6ebf6f402c18fc25a324cee215784adafe0a1eef925f \
--hash=sha256:26e1d9629f3bf70d23f0d22238152aec51c837a7c9e384cb74f356fdccad7eb3 \
--hash=sha256:272db0c51e8b71e953c1f2ecbe63402b819680e4564be2ef285cfd4584ee8355 \
--hash=sha256:289f213d2a3dde2e8312c415ffecec5a01698589ec6249ec4e8fb3b47c0444ba \
--hash=sha256:29b0d823e3c1e7cd1093a5dc889245db693ef13ada624cd66e2262421ef38867 \
--hash=sha256:310266a2db1377ffae3bdf6556ab4973f4f94508a8ce37b2f6bb096a89bcefa1 \
--hash=sha256:3238e198429cb8909ec42951b82d6a33fe0fdfcf86371732f8f09311c5b8ac32 \
--hash=sha256:34266cec8c1d4e3e91fcca7efe38971d6bdda64a7944f2a46ab576da15173680 \
--hash=sha256:36fac804b8cfd6b935ae64f71349f833d2b6298404626d017a2c57bb942bc643 \
--hash=sha256:3af4e45ff455fce5511fdf2653c1ce428ef09c56fe37a83eb4d924c2d474f31e \
--hash=sha256:3e3201fe4d46e0d15d7ff9fafc94a605da9eb82d2c5b9837f0368acb325481f1 \
--hash=sha256:45b3002392948dcf578029c89f6318e1289a993a1a5ec38a4161560fab60f811 \
--hash=sha256:465bc1526debf53a3be92022a16ca0c38f891ea3b5c1587af4f52e44020f8a07 \
--hash=sha256:48c705bd0b1afb6253ed71eca9f9ba7ac7d47838e5fed1ef7891d67f21ecd4de \
--hash=sha256:4a4d8c2c7e73ba5967be74d7c3a5ff81fde815ee1b48d9c5c0f14de8463a847b \
--hash=sha256:4a85401b0c3f893cf5695c1199e8679fbf673f7f78c2f6c11d6b1850f8c7e358 \
--hash=sha256:4c58dc91aefb31adad500aa68054334f429b840b36dd29e34e834101044cb2ef \
--hash=sha256:4efbee349138a3fee7a4cc3a95abd2d499fae70dd5bff9fed9138d6f570f4283 \
--hash=sha256:4fb995082fe41ec410b33c48b54fb1d44abb8a6ee762c31e8c42519e8c3a30a9 \
--hash=sha256:5042aa1c7e2b1a24c17dab31d8770b63a5101c9abc25f832c6aef6b201e1ca4f \
--hash=sha256:52fe0176682a25b15370f23f5b0f1366a84771df89144fb0cd979cb72a94b5ca \
--hash=sha256:5332a020a60bbe32ede4bda1a62b3d56c4831d309cdf0932842c0fca8ad6aaa3 \
--hash=sha256:563e4568217dc907a91843f38c737be865222c0400a38cdcd0d26ce92b3db271 \
--hash=sha256:581b27663c6e9f4df68068f32fe6d1cd7647b31fac90237221a66f8821c342eb \
--hash=sha256:58a1b0ec4cbb930e69669f9771715b2c7898d3cdf064d9811f7a66afef96b544 \
--hash=sha256:5cc5d3a29f9ec86ce406e5ec09c241dd8dc4d30e838f74f68d728b89131a3acf \
--hash=sha256:63d38e9a9a10a20fb57593742e63c6b1e78dd7f6ef5472de8e0b1e4cf4f3db26 \
--hash=sha256:6b1ac7f1bc6c0dbf90684b77571a51a21b2463909fd916ce0ac9bfc4d566dc75 \
--hash=sha256:6b900073e7b8481ef1aaf4f6c1789d210a1db01a9da8789821578cfeb4c2d540 \
--hash=sha256:6c12d0393a903b58bc5f5a7406d6c5290acfb8284290d68547ce620c06f7d133 \
--hash=sha256:6e2780e33a58a93f27cc3bb74a55bae6f9a8278a1dbabdff392940d30d381671 \
--hash=sha256:6ebd39ee26db460cfe5ab8b71a15d1149b289139a0d3981522757d6af620887e \
--hash=sha256:6f8b41299b203ce8f627db670cfea82067d9638853dbeaf86dccd93878879b85 \
--hash=sha256:6f9549ca354a1d6d6167c458a1f1b12147726b968f02dd64b6a5801dba91ae0f \
--hash=sha256:6ff0145b34610e57c9fae20df4e133c8d54266447387de6fcc0bdabfe4db4569 \
--hash=sha256:6ff5f0ed70783dcb9562dbd20edca51c3d4d277f128223709e3da6b75986d1d4 \
--hash=sha256:714bf348f468532d86bed670837e7d5ddff3834dd7f5d3c08066da400c86f088 \
--hash=sha256:757e3f79cb865a7db94e0db5f4d0ed3284a69e39d53568f433982ea13c60cac1 \
--hash=sha256:7e32b83bd8c2f8b6fa726ef34e63e21c4d7eddc277d40d4ef7245ea3ed28e5b6 \
--hash=sha256:805b0f2618e5d4c3e28f45b731eb1a0539691ae4a2f97b4ce014de0bf96a1ff5 \
--hash=sha256:80eae881cfb69383303e9a4d7961a478025b89c24f38f2e69b30c516fa0d57f2 \
--hash=sha256:813a32f94991b9627795528053c73a57d2ce3eb98ede89f0e1c7a31095938e81 \
--hash=sha256:8463b34ebde3f000627e9dbd8a545f995ad49fbf7ff9dd5abc0cd507da98a603 \
--hash=sha256:8a59c749a73fbdbc8e63b895a3079825fa085d752e75bc0a500042cb8a801e48 \
--hash=sha256:8d90d10e9b6594c28f27896a68fab97fd784c43804e9fe419dab8e8dcfcf4b02 \
--hash=sha256:8e1e037bb57dbc549c6fe20370b763ea74bdb09413cdcf857e4f14d9e4e2fb13 \
--hash=sha256:931f45f84e15daafec5f82cc92e6710569e1f50933f3253d206eab4132bec678 \
--hash=sha256:995b52f7c260ac7023640221f27472303968753cb6fc6fce1ddfb0e9db59a398 \
--hash=sha256:9b4da5789d7cf576c7e81f0088c632f6ee3786d87d17f08e90e703c22ce15633 \
--hash=sha256:a3ed60ea9a7c352c590182c67404599e6b5a0c901e75ae4cceee9a9fd6bfa455 \
--hash=sha256:a4d1ecad62e83cc65b411ea0125972cf3af98821e8117129947fd1e3a113f8d2 \
--hash=sha256:ae9bb62a7902e2ab65782447cd3eeb753510feace4e3ea03937a85489b01b16b \
--hash=sha256:b2ab3aad55d75d0b8df8d8a1b5920baaec9b161112cd5e95984848b4d2cd3dfe \
--hash=sha256:b2cc6991f16f6d666d48e4b57318104e7b29109e32e2f6b86e9d44c4e6a27f4e \
--hash=sha256:b5a3f5f70967a1aa2bc47fec42a1e19d2fb38c61700e3ee62b63a4af4f4fd001 \
--hash=sha256:b68fb053b37c258a473ab67f4965c3b439500dc160fe364667035a6833eaf50a \
--hash=sha256:b6ee42112d785a913dd63ec0335435a3dddbea5040c151252db815b0095cf066 \
--hash=sha256:b928ab0ecaa664e8caecc529dcb8bc881b6b35bb2b74bf9a39ae25f982ee8812 \
--hash=sha256:b9430f65db521db7962ad951571d446171213686f96c998a54dc18ed574821e2 \
--hash=sha256:b9cd15cb7cf0d5cc41f649fd789aae12c56c3b83eff593f8e095c1d4555ad5c3 \
--hash=sha256:bb1533541c729ad422f870a780d8b4af924f9817d45b5f580390418cda72eaa2 \
--hash=sha256:bbf7377fbd41b7c87d47820e25b9876724963681c2a1d6f6ff2adb4db46ac174 \
--hash=sha256:bca180cbe84e4fba7807eb408a8655295f697928512324517e30a091ede522a8 \
--hash=sha256:beb2c8a34cc90fb4d862b7284eafdb322030d6a8b2ee5eb6a744f84205beedc3 \
--hash=sha256:bfdabac0c6d3d6a5be8c2a100a001c92c14a39bbafd5999545a675c493626e64 \
--hash=sha256:c0e45def4d9ce7073e2226535572442d9d6efb4047c7a5fd8960807e877ce70a \
--hash=sha256:c0f537e5e8152e8d9cae82804024790cb973061abd3b7ef8f66f46e2b5c7bb51 \
--hash=sha256:c195a69df0ab2541252ab5b1d76e3c182e5688ac2a9b708e5e6f66aaeda91e9a \
--hash=sha256:c271bfb832be5c5c020b4e2fcbc1e70a0b990adba6de874b0bba1184b89cdea3 \
--hash=sha256:c42424213c28804f8d0e20f5692106cfb57bf72e1dbc4092b8481fb2f9e4c707 \
--hash=sha256:c4fa57d3c31889722f64bfa785545a5e603a893b6f29ac1a41bfa830abeaefd5 \
--hash=sha256:cb2bb3ac0af7fdab2311b895c9eb95442b45deb14cc949b9e65545e74aa0be69 \
--hash=sha256:cb3e7a4fd0168e362673a980380bf4fd6ae3b1555150e60c5390b4b10d9c50c4 \
--hash=sha256:cbbfcd5d15056fbd1edd5e725cf3feeb47c7cbccbe205927ebab422cc229f417 \
--hash=sha256:cd3e55223a77d6e08d5730ebacb4930ecca5d2ce7c57e7ba10833be7e52903f1 \
--hash=sha256:ce8e723b4637034b76f5382a30a6b725518c332273e8d62a6c7d46e90837c947 \
--hash=sha256:d1e329a1866981efe0201d05a374617f6c6cf14434a501d78ab22793d1ab1fa6 \
--hash=sha256:d20ba5c84cf0592afb2713336f07e2b6ced082e4ae803ceada153a85613efc9f \
--hash=sha256:d2b095129b9a98eb46a271ee9631089529c4e40354576b4aa74e24de9d2bf2f7 \
--hash=sha256:d3906b5c549ff2ad2473cb711e1fc65d76715c2726a402108fbf55eab6c6b49d \
--hash=sha256:d484ebb7e3a3f3597b0f645fbd1b85633674ca808c1f5ba11c2caf7c66f5c8b6 \
--hash=sha256:db735a23ecb0f0450d2b24e0a05fb00a8a35c9db172919c4d3e023e7c7ee4c9b \
--hash=sha256:dbc9fd1521e573045d71b6afab7398439c5cc259e8cb9d416fe62d485c4899c6 \
--hash=sha256:df3867518b205be3648e2fbd522bf380c851b5c2500588047505afdd786b6669 \
--hash=sha256:e0acbd474d0af4afacc6e66c4273f8a19e25f8af4379fc816388095ea6b01371 \
--hash=sha256:eacf0f45ca3ff84c01481c60c15da9ee56711f7292f66663df0f57af61e011c2 \
--hash=sha256:ead1a40543a033a6732a9e1e515944979a19db3737ce77363fc0660e38554344 \
--hash=sha256:eae4e9c7a0785a1a715de0a74fb822ab40084c060f444f18f075d05e322aa7ef \
--hash=sha256:ecf7037e491c220cd73987838c1ac3958d787bb098c3be0bfaf7f04204a6162c \
--hash=sha256:ecfeee649184ffd800955068be9a6b579a0f33fc3c98535d685d5779cb59347f \
--hash=sha256:edd5aa045fa3cc57143db018dd32ce7962bd5b525d05230709015d7e570100aa \
--hash=sha256:f0ef48ce353f6b6a52232ba23d0983d4c2c84c84a778899404e34b4718509bf2 \
--hash=sha256:f1734bd6f588975ffc246211e8b96c11933344087ca280d2cbcbf35cf835d7a9 \
--hash=sha256:f67db0ba2bedafec15b8e5330d40da1e1c7921559fa715af021252bfef81a6f8 \
--hash=sha256:f6ac1414556b910a879c108d79736f77e797871f9919ed0d2c3cf8cf3ecca986 \
--hash=sha256:f78f7ae1c2e5aabf29583fc0d302d8081a663776f84578025662eb6f5d63a921 \
--hash=sha256:f9489c1d87160c126f73b004742fe8654fa1ce37ed89e9e01330a1c10aaecde4 \
--hash=sha256:f9ccc9884241efceb4547a92955d128574c864681f11b7ea3ecbde295fafbe8b \
--hash=sha256:fc1a4f9d18d32a6e0a0a0a382986a60a2126f5144dd08715be7adb8df18e8a46
# via -r requirements.in
idna==3.20 \
--hash=sha256:a7db850025b95ded1eae8a46181a1a6c56c92c96f0e2b005d9ff8dc0210cab44 \
--hash=sha256:ab7ae7122974553370f0bdb919e1a960b2cd1bc1ef0276416d896db81c14582c
# via anyio
psycopg==3.3.6 \
--hash=sha256:a1db9f7148b06a28606767efaca51fa6f9398c5c0a3810519be69d7000bdb631 \
--hash=sha256:c081f2250df751a943036e42db6df4571c66cd0aabe8291a7a506512b12007d2
# via -r requirements.in
psycopg-binary==3.3.6 \
--hash=sha256:05a83ac9fd52b9bca7cb5ab04b3691163170bd16f53defa27216ea3aa07ee781 \
--hash=sha256:0a52991594ac4db888c7d39bccef331797e30cb31a95cae02cf2607f83a42dc2 \
--hash=sha256:0bf08b749cc144f33b44a91b78e3f71c60eb07963746a0df5a100b36ce3d7475 \
--hash=sha256:0ebfad5d131de9f892ae9e70cc7616207768b6714b66a52d4612b8ceaf78b372 \
--hash=sha256:1679a1cb93fbe5a6d1fd58d82cbddcc6fcb8c61446ba7cae6eb2a7b19bc585de \
--hash=sha256:198a48e68cc99ccac03ba95ac857e73aa66f3bf6be77019fafb0832a05f7ad03 \
--hash=sha256:1fbd30e537dab22cafdf080608f10148fe2a5f3a61294ddb5113caac8a623840 \
--hash=sha256:289aadd6a00e151203c081f708348ec89f1e483c9b510ef4ac3981f847f01f79 \
--hash=sha256:2f122603f36050937982abf9668d8bc4769a79f7c93a65013b1c49f1cab7b56b \
--hash=sha256:303732e798fe6729f8e12021b9c96107df8e95ecec4dd487c67b98ec2a59435e \
--hash=sha256:31cd942c23f613276b81a6e6598cefa12960058b0f46e1e874b540c793f6aca5 \
--hash=sha256:366db6e97e66b37211475f20c4c1324a2dc0dd825e46d4e87f9d599304d276f9 \
--hash=sha256:373704aea331d3f3e3402c125a1543f5875e2986ebb54f97d1647942161f803f \
--hash=sha256:37d40450659401600e6d043ff586c89a71a69f33cbb8bcdba6cdb2569beecdbe \
--hash=sha256:37e517c146b185f9c0c6e8d0a0ebbdeeeb67896af28466e032bc810d0c7dc7a7 \
--hash=sha256:3af90f92769d8cc10f94515ee7a0aef36ea85ca733a0ce22858f6e0953f41138 \
--hash=sha256:3c9e663b2e800e3218994cf948c11bcc2844e6491b34aa80d089baf6531827bf \
--hash=sha256:3f84dab25e0385692ee13274c68678377e0b1a70ab9d14e56264cbf61f60c62d \
--hash=sha256:4690cf67738f0e0e49a32aeec99bf0e4595cc2b4f1af984a4345394b1dcff91a \
--hash=sha256:566dd827f17728efdf7d88a5b066f815170f6fdad13967ae952842d90e6aaa9f \
--hash=sha256:5927b7ba63153cd8e9862987290a2b783a5c590daf2a4ef981700cc3569166d4 \
--hash=sha256:5ad8f35e67cc16d1fad1fa8c88972dc9b3a3141ea67897399904edab96a301b6 \
--hash=sha256:5ea8beeb5541780b4b50b462eeacbc4f594ce3b911dc20c81c75f267876f71d2 \
--hash=sha256:5f598f19fa9a91540b5cee17932ffd227b7b53a481605bcc4573c0eafa647300 \
--hash=sha256:612382ac3ed13651c7fa44b5fee9fbf7baaa2ddbc6f500391672682c5f1df9e0 \
--hash=sha256:6ff05561e4a067d35507dc5c90f1deb2ec1c9703ac5cccc1bc26e08a197f9c5a \
--hash=sha256:7308c93cf0b19bbaf8e6ff0a6ad50d3c442385739245fe15a8d593bf841734a6 \
--hash=sha256:79a2a1c3449f6c3409427078ed1cec10de79f3023cb5f2504f0597d350ad46c7 \
--hash=sha256:7beb3e41c9a1e509f3ed85263386588cbe3e975aa67be21f79f44fd35ffaeefc \
--hash=sha256:86147cb5d140341c3363fb5bacce31f8d5543902a46699d3c536b101bbceaf9e \
--hash=sha256:889e42acec10450185e0cdfb396f375e2c1a8d7737c114830a7fde4654f59e30 \
--hash=sha256:910ace140e3e7b7596898d083f37a8fe90c5c40684252ad4e682364b2cd3deba \
--hash=sha256:955e3dd94da361e052d2e49acf591017158dc8f8ed2c8a42c2e3943403c39dc2 \
--hash=sha256:9892188bb15e5803beb51afe8a25add6b56be391a53058e8bca03b74e1e6bf22 \
--hash=sha256:98c02090d88f2ebc0ec1e8da538f77d225ce0fffecf372aa39262e62a1b054ef \
--hash=sha256:9b2f11794e017ce340934e35de46181c46ef71ec75ea3d85dd75cd836761c01e \
--hash=sha256:a2e44a342d2aee40508e28a563d8961c39d9bbd8cae36d8578f0a3c6658aab0f \
--hash=sha256:a4ee3bdd5468a725f2a4d9aab8a74b6d0279f768c8b5d3aeb102c5307ff3d59c \
--hash=sha256:a5165300324efd5a772c48a88ab3a928513ab3979fca76553e62ee815f7b2b9c \
--hash=sha256:a9348c5b43a3bb5ef8c2e89d5237c9c87eeafb01d338c84a7aebbc5cd0313299 \
--hash=sha256:aa73160077345ec21b3f51e8e24b3de2e99586217e497629326eb9b2ea88c52e \
--hash=sha256:ad1c785e784cfd87e8436c6b7702f2d321fc39601bbaf29bc63a41a867091638 \
--hash=sha256:b3f75dee0f9afafabe4edc52c4842f1e1878ed2069bd05b22d6fe961e97e4dba \
--hash=sha256:b599defe9190b17e9907c8b4d114c181e702c87efcd1b8a0ad40971cdcc4634a \
--hash=sha256:b82491019b884d62318b5f30706c3d7e6d4e5a6cb7eabcb3edc0c1b0fdaceae9 \
--hash=sha256:b8ece331509f7a975b90501f41e83ad905e4141753fedf3f2711b2bc70a8efbc \
--hash=sha256:b979a42815410432420275412633960807178b1ce26591a16ce06e78a5bd4bb2 \
--hash=sha256:be4f9b3c9338ac5dd217c5847e21521b396c8117f78dc420d495a5c49bbef874 \
--hash=sha256:bf8c8481d026b85dd70c5fa7dde85b2333aed0b32a2602bcd38a900cbd78a49c \
--hash=sha256:c61617eaae0112ca154da87ffb99b73af2c74067acac28dfb9a4455b019dff2e \
--hash=sha256:c6d19cb4999d03231e8730a5f66c8f5068bc3b532677eb39dab0f600bff3e312 \
--hash=sha256:c7753871eb57e6a5f4646f6168590c6653073dea5e9e720b201c8875332df4c8 \
--hash=sha256:c7f92daa0d2a1c76f07264abddf8cbabd30152a2f09c3270e50f0c7efdf5dcac \
--hash=sha256:cbd5f73073ed19c378d4c35499db1e3e703a5b1a324e521204065967bfaa7a18 \
--hash=sha256:cec5ea900390897d0b46130f60bc2883bf19c314f9044235217c8be88b0ef269 \
--hash=sha256:d636338c8f21b0df2f84657b00bc34f9313f826ef93f1155bc743607e4a0c5eb \
--hash=sha256:dc75da5a20951049f7b773145f998f69d181adad9c58a0ff36e0cf1d73c10e10 \
--hash=sha256:e23a66a763fbe83fcc210bc77c27e5a5ea380ebf091c06f34d8561b695e5a40f \
--hash=sha256:e8cbb54454dbf1bbf2ff08dd7693e8d94ac94b1a20f70f4b3b813d52ecb5cbc1 \
--hash=sha256:ee2c4728c691245e24501fcd7a97b5b381236b9985bc445bba88cdce7d1b5784 \
--hash=sha256:f0535693ce476a722b718b002d5d2c27d47e71ca945276ac194409c98e74c492 \
--hash=sha256:f19cc87343eaa55255e76b31259a570072ac95d6ae82c92dd34b97691f5e49dc \
--hash=sha256:f21d057f3e5f5491067e5b292498073b73847d48799b099803fef100775fcc52 \
--hash=sha256:f87dbdc42e78ee0f7ea180c03f8c78e80a949e373066629bd90fefff10552dff \
--hash=sha256:fa34eb47969297471db7b7f193622c7e3ee839ec05abd05f1fe104d5b1b1dcf4 \
--hash=sha256:fdccb3a0e184b03e9baa673b15a809cf36c339c85dbda0ebc25a698846dfbee8
# via -r requirements.in
psycopg-pool==3.3.3 \
--hash=sha256:9b9cd6a4fcec47a410f7e82d408540e7f77b478509e91b44c1a5457a13e5ff37 \
--hash=sha256:df87b5d9d0ad7db37f6cdad4fa8ce113d250f5997f6db38e9a99192fb67f9e1d
# via -r requirements.in
pycparser==3.11 \
--hash=sha256:51d5a8ba2be0bbe440b99d2112604c95bbbc3c2748a64260186c541e1729cd80 \
--hash=sha256:d875f09c3507d00e1aba0eecc6dcadc1352f30fff09dc6bff2f1c2935e97c2bc
# via cffi
redis==8.1.0 \
--hash=sha256:6e1a19beef9225c83efd689c7e6b7da2d5215b1f42cd13b7fc3714d0a09c7b25 \
--hash=sha256:a4fe1aac3d3b3cc791d4b3d5931c5a956045dc951ee74d1c913ee3ac4d2ee9fb
# via -r requirements.in
starlette==1.7.0 \
--hash=sha256:67f8e99895493dd2911a03f11314af6ceebeae4e704bb9f43dfc6a9db151c93e \
--hash=sha256:c79f74ea63cff761804fbbfb182f1e0b440c2d07b164d24700c5a1bab5d6ff5d
# via -r requirements.in
typing-extensions==4.16.0 \
--hash=sha256:481caa481374e813c1b176ada14e97f1f67a4539ce9cfeb3f350d78d6370c2e8 \
--hash=sha256:dc983d19a509c94dba722ee6abd33940f7c05a89e243c47e907eb4db6f1a43e5
# via
# anyio
# psycopg-pool
uvicorn==0.54.0 \
--hash=sha256:505bdb0f318731d45f1f712071fc781a8981f6847a31c902c9f5e652d4f67faf \
--hash=sha256:a2e33cbfaa0306f8e6b0c13e0cb89d7d7a2da3e62b90c66e18c33d9807b28620
# via -r requirements.in
uvloop==0.23.0 ; sys_platform != "win32" \
--hash=sha256:0305871ac712f54b62af73f943dbf21ae3ce80a44bc0f0151424484affa85645 \
--hash=sha256:090865d8ce7a03986755a3ce711b7dd0d4b44eb14ab74368b717f3fad1180208 \
--hash=sha256:098a85e1393ef5202767b7e5fb41a32cd8bd81e6ee4af364c179801c4aa3f6d4 \
--hash=sha256:0efdd55bddbd36bb2fcb842d64c0d5f6407c6958c68088cc25df8c09edc5b5fd \
--hash=sha256:12634f15e6625f78b3f2922f91404c4d7173487eba11746764153f556e9852dc \
--hash=sha256:1748321e3c59a14a75404b1ae8d5a8d81c4e201803ea0e14c1b6fd84421024b5 \
--hash=sha256:19c64108b507cd0bc140e400e3396bacebd9d504956aa7726272bf6de7d9aabb \
--hash=sha256:1e84575f11873c109cf3962ad0bdf679094466184125f4cadcc41a73febff41f \
--hash=sha256:24c58ae4a83e93a04c504bcc678125e36a0bfc44af928ad69444880c60f187a5 \
--hash=sha256:28d160f51ab4da3b187063652e643dea6831072add4adc1e6d62afbe73b6be27 \
--hash=sha256:2dcff2d69be43e6559e5dad2c5a7a2dbfb60e05a77311b6c4b7a4a8123d86c65 \
--hash=sha256:31e0cf90bc8fd88784f6802cdba968a51fb1aec1cc3feec74d862b2d371d1330 \
--hash=sha256:378188efbb1524f2219d05246a3e1e5907217848d2882144dff59585f1b81d55 \
--hash=sha256:42feced24b9b44b856c633eafb5cc5dec354972da55ce77598db6844c054bc7c \
--hash=sha256:4448e9124537620f9c25d004c227bb5104440b58955c19bbd312d910af919a63 \
--hash=sha256:4a08875543bbd4519faf30497506c9cda8a48470467ffdf967c7313c7a5981a8 \
--hash=sha256:4b8e207c67d207a8608fec57e116511030af3495dc0109b8c333cf9cb412b16f \
--hash=sha256:4bb7f5d0b62b5afaaaea2b7b60d508921c24b0fe39c22c1438bec1811ffe10ec \
--hash=sha256:4f1798f56c6f4ba5ac11fa2869e5717926e4470d97a1dd42b4f59219d43b5027 \
--hash=sha256:514698d3683189031dcbfdc31e87115992e5ce9e1b19fe5359941323f2df800c \
--hash=sha256:53c2c5d7e2024e46776c2d90e6c637d01102126b61aaf5faa5edaf05f8b5722a \
--hash=sha256:55d6f4135d914305929fe9e9c44d8b5383a9b3fa1bee3bfcf60ee97e01af07ea \
--hash=sha256:5a2bbad3a63007f7e9524d4903ba04fee252557c2acd86f9a3d4f91786695254 \
--hash=sha256:5a3e0f56ec19bfd9ad1605572878dd6ff7f01b325f4fc154812ae70d615c3aff \
--hash=sha256:5bb9be71d9ee39b4359b832f9569518ec9bc08704194034e79e4958e6bc4d46d \
--hash=sha256:60ec798c40a1810d282ee046f61ecac1c5675cb898763d9f08d97d53a5e00a81 \
--hash=sha256:6b3cbc4f96ddfa1fb88a78a69dd851369825b7816d9702eee8c4461505ba172e \
--hash=sha256:6c7ef4701a96553514b2688e342ef1bf2beae6cfd172d89a76c768292aabf405 \
--hash=sha256:7337b06a9f9ed9ea3049f04b76f65819db9b19bb832ee598e97b388eadf25e5f \
--hash=sha256:76345f51367fb1f23e08605c6efb18374f669be5b223658fbab6b17627950507 \
--hash=sha256:7e35c9bc977760981693e1a7a51493b58ee5a501f9ebb1e547565ee40b6c6208 \
--hash=sha256:80cac5cb90ed7b9b72a217a1d6982b15b829cdbd0ee6bc19b93e3a9e47fb0ac9 \
--hash=sha256:8af88fe5c7dd68fe1fec6dea8155caa1a47155d219a750ff34049541cf536a5e \
--hash=sha256:8fcd721113260ffb5e38bf14a8725b17d431f34209f7d1c7005b667946e630b3 \
--hash=sha256:93087a845cdfb35753e539354ac9551bdd2ff528c202a98df0ae46e852bcf021 \
--hash=sha256:93935ab27b6eaef4c3e5489aebc84284f0644592f7ab516df60ee1b27eaf5eb3 \
--hash=sha256:9bf08e4b6362dd1c08623bbfa2d061e8bac0f1da8fc2007062cfe1dc360a49fa \
--hash=sha256:a6ac96da66c35bf789bdcde78a88dc7d56b7907d8379648c54adc1c61594575d \
--hash=sha256:ab17b3a8aa754be0de0e397f7b95f13b14e56f077a4c6ae295e3d4afd199b325 \
--hash=sha256:b0d106d9314546d69b3df1b5352639aa628530ec3ecef8a98a21942d2a2a64f5 \
--hash=sha256:b90397a50ad6332ed3e459c648ac20d182cce24a557354363ad85fc9ea4a17cd \
--hash=sha256:bbbdb8fcd5e7062e546eec1ac78c28bb21ae7df54c18f8e4b06e15a18d661a49 \
--hash=sha256:bd6f2f81c7b9da99d301c0b16b82044e76fe887086e42e1590ecf520b94dbdac \
--hash=sha256:be53e1d5f83de43dc175c87612ecc128d444b38e5c56cb3f807f5a73d6887476 \
--hash=sha256:c3f23f403a273900d57de6ee5ca0614c650f7f58563065dad1a4744498960e53 \
--hash=sha256:cbe8d03d4efcccdb7fcedecbaa1e1fa02913eaf3a74cb933634a6bc6d2ea9e2a \
--hash=sha256:ce17bc317d089f361b33521654c13e30eacfd3d2034fd34e613ca9c51c969686 \
--hash=sha256:d918d6f304a309222a784bbd140b85ec5594d97e4dc0e79f590549d28970663a \
--hash=sha256:dc61e4f9e37b507069dc7e659ae28bca7adcb04c993c3508214315d12c63f848 \
--hash=sha256:e095f9e105af76593b4c183bb0bcbdae64bd913a59ec595732dc108b48730ab5 \
--hash=sha256:e2cba180d6451822763eda8364f342435a873bcfb3849cbd82fdeca248ca65eb \
--hash=sha256:e49eba8f1e28e7c03648b7a476e1ba05309e087ccdea859fc6dd659564aa8d7e \
--hash=sha256:f1341c6abcee1c31277cfe28d34e46196f2143ec3d755e6efe7452126e1f626d \
--hash=sha256:f3fbfe82829d8e381426a289b87e59e585278728361db9ce975b88b51f64f410 \
--hash=sha256:f50b580fad005a092ed87c5a3a4683459b21d1620497d6a5bccad203bee4c071 \
--hash=sha256:f5576e8ae1723ece60d8f93c6710abf784714e99388bcf023ba9ca800bc587f6 \
--hash=sha256:f673d835bdb1a60229cc3609a113fd2c9ce3f4a3c75ad4eaed111180c00199d2 \
--hash=sha256:f7548ede3ee908cfabc0d068106e303a9a2d811af959cdf6ab85676344cedcda \
--hash=sha256:fa8ed556fcc87a4091cf61587ef172fa104323dc89ecc085a618ba7ff8629a8f \
--hash=sha256:fefea5cf8cdda9053b962ca8a90216fb0b1d40907dcb6819382b42e483e6e9f6 \
--hash=sha256:ff7144d8167e513fe39fbb46bffb4f6f192dfb1f4b0b4e9102e1fd4f212e4747
# via -r requirements.in
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""EXPLAIN (ANALYZE, BUFFERS) of the history query on >= 10 000 messages (level 4).
python scripts/explain_history.py --output evidence/explain-history.txt
Creates (once, idempotent) a synthetic chat with 20 000 messages plus 30 000 messages in
30 other chats, then explains the EXACT statements of src/messenger/repo.py:
1. first page (HISTORY_FIRST)
2. late page via cursor (HISTORY_AFTER) — generic plan forced, as a prepared statement
reused by the driver would get it
3. the rejected variant `($2 IS NULL OR (created_at, id) > ...)` — generic plan
4. the rejected OFFSET pagination for the same late page
Runs psql inside the postgres container; no database port is published.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import subprocess
import sys
from pathlib import Path
ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
sys.path.insert(0, str(ROOT / "src"))
from messenger.repo import HISTORY_AFTER, HISTORY_FIRST # noqa: E402 (the app's real SQL)
CHAT = "00000000-0000-4000-8000-00000000e002"
USER = "00000000-0000-4000-8000-00000000e001"
TARGET = 20_000
LATE = 19_950 # cursor position: the 50 newest messages remain
SEED = f"""
\\set ON_ERROR_STOP on
BEGIN;
INSERT INTO users (id, username, display_name, password_hash)
VALUES ('{USER}', 'explain_seed', convert_to('Explain seed', 'UTF8'), 'not-a-login') ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING;
INSERT INTO chats (id, title, created_by, created_at)
SELECT ('00000000-0000-4000-8000-0000000' || lpad(to_hex(n), 5, '0'))::uuid, convert_to('explain ' || n, 'UTF8'),
'{USER}', timestamptz '2026-01-01 00:00:00+00'
FROM generate_series(57346::int, 57376::int) AS n -- e002 .. e020: target + 30 noise chats
ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING;
INSERT INTO chat_members (chat_id, user_id, position, chat_created_at)
SELECT id, '{USER}', 0, created_at FROM chats WHERE created_by = '{USER}' ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING;
INSERT INTO messages (id, chat_id, sender_id, text, created_at)
SELECT gen_random_uuid(), '{CHAT}', '{USER}', convert_to('synthetic message ' || g, 'UTF8'),
timestamptz '2026-01-01 00:00:00+00' + g * interval '1 second'
FROM generate_series(1::int, {TARGET}::int) AS g
WHERE NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM messages WHERE chat_id = '{CHAT}');
INSERT INTO messages (id, chat_id, sender_id, text, created_at)
SELECT gen_random_uuid(), c.id, '{USER}', convert_to('noise ' || g, 'UTF8'),
timestamptz '2026-01-01 00:00:00+00' + g * interval '1 second'
FROM chats c CROSS JOIN generate_series(1::int, 1000::int) AS g
WHERE c.created_by = '{USER}' AND c.id <> '{CHAT}'
AND NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM messages m WHERE m.chat_id = c.id);
COMMIT;
ANALYZE messages;
"""
def pg(sql_param: str) -> str:
"""Turn psycopg %s placeholders into $1..$n for a PREPARE statement."""
parts = sql_param.split("%s")
return "".join(p + (f"${i + 1}" if i < len(parts) - 1 else "") for i, p in enumerate(parts))
EXPLAIN = f"""
\\set ON_ERROR_STOP on
\\pset pager off
SELECT count(*) AS messages_total, count(*) FILTER (WHERE chat_id = '{CHAT}') AS messages_in_target_chat FROM messages;
SELECT created_at AS cur_ts, id AS cur_id FROM messages WHERE chat_id = '{CHAT}'
ORDER BY created_at, id OFFSET {LATE - 1} LIMIT 1 \\gset
SET plan_cache_mode = force_generic_plan;
PREPARE first_page(uuid, int) AS {pg(HISTORY_FIRST)};
PREPARE after_page(uuid, timestamptz, uuid, int) AS {pg(HISTORY_AFTER)};
PREPARE or_page(uuid, timestamptz, uuid, int) AS
SELECT id, sender_id, text, created_at FROM messages
WHERE chat_id = $1 AND ($2 IS NULL OR (created_at, id) > ($2, $3)) ORDER BY created_at, id LIMIT $4;
PREPARE offset_page(uuid, int, int) AS
SELECT id, sender_id, text, created_at FROM messages WHERE chat_id = $1 ORDER BY created_at, id OFFSET $2 LIMIT $3;
\\echo '=== 1. first page, app query HISTORY_FIRST, generic plan'
EXPLAIN (ANALYZE, BUFFERS, SUMMARY ON) EXECUTE first_page('{CHAT}', 51);
\\echo '=== 2. late page (cursor at {LATE}), app query HISTORY_AFTER, generic plan'
EXPLAIN (ANALYZE, BUFFERS, SUMMARY ON) EXECUTE after_page('{CHAT}', :'cur_ts', :'cur_id', 51);
\\echo '=== 3. REJECTED: one query with ($2 IS NULL OR ...), same late page, generic plan'
EXPLAIN (ANALYZE, BUFFERS, SUMMARY ON) EXECUTE or_page('{CHAT}', :'cur_ts', :'cur_id', 51);
\\echo '=== 4. REJECTED: OFFSET pagination, same late page'
EXPLAIN (ANALYZE, BUFFERS, SUMMARY ON) EXECUTE offset_page('{CHAT}', {LATE}, 51);
"""
def psql(script: str) -> str:
result = subprocess.run(
["docker", "compose", "exec", "-T", "postgres", "psql", "-U", "messenger", "-d", "messenger", "-X", "-q", "-f", "-"],
cwd=ROOT, input=script, capture_output=True, text=True, encoding="utf-8", check=True)
return result.stdout
def run() -> str:
psql(SEED)
return psql(EXPLAIN)
def main() -> int:
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__.splitlines()[0])
parser.add_argument("--output", default=None)
args = parser.parse_args()
text = run()
print(text)
if args.output:
Path(args.output).write_text(text, encoding="utf-8", newline="\n")
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main())
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Create local synthetic credentials for the stand in ./secrets (ignored by Git).
python scripts/init_secrets.py
Idempotent: existing files are kept, so re-running never changes passwords of a
database that already has data. Prints only file names, never values.
Delete ./secrets together with the volumes (`docker compose down -v`) to start over.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import secrets
import sys
from pathlib import Path
ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
SECRETS = ROOT / "secrets"
def write(name: str, value: str) -> None:
path = SECRETS / name
if path.exists():
print(f"keep secrets/{name}")
return
path.write_text(value + "\n", encoding="utf-8", newline="\n")
# Readable by the container users (postgres, valkey, app uid 10001) through the
# compose bind mount. Local synthetic lab credentials only.
os.chmod(path, 0o644)
print(f"created secrets/{name}")
def read(name: str) -> str:
return (SECRETS / name).read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
def main() -> int:
SECRETS.mkdir(exist_ok=True)
write("postgres_password", secrets.token_urlsafe(24)) # [A-Za-z0-9_-]: safe inside URLs
write("valkey_password", secrets.token_urlsafe(24))
write("database_url", f"postgresql://messenger:{read('postgres_password')}@postgres:5432/messenger")
write("cache_url", f"redis://:{read('valkey_password')}@valkey:6379/0")
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main())
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@echo off
rem Windows wrapper: tests/resilience.py starts the hook as a program, and Windows
rem cannot execute a .sh file directly. Runs the same scripts\restart.sh with Git Bash.
rem python tests/resilience.py --mode persistence --action-script scripts/restart.cmd
"%ProgramFiles%\Git\bin\bash.exe" "%~dp0restart.sh"
exit /b %ERRORLEVEL%
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#!/bin/sh
# Restart hook for `make test-persistence ACTION_SCRIPT=scripts/restart.sh`.
# Restarts the API and ALL state stores (PostgreSQL, Valkey) of compose.yaml.
# Volumes, schema and data are preserved: no `down -v`, no FLUSH, no re-seed.
# Output is suppressed by the test; run it by hand to see the steps.
set -eu
cd "$(dirname "$0")/.."
# 1. API first: no request is served while the stores restart underneath it.
docker compose stop api
# 2. Stores: clean shutdown (PostgreSQL checkpoint, Valkey AOF fsync), then start again.
docker compose restart postgres valkey
# 3. API again; it waits for healthy stores via depends_on and reconnects its pool.
docker compose start api
echo "restart.sh: api, postgres and valkey restarted with volumes preserved"
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"""In-memory messenger for lab 1 (MTUSI, «Высоконагруженные приложения»)."""
__version__ = "1.0.0"
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"""Entry point: `python -m messenger`. The HTTP server is the main process (PID 1 in Docker).
Shutdown sequence on SIGTERM/SIGINT:
1. readiness flips to 503 (`app.state.draining = True`);
2. uvicorn closes the listening socket, so new connections are refused;
3. in-flight requests get up to SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT_SECONDS (default 8 s < Docker's 10 s) to finish;
4. the lifespan closes the DB pool and the Valkey client; the process exits with code 0.
Data stays in PostgreSQL and Valkey volumes.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import logging
import sys
from types import FrameType
import uvicorn
from . import __version__, logging_setup
from .app import create_app
from .config import ConfigError, Settings
log = logging.getLogger("messenger")
class GracefulServer(uvicorn.Server):
"""uvicorn.Server that marks the app as draining before the normal graceful stop."""
def handle_exit(self, sig: int, frame: FrameType | None) -> None:
if not self.should_exit:
log.info("shutdown_requested", extra={"fields": {"signal": sig, "timeout_s": self.config.timeout_graceful_shutdown}})
self.config.app.state.draining = True # config.app is our Starlette instance
super().handle_exit(sig, frame)
def main() -> int:
try:
settings = Settings.from_env()
except ConfigError as exc:
print(f"configuration error: {exc}", file=sys.stderr)
return 2
logging_setup.configure(settings.log_level)
app = create_app(settings)
config = uvicorn.Config(
app,
host=settings.host,
port=settings.port,
log_config=None,
access_log=False,
server_header=False,
proxy_headers=False,
lifespan="on",
timeout_graceful_shutdown=settings.shutdown_timeout,
)
server = GracefulServer(config)
log.info("starting", extra={"fields": {
"version": __version__, "env": settings.env, "host": settings.host, "port": settings.port,
"python": sys.version.split()[0], "storage": "postgresql",
}})
server.run()
log.info("stopped")
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main())
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"""HTTP layer: Starlette routes, request-id/logging middleware and error mapping."""
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
import contextlib
import logging
import re
import time
import uuid
from typing import Any
from starlette.applications import Starlette
from starlette.exceptions import HTTPException
from starlette.requests import Request
from starlette.responses import JSONResponse, Response
from starlette.routing import Route
from starlette.types import ASGIApp, Message as AsgiMessage, Receive, Scope, Send
from . import authhdr, cursor, docs, passwords, repo, validation
from .config import Settings
from .db import Database
from .errors import BASIC_CHALLENGE, ApiError, InvalidRequest, PayloadTooLarge, Unauthorized, Unavailable
from .sessions import SessionStore, build_store
from .timefmt import rfc3339
log = logging.getLogger("messenger")
access_log = logging.getLogger("messenger.access")
REQUEST_ID_RE = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9._:-]{1,128}")
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Responses
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------
def error_response(request_id: str, status: int, code: str, message: str, headers: dict[str, str] | None = None) -> JSONResponse:
body = {"error": {"code": code, "message": message, "request_id": request_id}}
return JSONResponse(body, status_code=status, headers={"X-Request-Id": request_id, **(headers or {})})
async def api_error_handler(request: Request, exc: Exception) -> JSONResponse:
assert isinstance(exc, ApiError)
return error_response(request.state.request_id, exc.status, exc.code, exc.message, exc.headers)
async def http_exception_handler(request: Request, exc: Exception) -> JSONResponse:
"""Unknown routes and wrong methods also answer in the contract error format."""
assert isinstance(exc, HTTPException)
if exc.status_code == 404:
return error_response(request.state.request_id, 404, "not_found", "Объект не найден")
if exc.status_code == 405:
return error_response(request.state.request_id, 405, "invalid_request", "Метод не поддерживается", exc.headers)
return error_response(request.state.request_id, exc.status_code, "invalid_request", "Неверный запрос")
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Middleware (pure ASGI, so it also covers 404/405 and unexpected exceptions)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------
class RequestContextMiddleware:
"""Assigns X-Request-Id to every response, writes one access-log line, turns crashes into 500."""
def __init__(self, app: ASGIApp):
self.app = app
async def __call__(self, scope: Scope, receive: Receive, send: Send) -> None:
if scope["type"] != "http":
await self.app(scope, receive, send)
return
incoming = dict(scope["headers"]).get(b"x-request-id", b"").decode("latin-1")
request_id = incoming if REQUEST_ID_RE.fullmatch(incoming) else uuid.uuid4().hex
scope.setdefault("state", {})["request_id"] = request_id
status = 500
started = False
begin = time.perf_counter()
async def send_with_id(message: AsgiMessage) -> None:
nonlocal status, started
if message["type"] == "http.response.start":
started = True
status = message["status"]
headers = [(k, v) for k, v in message.get("headers", []) if k.lower() != b"x-request-id"]
headers.append((b"x-request-id", request_id.encode("latin-1")))
message = {**message, "headers": headers}
await send(message)
try:
await self.app(scope, receive, send_with_id)
except asyncio.CancelledError:
# uvicorn cancels requests still running when SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT_SECONDS expires:
# answer 503 (retryable) instead of a generic 500, then let the cancellation proceed.
if not started:
status = 503
response = error_response(request_id, 503, "unavailable", "Сервер завершает работу")
await response(scope, receive, send)
raise
except Exception:
log.exception("unhandled_error", extra={"fields": {"request_id": request_id}})
if not started:
status = 500
response = error_response(request_id, 500, "internal_error", "Внутренняя ошибка сервера")
await response(scope, receive, send)
finally:
access_log.info("request", extra={"fields": {
"request_id": request_id,
"method": scope["method"],
"path": scope["path"], # ids only; query (cursor) and bodies are never logged
"status": status,
"duration_ms": round((time.perf_counter() - begin) * 1000, 3),
}})
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Request helpers
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------
def db_of(request: Request) -> Database:
return request.app.state.db
def sessions_of(request: Request) -> SessionStore:
return request.app.state.sessions
async def authenticate(request: Request) -> str:
"""User id of a valid Bearer session, otherwise 401. X-User-Id is ignored since lab 2.
Store failures are 503 (Unavailable), never 401 and never anonymous access.
"""
token = authhdr.parse_bearer(request.headers.get("authorization"))
user_id = await sessions_of(request).user_id_for(token)
if user_id is None:
raise Unauthorized("Сессия недействительна, истекла или отозвана")
return user_id
def path_uuid(request: Request, name: str) -> str:
return validation.parse_uuid(request.path_params[name], name)
async def read_json(request: Request) -> dict[str, Any]:
content_type = request.headers.get("content-type", "")
media_type, _, params = content_type.partition(";")
if media_type.strip().lower() != "application/json":
raise InvalidRequest("Content-Type должен быть application/json")
charset = params.strip().lower()
if charset and charset.replace(" ", "") not in {"charset=utf-8", "charset=\"utf-8\""}:
raise InvalidRequest("Поддерживается только кодировка UTF-8")
limit: int = request.app.state.settings.max_body_bytes
declared = request.headers.get("content-length")
if declared is not None and declared.isdigit() and int(declared) > limit:
raise PayloadTooLarge()
chunks: list[bytes] = []
size = 0
async for chunk in request.stream():
size += len(chunk)
if size > limit:
raise PayloadTooLarge()
chunks.append(chunk)
return validation.parse_json_object(b"".join(chunks))
def page_params(request: Request) -> tuple[int, str | None]:
query = request.query_params.multi_items()
limit = validation.parse_limit(validation.single_query_param(query, "limit"))
raw_cursor = validation.single_query_param(query, "cursor")
if raw_cursor is not None and raw_cursor == "":
raise InvalidRequest("cursor не может быть пустым")
return limit, raw_cursor
def ok(body: Any, status: int = 200) -> JSONResponse:
return JSONResponse(body, status_code=status)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Handlers
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------
async def live(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
return ok({"status": "ok"})
async def ready(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
"""200 only if the mandatory synchronous path can be served: PostgreSQL and,
with SESSION_STORE=valkey, Valkey answer. 503 while draining after SIGTERM."""
if request.app.state.draining:
raise Unavailable("Сервер завершает работу")
db_ok, store_ok = await asyncio.gather(db_of(request).ping(), sessions_of(request).ping())
if not db_ok:
raise Unavailable("PostgreSQL недоступен")
if not store_ok:
raise Unavailable("Хранилище сессий недоступно")
return ok({"status": "ok"})
async def register_user(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
data = await read_json(request)
validation.check_fields(data, {"username", "display_name", "password"})
username = validation.username_field(data)
display_name = validation.text_field(data, "display_name", 100)
password = validation.password_field(data)
password_hash = await passwords.hash_password(password)
user = await repo.create_user(db_of(request), username, display_name, password_hash)
log.info("user_created", extra={"fields": {"request_id": request.state.request_id, "user_id": user.id}})
return ok(user.to_json(), 201)
async def create_session(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
"""Login: only `Authorization: Basic`; wrong user and wrong password give the same 401."""
username, password = authhdr.parse_basic(request.headers.get("authorization"))
found = await repo.get_credentials(db_of(request), username)
user, stored_hash = found if found else (None, None)
if not await passwords.verify_password(stored_hash, password) or user is None:
log.info("login_failed", extra={"fields": {"request_id": request.state.request_id}})
raise Unauthorized("Неверное имя пользователя или пароль", challenge=BASIC_CHALLENGE)
ttl = request.app.state.settings.session_ttl_seconds
token, expires_at = await sessions_of(request).create(user.id, ttl)
log.info("session_created", extra={"fields": {"request_id": request.state.request_id, "user_id": user.id}})
return ok({"token": token, "token_type": "Bearer", "expires_at": rfc3339(expires_at), "user": user.to_json()}, 201)
async def revoke_session(request: Request) -> Response:
token = authhdr.parse_bearer(request.headers.get("authorization"))
if not await sessions_of(request).revoke(token):
raise Unauthorized("Сессия недействительна, истекла или отозвана")
log.info("session_revoked", extra={"fields": {"request_id": request.state.request_id}})
return Response(status_code=204)
async def me(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
user_id = await authenticate(request)
user = await repo.get_user(db_of(request), user_id)
if user is None:
raise Unauthorized("Сессия недействительна, истекла или отозвана")
return ok(user.to_json())
async def create_chat(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
user_id = await authenticate(request)
data = await read_json(request)
validation.check_fields(data, {"title", "member_ids"})
title = validation.text_field(data, "title", 100)
member_ids = validation.member_ids_field(data)
chat = await repo.create_chat(db_of(request), user_id, title, member_ids)
log.info("chat_created", extra={"fields": {"request_id": request.state.request_id, "chat_id": chat.id, "members": len(member_ids)}})
return ok(chat.to_json(), 201)
async def list_chats(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
user_id = await authenticate(request)
limit, raw_cursor = page_params(request)
after = cursor.decode(raw_cursor, cursor.CHATS, user_id) if raw_cursor else None
items, has_more = await repo.list_chats(db_of(request), user_id, after, limit)
next_cursor = cursor.encode(cursor.CHATS, user_id, items[-1].key) if has_more else None
return ok({"items": [c.to_json() for c in items], "next_cursor": next_cursor})
async def get_chat(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
user_id = await authenticate(request)
chat_id = path_uuid(request, "chat_id")
return ok((await repo.get_chat(db_of(request), user_id, chat_id)).to_json())
async def create_message(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
user_id = await authenticate(request)
chat_id = path_uuid(request, "chat_id")
db = db_of(request)
await repo.ensure_member(db, user_id, chat_id) # outsiders get 404 before the body is read
data = await read_json(request)
validation.check_fields(data, {"text"})
text = validation.text_field(data, "text", 4000)
# sender_id is derived from the session, never taken from the body.
message = await repo.add_message(db, user_id, chat_id, text)
return ok(message.to_json(), 201)
async def list_messages(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
user_id = await authenticate(request)
chat_id = path_uuid(request, "chat_id")
db = db_of(request)
await repo.ensure_member(db, user_id, chat_id) # 404 for outsiders before cursor details leak
limit, raw_cursor = page_params(request)
after = cursor.decode(raw_cursor, cursor.MESSAGES, chat_id) if raw_cursor else None
items, has_more = await repo.list_messages(db, chat_id, after, limit)
next_cursor = cursor.encode(cursor.MESSAGES, chat_id, items[-1].key) if has_more else None
return ok({"items": [m.to_json() for m in items], "next_cursor": next_cursor})
def create_app(settings: Settings | None = None) -> Starlette:
settings = settings or Settings.from_env()
db = Database(settings)
sessions = build_store(settings, db)
@contextlib.asynccontextmanager
async def lifespan(app: Starlette):
passwords.configure(settings.hash_concurrency)
await db.open()
log.info("dependencies_configured", extra={"fields": {
"session_store": sessions.name, "session_ttl_s": settings.session_ttl_seconds,
"db_pool_max": settings.db_pool_max, "db_timeout_s": settings.db_timeout_seconds}})
try:
yield
finally:
await sessions.close()
await db.close()
routes = [
Route("/health/live", live, methods=["GET"]),
Route("/health/ready", ready, methods=["GET"]),
Route("/api/v1/users", register_user, methods=["POST"]),
Route("/api/v1/users/me", me, methods=["GET"]),
Route("/api/v1/auth/sessions", create_session, methods=["POST"]),
Route("/api/v1/auth/sessions/current", revoke_session, methods=["DELETE"]),
Route("/api/v1/chats", create_chat, methods=["POST"]),
Route("/api/v1/chats", list_chats, methods=["GET"]),
Route("/api/v1/chats/{chat_id}", get_chat, methods=["GET"]),
Route("/api/v1/chats/{chat_id}/messages", create_message, methods=["POST"]),
Route("/api/v1/chats/{chat_id}/messages", list_messages, methods=["GET"]),
]
if settings.docs_enabled: # Swagger UI for manual experiments, not part of the contract
routes += [
Route("/docs", docs.swagger_page, methods=["GET"]),
Route("/openapi.json", docs.openapi_json, methods=["GET"]),
]
app = Starlette(
routes=routes,
exception_handlers={ApiError: api_error_handler, HTTPException: http_exception_handler},
lifespan=lifespan,
)
app.add_middleware(RequestContextMiddleware)
app.state.settings = settings
app.state.db = db
app.state.sessions = sessions
app.state.draining = False
return app
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"""Parsing of the Authorization header. Any malformed value is 401, never 500.
Basic (RFC 7617) is accepted only by POST /auth/sessions; everything else needs
Bearer. Basic is an encoding, not encryption: plain HTTP is acceptable only for the
local synthetic lab stand (lab 7 adds TLS).
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import base64
import binascii
import re
from .errors import BASIC_CHALLENGE, BEARER_CHALLENGE, Unauthorized
from .validation import USERNAME_RE
B64_RE = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9+/]+={0,2}")
TOKEN_RE = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9_-]{32,128}") # token_urlsafe(32) gives 43 characters
def _split(header: str | None) -> tuple[str, str]:
if not header:
return "", ""
scheme, _, value = header.strip().partition(" ")
return scheme.lower(), value.strip()
def parse_basic(header: str | None) -> tuple[str, str]:
"""(username, password) from `Basic base64(username:password)`; the password may contain ':'."""
invalid = Unauthorized("Неверное имя пользователя или пароль", challenge=BASIC_CHALLENGE)
scheme, value = _split(header)
if scheme != "basic" or B64_RE.fullmatch(value) is None or len(value) > 1024:
raise invalid
try:
decoded = base64.b64decode(value, validate=True).decode("utf-8")
except (binascii.Error, ValueError, UnicodeDecodeError):
raise invalid from None
username, sep, password = decoded.partition(":") # split at the FIRST colon
if not sep or USERNAME_RE.fullmatch(username) is None or not password:
raise invalid
return username, password
def parse_bearer(header: str | None) -> str:
scheme, value = _split(header)
if scheme != "bearer" or TOKEN_RE.fullmatch(value) is None:
# Missing header, Basic on a business endpoint, garbage token: one answer.
raise Unauthorized("Требуется действительная Bearer-сессия", challenge=BEARER_CHALLENGE)
return value
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"""Runtime configuration read from environment variables (12-factor style).
Non-secret settings have safe defaults. Connection strings with passwords are
read from files (`DATABASE_URL_FILE`, `CACHE_URL_FILE` → Docker secrets in
/run/secrets), so they never appear in `docker inspect`, compose files or logs.
Invalid values stop the process at startup with a clear message.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
from dataclasses import dataclass
from pathlib import Path
class ConfigError(ValueError):
pass
def _int(name: str, default: int, low: int, high: int) -> int:
raw = os.environ.get(name)
if raw is None or raw.strip() == "":
return default
try:
value = int(raw.strip())
except ValueError:
raise ConfigError(f"{name} must be an integer, got {raw!r}") from None
if not low <= value <= high:
raise ConfigError(f"{name} must be in [{low}, {high}], got {value}")
return value
def _float(name: str, default: float, low: float, high: float) -> float:
raw = os.environ.get(name)
if raw is None or raw.strip() == "":
return default
try:
value = float(raw.strip())
except ValueError:
raise ConfigError(f"{name} must be a number, got {raw!r}") from None
if not low <= value <= high:
raise ConfigError(f"{name} must be in [{low}, {high}], got {value}")
return value
def _bool(name: str, default: bool) -> bool:
raw = os.environ.get(name, "").strip().lower()
if raw == "":
return default
if raw not in {"true", "false", "1", "0"}:
raise ConfigError(f"{name} must be true/false, got {raw!r}")
return raw in {"true", "1"}
def _secret(name: str, required: bool) -> str:
"""Value of <NAME>_FILE (preferred, Docker secret) or <NAME> (local runs/tests)."""
path = os.environ.get(f"{name}_FILE", "").strip()
if path:
try:
value = Path(path).read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
except OSError as exc:
# The message names the file, never its content.
raise ConfigError(f"{name}_FILE={path} cannot be read: {exc.strerror}") from None
else:
value = os.environ.get(name, "").strip()
if required and not value:
raise ConfigError(f"{name}_FILE (or {name}) must be set")
return value
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Settings:
host: str
port: int
env: str
log_level: str
shutdown_timeout: float
max_body_bytes: int
docs_enabled: bool = True
database_url: str = ""
session_store: str = "postgres"
cache_url: str = ""
session_ttl_seconds: int = 3600
db_pool_min: int = 1
db_pool_max: int = 10
db_timeout_seconds: float = 3.0
cache_timeout_seconds: float = 0.5
hash_concurrency: int = 2
@property
def db_statement_timeout_ms(self) -> int:
# The server stops a statement a bit before the client-side deadline fires.
return max(100, int(self.db_timeout_seconds * 1000) - 500)
@classmethod
def from_env(cls) -> "Settings":
log_level = os.environ.get("LOG_LEVEL", "info").strip().lower() or "info"
if log_level not in {"debug", "info", "warning", "error"}:
raise ConfigError(f"LOG_LEVEL must be debug/info/warning/error, got {log_level!r}")
session_store = os.environ.get("SESSION_STORE", "postgres").strip().lower() or "postgres"
if session_store == "redis":
session_store = "valkey" # same protocol; the course allows Redis OR Valkey
if session_store not in {"postgres", "valkey"}:
raise ConfigError(f"SESSION_STORE must be postgres or valkey, got {session_store!r}")
db_pool_min = _int("DB_POOL_MIN", 1, 0, 50)
db_pool_max = _int("DB_POOL_MAX", 10, 1, 100)
if db_pool_min > db_pool_max:
raise ConfigError("DB_POOL_MIN must not exceed DB_POOL_MAX")
return cls(
host=os.environ.get("APP_HOST", "0.0.0.0").strip() or "0.0.0.0",
port=_int("APP_PORT", 8080, 1, 65535),
env=os.environ.get("APP_ENV", "lab").strip() or "lab",
log_level=log_level,
# Docker sends SIGKILL 10 s after SIGTERM by default; finish earlier.
shutdown_timeout=_float("SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT_SECONDS", 8.0, 0.0, 9.0),
max_body_bytes=_int("MAX_BODY_BYTES", 64 * 1024, 1024, 1024 * 1024),
docs_enabled=_bool("DOCS_ENABLED", True),
database_url=_secret("DATABASE_URL", required=True),
session_store=session_store,
cache_url=_secret("CACHE_URL", required=session_store == "valkey"),
# Contract name. Minimum 1 s so the expiry test can use 2 s.
session_ttl_seconds=_int("SESSION_TTL_SECONDS", 3600, 1, 30 * 24 * 3600),
db_pool_min=db_pool_min,
db_pool_max=db_pool_max,
db_timeout_seconds=_float("DB_TIMEOUT_SECONDS", 3.0, 0.5, 30.0),
cache_timeout_seconds=_float("CACHE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS", 0.5, 0.05, 10.0),
hash_concurrency=_int("PASSWORD_HASH_CONCURRENCY", 2, 1, 16),
)
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"""Opaque keyset cursors.
A cursor encodes the sort key `(created_at, id)` of the last item on the page
plus the resource it belongs to, e.g. `v1|m|<chat_id>|<ts_us>|<message_id>`,
packed in URL-safe base64. The client treats it as an opaque string; the server
rejects cursors of another chat/user (400) and any non-canonical encoding.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import base64
import re
from .errors import InvalidRequest
from .validation import UUID_RE
B64_RE = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,512}")
TS_RE = re.compile(r"[0-9]{1,19}")
# Latest instant both Python datetime and PostgreSQL accept: 9999-12-31T23:59:59.999999Z.
MAX_TS_US = 253402300799999999
MESSAGES = "m"
CHATS = "c"
SortKey = tuple[int, str]
def encode(scope: str, owner_id: str, key: SortKey) -> str:
ts, item_id = key
raw = f"v1|{scope}|{owner_id}|{ts}|{item_id}".encode("ascii")
return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(raw).rstrip(b"=").decode("ascii")
def decode(cursor: str, scope: str, owner_id: str) -> SortKey:
"""Return the sort key stored in the cursor or raise InvalidRequest."""
bad = InvalidRequest("Неверный cursor")
if B64_RE.fullmatch(cursor) is None:
raise bad
try:
raw = base64.urlsafe_b64decode(cursor + "=" * (-len(cursor) % 4)).decode("ascii")
except (ValueError, UnicodeDecodeError):
raise bad from None
parts = raw.split("|")
if len(parts) != 5 or parts[0] != "v1":
raise bad
_, got_scope, got_owner, ts, item_id = parts
if TS_RE.fullmatch(ts) is None or UUID_RE.fullmatch(item_id) is None or item_id != item_id.lower():
raise bad
key = (int(ts), item_id)
if key[0] > MAX_TS_US:
raise bad # out-of-range time must be 400, not an overflow (500) in datetime/SQL
if encode(got_scope, got_owner, key) != cursor:
raise bad # only the canonical form produced by the server is accepted
if got_scope != scope or got_owner != owner_id:
raise InvalidRequest("cursor относится к другому ресурсу")
return key
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"""PostgreSQL access: a bounded connection pool and a hard deadline for every unit of work.
Three independent limits keep a request from hanging when the database misbehaves:
* pool `timeout` — waiting for a free connection (pool exhausted);
* server `statement_timeout` / `lock_timeout` — PostgreSQL itself cancels a slow
statement or a statement stuck behind a lock;
* client deadline — covers what the server cannot report, e.g. a
paused/frozen PostgreSQL container or a dead network.
The client deadline needs care: when a psycopg query is cancelled, psycopg sends a
cancel request to the server and waits for it (up to 5 s + 5 s) before giving up.
With a frozen server that would stretch a 3 s deadline to 13 s. Therefore every unit
of work runs as its own task: at the deadline the request stops waiting and gets 503
at once, while the task finishes its cleanup (cancel, close, return to the pool) in
the background. Any failure becomes 503 `unavailable` — never 401, never a hang.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
import logging
from collections.abc import Awaitable, Callable
from typing import TypeVar
import psycopg
from psycopg_pool import AsyncConnectionPool, PoolTimeout
from .config import Settings
from .errors import Unavailable
log = logging.getLogger("messenger.db")
T = TypeVar("T")
Work = Callable[[psycopg.AsyncConnection], Awaitable[T]]
# Errors that mean "the database is unavailable right now", not "the request is wrong".
# QueryCanceled (statement_timeout), LockNotAvailable (lock_timeout) and AdminShutdown
# (server restart) are subclasses of OperationalError.
UNAVAILABLE_ERRORS = (psycopg.OperationalError, psycopg.InterfaceError, PoolTimeout, TimeoutError)
def _forget(task: asyncio.Task) -> None:
"""Done-callback for abandoned tasks: retrieve the result so nothing is logged as 'never retrieved'."""
if not task.cancelled():
task.exception()
class Database:
def __init__(self, settings: Settings):
self.deadline = settings.db_timeout_seconds
options = (
f"-c statement_timeout={settings.db_statement_timeout_ms} "
f"-c lock_timeout={max(100, settings.db_statement_timeout_ms // 2)} "
"-c idle_in_transaction_session_timeout=10000"
)
self.pool = AsyncConnectionPool(
conninfo=settings.database_url,
min_size=settings.db_pool_min,
max_size=settings.db_pool_max,
timeout=settings.db_timeout_seconds, # max wait for a free connection
open=False,
name="messenger",
check=AsyncConnectionPool.check_connection, # drop connections broken by a DB restart
kwargs={
"options": options,
"connect_timeout": max(1, int(settings.db_timeout_seconds)),
"application_name": "messenger-api",
},
)
async def open(self) -> None:
# wait=False: the API starts (liveness 200) even if PostgreSQL is not up yet;
# readiness stays 503 until the database answers.
await self.pool.open(wait=False)
async def close(self) -> None:
await self.pool.close(timeout=2)
async def run(self, work: Work[T], deadline: float | None = None) -> T:
"""Run `work(conn)` in one transaction (COMMIT on success, ROLLBACK on any exception).
Domain errors raised by `work` (NotFound, Conflict, ...) propagate unchanged;
database unavailability and the deadline become Unavailable (503).
"""
async def unit() -> T:
async with self.pool.connection() as conn:
async with conn.transaction():
return await work(conn)
task = asyncio.ensure_future(unit())
try:
return await asyncio.wait_for(asyncio.shield(task), deadline or self.deadline)
except UNAVAILABLE_ERRORS as exc:
log.warning("database_unavailable", extra={"fields": {"error": type(exc).__name__}})
raise Unavailable("База данных временно недоступна") from None
finally:
if not task.done():
# Deadline or cancelled request: stop waiting now, let psycopg clean up later.
task.cancel()
task.add_done_callback(_forget)
async def ping(self, timeout: float = 1.0) -> bool:
async def select_one(conn: psycopg.AsyncConnection) -> None:
await conn.execute("SELECT 1")
try:
await self.run(select_one, deadline=timeout)
return True
except Unavailable:
return False
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"""Swagger UI for manual experiments: http://127.0.0.1:8080/docs
The page shows the course contract contracts/openapi.json as is (it is not
generated from our code). Only `servers` is replaced with "/" so that the
"Try it out" requests go to the same host the page was opened from.
Swagger UI itself (JS/CSS) is loaded by the browser from the jsDelivr CDN.
Disable with DOCS_ENABLED=false.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
from functools import lru_cache
from pathlib import Path
from starlette.requests import Request
from starlette.responses import HTMLResponse, JSONResponse
SPEC_PATH = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] / "contracts" / "openapi.json"
SWAGGER_UI = "https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/swagger-ui-dist@5.33.0"
PAGE = f"""<!doctype html>
<html lang="ru">
<head>
<meta charset="utf-8">
<title>Messenger lab1 — Swagger UI</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" href="{SWAGGER_UI}/swagger-ui.css">
</head>
<body>
<div id="swagger-ui"></div>
<script src="{SWAGGER_UI}/swagger-ui-bundle.js"></script>
<script>
window.ui = SwaggerUIBundle({{
url: "/openapi.json",
dom_id: "#swagger-ui",
tryItOutEnabled: true, // fields are editable right away
persistAuthorization: true, // X-User-Id from "Authorize" survives page reload
displayRequestDuration: true,
}});
</script>
</body>
</html>
"""
@lru_cache(maxsize=1)
def _spec() -> dict:
spec = json.loads(SPEC_PATH.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
spec["servers"] = [{"url": "/", "description": "этот сервер"}]
return spec
async def swagger_page(request: Request) -> HTMLResponse:
return HTMLResponse(PAGE)
async def openapi_json(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
return JSONResponse(_spec())
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"""Domain errors mapped 1:1 to the contract error codes (contracts/README.md)."""
from __future__ import annotations
BEARER_CHALLENGE = 'Bearer realm="messenger"'
BASIC_CHALLENGE = 'Basic realm="messenger", charset="UTF-8"'
class ApiError(Exception):
status = 500
code = "internal_error"
default_message = "Внутренняя ошибка сервера"
def __init__(self, message: str | None = None):
self.message = message or self.default_message
super().__init__(self.message)
@property
def headers(self) -> dict[str, str]:
return {}
class InvalidRequest(ApiError):
status = 400
code = "invalid_request"
default_message = "Неверный запрос"
class Unauthorized(ApiError):
"""401 with the challenge of the scheme the endpoint expects (RFC 7235)."""
status = 401
code = "unauthorized"
default_message = "Требуется действительная сессия"
def __init__(self, message: str | None = None, challenge: str = BEARER_CHALLENGE):
super().__init__(message)
self.challenge = challenge
@property
def headers(self) -> dict[str, str]:
return {"WWW-Authenticate": self.challenge}
class NotFound(ApiError):
status = 404
code = "not_found"
default_message = "Объект не найден"
class Conflict(ApiError):
status = 409
code = "conflict"
default_message = "Конфликт"
class PayloadTooLarge(ApiError):
status = 413
code = "payload_too_large"
default_message = "Тело запроса слишком большое"
class Unavailable(ApiError):
status = 503
code = "unavailable"
default_message = "Сервис временно недоступен"
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"""Docker HEALTHCHECK probe without curl/wget in the image: `python -m messenger.healthcheck`."""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import sys
import urllib.request
def main() -> int:
port = os.environ.get("APP_PORT", "8080").strip() or "8080"
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(f"http://127.0.0.1:{port}/health/ready", timeout=2) as response:
return 0 if response.status == 200 else 1
except Exception:
return 1
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main())
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"""JSON-lines logging to stdout. Logs never contain message texts or request bodies."""
from __future__ import annotations
import datetime as dt
import json
import logging
import sys
class JsonFormatter(logging.Formatter):
def format(self, record: logging.LogRecord) -> str:
entry = {
"ts": dt.datetime.fromtimestamp(record.created, dt.timezone.utc).isoformat(timespec="milliseconds").replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"level": record.levelname.lower(),
"logger": record.name,
"event": record.getMessage(),
}
fields = getattr(record, "fields", None)
if fields:
entry.update(fields)
if record.exc_info:
# Stack traces go only to the server log, never to the HTTP client.
entry["exception"] = self.formatException(record.exc_info)
return json.dumps(entry, ensure_ascii=False)
def configure(level: str) -> None:
handler = logging.StreamHandler(sys.stdout)
handler.setFormatter(JsonFormatter())
root = logging.getLogger()
root.handlers[:] = [handler]
root.setLevel(level.upper())
# uvicorn's own access log is disabled; our middleware writes one line per request.
for name in ("uvicorn", "uvicorn.error"):
logging.getLogger(name).handlers[:] = []
logging.getLogger(name).propagate = True
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"""Versioned SQL migrations: `python -m messenger.migrate` (compose service `migrate`).
* Files `migrations/NNNN_name.sql` are applied in name order, each in its own
transaction together with its row in `schema_migrations` (DDL is transactional
in PostgreSQL, so a failed migration leaves nothing behind).
* Re-running is safe: applied versions are skipped, so data is never duplicated.
* The SHA-256 of every applied file is stored; if an applied file was edited later,
the run stops instead of silently diverging from the real schema.
* `pg_advisory_lock` serialises concurrent runs (two API replicas starting at once).
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import hashlib
import sys
import time
from pathlib import Path
import psycopg
from .config import ConfigError, _secret
MIGRATIONS_DIR = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] / "migrations"
LOCK_ID = 2026_02 # arbitrary application-wide advisory lock id
def say(text: str) -> None:
print(f"migrate: {text}", flush=True)
def connect(url: str, wait_seconds: float = 60) -> psycopg.Connection:
deadline = time.monotonic() + wait_seconds
while True:
try:
return psycopg.connect(url, autocommit=True, connect_timeout=3, application_name="messenger-migrate")
except psycopg.OperationalError as exc:
if time.monotonic() > deadline:
raise SystemExit(f"migrate: database is not reachable: {type(exc).__name__}") from None
time.sleep(1)
def main() -> int:
try:
url = _secret("DATABASE_URL", required=True)
except ConfigError as exc:
print(f"configuration error: {exc}", file=sys.stderr)
return 2
files = sorted(MIGRATIONS_DIR.glob("*.sql"))
with connect(url) as conn:
conn.execute("SELECT pg_advisory_lock(%s)", (LOCK_ID,))
try:
conn.execute(
"CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS schema_migrations ("
" version text PRIMARY KEY, checksum text NOT NULL,"
" applied_at timestamptz NOT NULL DEFAULT now())")
applied = dict(conn.execute("SELECT version, checksum FROM schema_migrations").fetchall())
for path in files:
version, sql = path.stem, path.read_bytes()
checksum = hashlib.sha256(sql).hexdigest()
if version in applied:
if applied[version] != checksum:
say(f"{version}: file changed after it was applied; create a new migration instead")
return 1
say(f"{version}: already applied, skipped")
continue
with conn.transaction():
conn.execute(sql.decode("utf-8"))
conn.execute("INSERT INTO schema_migrations (version, checksum) VALUES (%s, %s)", (version, checksum))
say(f"{version}: applied")
finally:
conn.execute("SELECT pg_advisory_unlock(%s)", (LOCK_ID,))
say(f"done, {len(files)} migration file(s) checked")
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main())
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"""Password hashing with Argon2id (memory-hard password KDF; also mandatory in lab 7).
* Parameters follow the OWASP minimum for Argon2id: m=19 MiB, t=2, p=1. Unlike bcrypt
there is no 72-byte limit, so any 12-128 code point UTF-8 password is hashed whole.
* Hashing takes tens of milliseconds of CPU and 19 MiB of RAM. It runs in a worker
thread (argon2-cffi releases the GIL), so the event loop keeps serving other
requests, and a semaphore caps parallel hashes (memory/CPU DoS protection).
* An unknown username is checked against a dummy hash, so "no such user" and
"wrong password" take the same time and return the same 401.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
from argon2 import PasswordHasher
from argon2.exceptions import InvalidHashError, VerificationError, VerifyMismatchError
_hasher = PasswordHasher(time_cost=2, memory_cost=19 * 1024, parallelism=1, hash_len=32, salt_len=16)
_semaphore: asyncio.Semaphore | None = None
_dummy_hash: str | None = None
def configure(concurrency: int) -> None:
global _semaphore
_semaphore = asyncio.Semaphore(concurrency)
async def _run(func, *args):
if _semaphore is None:
configure(2)
async with _semaphore:
return await asyncio.to_thread(func, *args)
async def hash_password(password: str) -> str:
return await _run(_hasher.hash, password)
def _verify(stored_hash: str, password: str) -> bool:
try:
return _hasher.verify(stored_hash, password)
except (VerifyMismatchError, VerificationError, InvalidHashError):
return False
async def verify_password(stored_hash: str | None, password: str) -> bool:
global _dummy_hash
if stored_hash is None:
if _dummy_hash is None:
_dummy_hash = await hash_password("dummy-password-for-timing")
await _run(_verify, _dummy_hash, password)
return False
return await _run(_verify, stored_hash, password)
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"""SQL for users, chats and messages. All statements are parameterised (%s placeholders):
values travel separately from the SQL text, so input can never change the query.
Free text is stored as UTF-8 BYTEA (PostgreSQL TEXT cannot hold U+0000), so it is
encoded on the way in and decoded on the way out. See docs/DATA_MODEL.md.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import datetime as dt
import uuid
from dataclasses import dataclass
import psycopg
from psycopg import errors as pg_errors
from .cursor import SortKey
from .db import Database
from .errors import Conflict, InvalidRequest, NotFound
from .timefmt import from_us, rfc3339, to_us
def _b(text: str) -> bytes:
return text.encode("utf-8")
def _s(raw: bytes | memoryview) -> str:
return bytes(raw).decode("utf-8")
@dataclass(slots=True, frozen=True)
class User:
id: str
username: str
display_name: str
created_at: dt.datetime
def to_json(self) -> dict:
return {"id": self.id, "username": self.username, "display_name": self.display_name,
"created_at": rfc3339(self.created_at)}
@dataclass(slots=True, frozen=True)
class Chat:
id: str
title: str
member_ids: tuple[str, ...]
created_at: dt.datetime
@property
def key(self) -> SortKey:
return (to_us(self.created_at), self.id)
def to_json(self) -> dict:
return {"id": self.id, "title": self.title, "member_ids": list(self.member_ids),
"created_at": rfc3339(self.created_at)}
@dataclass(slots=True, frozen=True)
class Message:
id: str
chat_id: str
sender_id: str
text: str
created_at: dt.datetime
@property
def key(self) -> SortKey:
return (to_us(self.created_at), self.id)
def to_json(self) -> dict:
return {"id": self.id, "chat_id": self.chat_id, "sender_id": self.sender_id, "text": self.text,
"created_at": rfc3339(self.created_at)}
def _user(row) -> User:
return User(str(row[0]), row[1], _s(row[2]), row[3])
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ users
async def create_user(db: Database, username: str, display_name: str, password_hash: str) -> User:
async def work(conn: psycopg.AsyncConnection) -> User:
cur = await conn.execute(
"INSERT INTO users (id, username, display_name, password_hash) VALUES (%s, %s, %s, %s) "
"RETURNING id, username, display_name, created_at",
(uuid.uuid4(), username, _b(display_name), password_hash))
return _user(await cur.fetchone())
try:
return await db.run(work)
except pg_errors.UniqueViolation:
# Two concurrent registrations: the unique index lets exactly one INSERT commit.
raise Conflict("Имя пользователя уже занято") from None
async def get_user(db: Database, user_id: str) -> User | None:
async def work(conn: psycopg.AsyncConnection) -> User | None:
cur = await conn.execute(
"SELECT id, username, display_name, created_at FROM users WHERE id = %s", (user_id,))
row = await cur.fetchone()
return _user(row) if row else None
return await db.run(work)
async def get_credentials(db: Database, username: str) -> tuple[User, str] | None:
async def work(conn: psycopg.AsyncConnection) -> tuple[User, str] | None:
cur = await conn.execute(
"SELECT id, username, display_name, created_at, password_hash FROM users WHERE username = %s",
(username,))
row = await cur.fetchone()
return (_user(row), row[4]) if row else None
return await db.run(work)
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ chats
async def create_chat(db: Database, creator_id: str, title: str, member_ids: list[str]) -> Chat:
"""Atomic: the chat row and all memberships commit together or not at all.
The chat is inserted FIRST; an unknown member then fails the membership INSERT
with a foreign-key violation and the whole transaction (chat row included) is
rolled back. student-tests check that nothing is left behind.
"""
if creator_id not in member_ids:
raise InvalidRequest("member_ids должен включать текущего пользователя")
chat_id = uuid.uuid4()
async def work(conn: psycopg.AsyncConnection) -> dt.datetime:
cur = await conn.execute(
"INSERT INTO chats (id, title, created_by) VALUES (%s, %s, %s) RETURNING created_at",
(chat_id, _b(title), creator_id))
(created_at,) = await cur.fetchone()
await conn.execute(
"INSERT INTO chat_members (chat_id, user_id, position, chat_created_at) "
"SELECT %s, m.user_id, m.ord - 1, %s "
"FROM unnest(%s::uuid[]) WITH ORDINALITY AS m(user_id, ord)",
(chat_id, created_at, member_ids))
return created_at
try:
created_at = await db.run(work)
except pg_errors.ForeignKeyViolation:
raise InvalidRequest("member_ids содержит несуществующих пользователей") from None
return Chat(str(chat_id), title, tuple(member_ids), created_at)
async def _load_chats(conn: psycopg.AsyncConnection, rows) -> list[Chat]:
if not rows:
return []
ids = [r[0] for r in rows]
cur = await conn.execute(
"SELECT chat_id, user_id FROM chat_members WHERE chat_id = ANY(%s) ORDER BY chat_id, position", (ids,))
members: dict[uuid.UUID, list[str]] = {i: [] for i in ids}
for chat_id, user_id in await cur.fetchall():
members[chat_id].append(str(user_id))
return [Chat(str(r[0]), _s(r[1]), tuple(members[r[0]]), r[2]) for r in rows]
async def get_chat(db: Database, user_id: str, chat_id: str) -> Chat:
"""The chat if the user is a member; a missing chat and a foreign chat are both 404."""
async def work(conn: psycopg.AsyncConnection) -> Chat:
cur = await conn.execute(
"SELECT c.id, c.title, c.created_at FROM chats c "
"JOIN chat_members m ON m.chat_id = c.id AND m.user_id = %s WHERE c.id = %s",
(user_id, chat_id))
row = await cur.fetchone()
if row is None:
raise NotFound("Чат не найден")
return (await _load_chats(conn, [row]))[0]
return await db.run(work)
async def _check_member(conn: psycopg.AsyncConnection, user_id: str, chat_id: str) -> None:
cur = await conn.execute(
"SELECT 1 FROM chat_members WHERE chat_id = %s AND user_id = %s", (chat_id, user_id))
if await cur.fetchone() is None:
raise NotFound("Чат не найден")
async def ensure_member(db: Database, user_id: str, chat_id: str) -> None:
async def work(conn: psycopg.AsyncConnection) -> None:
await _check_member(conn, user_id, chat_id)
await db.run(work)
async def list_chats(db: Database, user_id: str, after: SortKey | None, limit: int) -> tuple[list[Chat], bool]:
async def work(conn: psycopg.AsyncConnection) -> tuple[list[Chat], bool]:
if after is None:
cur = await conn.execute(
"SELECT c.id, c.title, c.created_at FROM chat_members m JOIN chats c ON c.id = m.chat_id "
"WHERE m.user_id = %s ORDER BY m.chat_created_at, m.chat_id LIMIT %s",
(user_id, limit + 1))
else:
cur = await conn.execute(
"SELECT c.id, c.title, c.created_at FROM chat_members m JOIN chats c ON c.id = m.chat_id "
"WHERE m.user_id = %s AND (m.chat_created_at, m.chat_id) > (%s, %s) "
"ORDER BY m.chat_created_at, m.chat_id LIMIT %s",
(user_id, from_us(after[0]), after[1], limit + 1))
rows = await cur.fetchall()
return await _load_chats(conn, rows[:limit]), len(rows) > limit
return await db.run(work)
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ messages
async def add_message(db: Database, user_id: str, chat_id: str, text: str) -> Message:
"""Insert with a per-chat strictly increasing timestamp.
`UPDATE chats ... RETURNING` locks the chat row until COMMIT, so writers of one
chat are serialised: a message with a smaller created_at can never commit after
a message with a bigger one, and a reader paging by cursor cannot skip it.
"""
message_id = uuid.uuid4()
async def work(conn: psycopg.AsyncConnection) -> dt.datetime:
await _check_member(conn, user_id, chat_id)
cur = await conn.execute(
"UPDATE chats SET last_message_at = greatest(clock_timestamp(), "
"last_message_at + interval '1 microsecond') WHERE id = %s RETURNING last_message_at",
(chat_id,))
(created_at,) = await cur.fetchone()
await conn.execute(
"INSERT INTO messages (id, chat_id, sender_id, text, created_at) VALUES (%s, %s, %s, %s, %s)",
(message_id, chat_id, user_id, _b(text), created_at))
return created_at
created_at = await db.run(work)
return Message(str(message_id), chat_id, user_id, text, created_at)
# Two statements instead of one with "(%s IS NULL OR ...)": with a generic plan the OR
# would push the cursor into a Filter and late pages would scan the whole prefix.
HISTORY_FIRST = (
"SELECT id, sender_id, text, created_at FROM messages "
"WHERE chat_id = %s ORDER BY created_at, id LIMIT %s")
HISTORY_AFTER = (
"SELECT id, sender_id, text, created_at FROM messages "
"WHERE chat_id = %s AND (created_at, id) > (%s, %s) ORDER BY created_at, id LIMIT %s")
async def list_messages(db: Database, chat_id: str, after: SortKey | None, limit: int) -> tuple[list[Message], bool]:
async def work(conn: psycopg.AsyncConnection) -> list:
if after is None:
cur = await conn.execute(HISTORY_FIRST, (chat_id, limit + 1))
else:
cur = await conn.execute(HISTORY_AFTER, (chat_id, from_us(after[0]), after[1], limit + 1))
return await cur.fetchall()
rows = await db.run(work)
items = [Message(str(r[0]), chat_id, str(r[1]), _s(r[2]), r[3]) for r in rows[:limit]]
return items, len(rows) > limit
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"""Server-side sessions behind an opaque Bearer token.
* Token: `secrets.token_urlsafe(32)` = 256 random bits. Only SHA-256(token) is
stored, so a leaked database/AOF does not contain usable tokens. A fast hash is
enough for a 256-bit random value; passwords need a slow KDF (passwords.py).
* Expiry is absolute: `expires_at = login time + SESSION_TTL_SECONDS`. Every lookup
compares it with the current time, and a restart never extends it.
Two interchangeable stores (SESSION_STORE):
* `valkey` (compose default): the ONLY copy of a session is a Valkey key with
`PXAT expires_at`, persisted by AOF with `appendfsync always`. There is no second
copy (no cache over PostgreSQL), so a logout cannot be "forgotten" and a revoked
token cannot come back after Valkey fails and recovers. If Valkey is unreachable
a session cannot be checked: protected requests and logout get 503, never access.
* `postgres`: table `sessions` (migrations/0001_init.sql).
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
import datetime as dt
import hashlib
import json
import logging
import secrets
from typing import Protocol
from redis import exceptions as redis_errors
from redis.asyncio import Redis
from redis.backoff import NoBackoff
from redis.retry import Retry
from .config import Settings
from .db import Database
from .errors import Unavailable
from .timefmt import UTC, from_us, to_us
log = logging.getLogger("messenger.sessions")
def new_token() -> str:
return secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
def token_hash(token: str) -> bytes:
return hashlib.sha256(token.encode("ascii")).digest()
def now() -> dt.datetime:
return dt.datetime.now(UTC)
class SessionStore(Protocol):
name: str
async def create(self, user_id: str, ttl_seconds: int) -> tuple[str, dt.datetime]: ...
async def user_id_for(self, token: str) -> str | None: ...
async def revoke(self, token: str) -> bool: ...
async def ping(self) -> bool: ...
async def close(self) -> None: ...
class PostgresSessionStore:
name = "postgres"
def __init__(self, db: Database):
self.db = db
async def create(self, user_id: str, ttl_seconds: int) -> tuple[str, dt.datetime]:
token = new_token()
expires_at = now() + dt.timedelta(seconds=ttl_seconds)
async def work(conn) -> None:
await conn.execute(
"INSERT INTO sessions (token_hash, user_id, expires_at) VALUES (%s, %s, %s)",
(token_hash(token), user_id, expires_at))
# Housekeeping: drop this user's expired sessions (bounded by the user's own rows).
await conn.execute("DELETE FROM sessions WHERE user_id = %s AND expires_at <= %s", (user_id, now()))
await self.db.run(work)
return token, expires_at
async def user_id_for(self, token: str) -> str | None:
async def work(conn):
cur = await conn.execute(
"SELECT user_id FROM sessions WHERE token_hash = %s AND expires_at > %s", (token_hash(token), now()))
return await cur.fetchone()
row = await self.db.run(work)
return str(row[0]) if row else None
async def revoke(self, token: str) -> bool:
async def work(conn) -> bool:
cur = await conn.execute(
"DELETE FROM sessions WHERE token_hash = %s AND expires_at > %s", (token_hash(token), now()))
return cur.rowcount == 1
return await self.db.run(work)
async def ping(self) -> bool:
return True # covered by the database readiness check
async def close(self) -> None:
return None
class ValkeySessionStore:
name = "valkey"
PREFIX = "session:"
def __init__(self, settings: Settings):
self.timeout = settings.cache_timeout_seconds
self.client = Redis.from_url(
settings.cache_url,
socket_timeout=self.timeout,
socket_connect_timeout=self.timeout,
retry=Retry(NoBackoff(), 0), # no hidden retries: a failure is reported at once
decode_responses=False,
)
def _key(self, token: str) -> str:
return self.PREFIX + token_hash(token).hex()
async def _call(self, coro):
try:
async with asyncio.timeout(self.timeout * 2):
return await coro
except (redis_errors.ConnectionError, redis_errors.TimeoutError, TimeoutError, OSError) as exc:
log.warning("session_store_unavailable", extra={"fields": {"error": type(exc).__name__}})
raise Unavailable("Хранилище сессий временно недоступно") from None
async def create(self, user_id: str, ttl_seconds: int) -> tuple[str, dt.datetime]:
token = new_token()
expires_at = now() + dt.timedelta(seconds=ttl_seconds)
value = json.dumps({"user_id": user_id, "expires_at_us": to_us(expires_at)}).encode()
# PXAT = absolute expiry time: survives restarts (AOF) without being extended.
await self._call(self.client.set(self._key(token), value, pxat=to_us(expires_at) // 1000))
return token, expires_at
async def user_id_for(self, token: str) -> str | None:
raw = await self._call(self.client.get(self._key(token)))
if raw is None:
return None
data = json.loads(raw)
if from_us(data["expires_at_us"]) <= now():
return None # do not rely only on Valkey's lazy expiry
return data["user_id"]
async def revoke(self, token: str) -> bool:
return await self._call(self.client.delete(self._key(token))) == 1
async def ping(self) -> bool:
try:
return bool(await self._call(self.client.ping()))
except Unavailable:
return False
async def close(self) -> None:
await self.client.aclose()
def build_store(settings: Settings, db: Database) -> SessionStore:
return ValkeySessionStore(settings) if settings.session_store == "valkey" else PostgresSessionStore(db)
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"""Conversions between PostgreSQL timestamptz values, cursor integers and RFC 3339 strings."""
from __future__ import annotations
import datetime as dt
UTC = dt.timezone.utc
_EPOCH = dt.datetime(1970, 1, 1, tzinfo=UTC)
def to_us(value: dt.datetime) -> int:
"""Microseconds since the Unix epoch (exact: timestamptz has microsecond precision)."""
delta = value - _EPOCH
return (delta.days * 86_400 + delta.seconds) * 1_000_000 + delta.microseconds
def from_us(us: int) -> dt.datetime:
return _EPOCH + dt.timedelta(microseconds=us)
def rfc3339(value: dt.datetime) -> str:
"""RFC 3339 UTC with fixed microsecond precision, e.g. 2026-10-12T12:00:00.000001Z."""
return value.astimezone(UTC).strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S.%fZ")
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"""Strict request validation according to contracts/openapi.json + contracts/README.md.
Written by hand instead of a schema library so that every rule is visible:
extra fields, wrong JSON types, whitespace-only strings and lengths counted in
Unicode code points all produce 400 invalid_request.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import re
from typing import Any
from .errors import InvalidRequest
USERNAME_RE = re.compile(r"[a-z0-9_]{3,32}")
# Canonical textual UUID (8-4-4-4-12 hex). Case-insensitive, normalised to lower case.
UUID_RE = re.compile(r"[0-9a-fA-F]{8}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{12}")
LIMIT_RE = re.compile(r"[0-9]{1,3}")
SURROGATES_RE = re.compile("[\ud800-\udfff]")
DEFAULT_LIMIT = 50
MAX_LIMIT = 100
def _reject_constant(name: str) -> Any:
# Python's json accepts NaN/Infinity, which are not valid JSON.
raise ValueError(f"invalid JSON constant {name}")
def parse_json_object(body: bytes) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Decode a UTF-8 JSON object or raise InvalidRequest (malformed JSON -> 400)."""
try:
text = body.decode("utf-8")
value = json.loads(text, parse_constant=_reject_constant)
except (UnicodeDecodeError, ValueError):
raise InvalidRequest("Тело запроса должно быть корректным JSON в UTF-8") from None
if not isinstance(value, dict):
raise InvalidRequest("Тело запроса должно быть JSON-объектом")
return value
def check_fields(data: dict[str, Any], required: set[str], optional: frozenset[str] = frozenset()) -> None:
extra = set(data) - required - optional
if extra:
raise InvalidRequest("Неизвестные поля: " + ", ".join(sorted(extra)))
missing = required - set(data)
if missing:
raise InvalidRequest("Отсутствуют обязательные поля: " + ", ".join(sorted(missing)))
def text_field(data: dict[str, Any], name: str, max_len: int, *, min_len: int = 1) -> str:
value = data[name]
if not isinstance(value, str):
raise InvalidRequest(f"Поле {name} должно быть строкой")
if SURROGATES_RE.search(value):
# "\ud800" escapes decode to lone surrogates that cannot be encoded as UTF-8.
raise InvalidRequest(f"Поле {name} содержит недопустимые символы")
# len() of a Python str is the number of Unicode code points, as the contract requires.
if not min_len <= len(value) <= max_len:
raise InvalidRequest(f"Длина поля {name} должна быть от {min_len} до {max_len} символов")
if value.strip() == "":
raise InvalidRequest(f"Поле {name} не может состоять только из пробелов")
return value
def username_field(data: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
value = data["username"]
if not isinstance(value, str) or USERNAME_RE.fullmatch(value) is None:
raise InvalidRequest("username должен соответствовать [a-z0-9_]{3,32}")
return value
def password_field(data: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
"""12-128 Unicode code points, not whitespace-only; any other character (':' too) is allowed."""
value = data["password"]
if not isinstance(value, str):
raise InvalidRequest("Поле password должно быть строкой")
if SURROGATES_RE.search(value):
raise InvalidRequest("Поле password содержит недопустимые символы")
if not 12 <= len(value) <= 128:
raise InvalidRequest("Длина пароля должна быть от 12 до 128 символов")
if value.strip() == "":
raise InvalidRequest("Пароль не может состоять только из пробелов")
return value
def parse_uuid(value: Any, what: str = "UUID") -> str:
if not isinstance(value, str) or UUID_RE.fullmatch(value) is None:
raise InvalidRequest(f"Неверный {what}")
return value.lower()
def member_ids_field(data: dict[str, Any]) -> list[str]:
value = data["member_ids"]
if not isinstance(value, list):
raise InvalidRequest("member_ids должен быть массивом")
if not 1 <= len(value) <= 100:
raise InvalidRequest("member_ids должен содержать от 1 до 100 элементов")
ids = [parse_uuid(item, "UUID участника") for item in value]
if len(set(ids)) != len(ids):
raise InvalidRequest("member_ids содержит дубликаты")
return ids
def single_query_param(query: list[tuple[str, str]], name: str) -> str | None:
values = [v for k, v in query if k == name]
if len(values) > 1:
raise InvalidRequest(f"Параметр {name} указан несколько раз")
return values[0] if values else None
def parse_limit(raw: str | None) -> int:
if raw is None:
return DEFAULT_LIMIT
if LIMIT_RE.fullmatch(raw) is None or not 1 <= int(raw) <= MAX_LIMIT:
raise InvalidRequest(f"limit должен быть целым числом от 1 до {MAX_LIMIT}")
return int(raw)
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"""Shared helpers for the student tests.
* `unit/` — pure functions (validation, cursor, auth headers, Argon2id); no services.
* `test_*` in this folder — marker `stack`: black-box HTTP against the running compose
stand (BASE_URL, default http://127.0.0.1:8080) plus `docker compose` for database
checks (psql inside the postgres container) and failure injection. Every failure
test restores the stopped/paused service in `finally`.
python -m pytest student-tests # everything (stand must be up)
python -m pytest student-tests -m "not stack" # unit only
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import base64
import contextlib
import json
import os
import subprocess
import sys
import time
import uuid
from pathlib import Path
import httpx2 as httpx
import pytest
from jsonschema import Draft202012Validator
ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
sys.path.insert(0, str(ROOT / "src"))
SPEC = json.loads((ROOT / "contracts" / "openapi.json").read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
BASE_URL = os.environ.get("BASE_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:8080").rstrip("/")
PASSWORD = "Test-password-Ω-12345" # synthetic; 12+ code points, non-ASCII on purpose
def pytest_configure(config):
config.addinivalue_line("markers", "stack: needs the running compose stand (docker compose up -d --wait)")
def schema_errors(value, name: str) -> list[str]:
"""Validate against components/schemas/<name> of the course contract (JSON Schema 2020-12)."""
schema = {"$ref": f"#/components/schemas/{name}", "components": SPEC["components"]}
validator = Draft202012Validator(schema, format_checker=Draft202012Validator.FORMAT_CHECKER)
return [e.message for e in validator.iter_errors(value)]
def basic(username: str, password: str) -> str:
return "Basic " + base64.b64encode(f"{username}:{password}".encode()).decode()
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ docker / psql
def compose(*args: str, check: bool = True, timeout: float = 120) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess:
return subprocess.run(["docker", "compose", *args], cwd=ROOT, capture_output=True, text=True,
encoding="utf-8", check=check, timeout=timeout)
def psql(sql: str) -> str:
"""Run SQL inside the postgres container (no DB port is published) and return unaligned output."""
result = compose("exec", "-T", "postgres", "psql", "-U", "messenger", "-d", "messenger",
"-At", "-v", "ON_ERROR_STOP=1", "-c", sql)
return result.stdout.strip()
def wait_ready(timeout: float = 90) -> None:
deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout
while time.monotonic() < deadline:
try:
if httpx.get(BASE_URL + "/health/ready", timeout=2).status_code == 200:
return
except httpx.HTTPError:
pass
time.sleep(0.3)
raise AssertionError("stand did not become ready")
def wait_healthy(*services: str, timeout: float = 120) -> None:
"""Poll Docker health until every service is healthy again. `compose up --wait` is not used:
it gives up at once on a container that was marked unhealthy while paused."""
deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout
pending = set(services)
while pending and time.monotonic() < deadline:
for service in list(pending):
ids = compose("ps", "-q", service, check=False).stdout.split()
if ids:
state = subprocess.run(["docker", "inspect", "-f", "{{.State.Health.Status}}", ids[0]],
capture_output=True, text=True).stdout.strip()
if state == "healthy":
pending.discard(service)
time.sleep(0.5)
assert not pending, f"not healthy: {pending}"
def restart_services(*services: str) -> None:
compose("restart", *services)
wait_healthy(*services)
wait_ready()
@contextlib.contextmanager
def service_down(service: str, how: str = "stop"):
"""Stop or pause a compose service; ALWAYS bring it back and wait for readiness."""
assert how in {"stop", "pause"}
compose(how, service)
try:
yield
finally:
compose("unpause" if how == "pause" else "start", service)
wait_healthy(service)
wait_ready()
@contextlib.contextmanager
def api_with_env(**overrides: str):
"""Recreate the api container with environment overrides (e.g. SESSION_TTL_SECONDS=2),
then ALWAYS recreate it with the normal configuration."""
env = {**os.environ, **overrides}
subprocess.run(["docker", "compose", "up", "-d", "--wait", "api"], cwd=ROOT, env=env,
capture_output=True, text=True, check=True, timeout=180)
wait_ready()
try:
yield
finally:
clean = {k: v for k, v in os.environ.items() if k not in overrides}
subprocess.run(["docker", "compose", "up", "-d", "--wait", "api"], cwd=ROOT, env=clean,
capture_output=True, text=True, check=True, timeout=180)
wait_ready()
def api_env(name: str) -> str:
"""Current value of an environment variable inside the running api container."""
return compose("exec", "-T", "api", "printenv", name).stdout.strip()
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ HTTP
class Api:
"""HTTP helper that checks the invariants every response must satisfy."""
def __init__(self, base_url: str = BASE_URL):
self.client = httpx.Client(base_url=base_url, timeout=15)
def call(self, method: str, path: str, expected: int | tuple[int, ...], *, token: str | None = None,
json_body=None, raw: bytes | None = None, headers: dict | None = None, schema: str | None = None):
h = dict(headers or {})
if token is not None:
h["Authorization"] = "Bearer " + token
if json_body is not None:
raw = json.dumps(json_body, ensure_ascii=False).encode("utf-8")
h.setdefault("Content-Type", "application/json")
response = self.client.request(method, path, content=raw, headers=h)
allowed = (expected,) if isinstance(expected, int) else expected
assert response.status_code in allowed, (method, path, response.status_code, response.text[:300])
request_id = response.headers.get("x-request-id")
assert request_id, "every response must carry X-Request-Id"
if response.status_code >= 400:
body = response.json()
assert schema_errors(body, "Error") == [], response.text
assert body["error"]["request_id"] == request_id
assert "Traceback" not in response.text and "psycopg" not in response.text
if response.status_code == 401:
challenge = "basic" if path == "/api/v1/auth/sessions" else "bearer"
assert response.headers.get("www-authenticate", "").lower().startswith(challenge)
elif schema:
assert schema_errors(response.json(), schema) == [], response.text
return response
def register(self, label: str = "u", *, password: str = PASSWORD, display_name: str | None = None) -> dict:
username = f"{label}_{uuid.uuid4().hex[:12]}"[:32]
body = {"username": username, "display_name": display_name or f"Студент {label}", "password": password}
user = self.call("POST", "/api/v1/users", 201, json_body=body, schema="User").json()
return {"id": user["id"], "user": user, "username": username, "password": password}
def login(self, actor: dict) -> str:
session = self.call("POST", "/api/v1/auth/sessions", 201,
headers={"Authorization": basic(actor["username"], actor["password"])},
schema="Session").json()
assert session["user"] == actor["user"] and session["token_type"] == "Bearer"
return session["token"]
def user(self, label: str = "u", **kwargs) -> dict:
actor = self.register(label, **kwargs)
actor["token"] = self.login(actor)
return actor
def chat(self, owner: dict, *members: dict, title: str = "Тестовый чат") -> dict:
ids = [owner["id"], *(m["id"] for m in members)]
return self.call("POST", "/api/v1/chats", 201, token=owner["token"],
json_body={"title": title, "member_ids": ids}, schema="Chat").json()
def send(self, actor: dict, chat: dict, text: str) -> dict:
return self.call("POST", f"/api/v1/chats/{chat['id']}/messages", 201, token=actor["token"],
json_body={"text": text}, schema="Message").json()
def history(self, actor: dict, chat: dict, limit: int) -> tuple[list[dict], int]:
"""Walk all pages; returns (items, number_of_pages)."""
items, pages, cursor = [], 0, None
while True:
query = f"?limit={limit}" + (f"&cursor={cursor}" if cursor else "")
page = self.call("GET", f"/api/v1/chats/{chat['id']}/messages{query}", 200,
token=actor["token"], schema="MessagePage").json()
pages += 1
items.extend(page["items"])
cursor = page["next_cursor"]
if cursor is None:
return items, pages
assert len(page["items"]) == limit, "a non-final page must be full"
assert len(items) < 100_000, "cursor loop"
def _stand_is_up() -> bool:
try:
return httpx.get(BASE_URL + "/health/ready", timeout=3).status_code == 200
except httpx.HTTPError:
return False
def pytest_collection_modifyitems(config, items):
if any("stack" in item.keywords for item in items) and not _stand_is_up():
skip = pytest.mark.skip(reason=f"stand is not running at {BASE_URL}: docker compose up -d --wait")
for item in items:
if "stack" in item.keywords:
item.add_marker(skip)
@pytest.fixture(scope="session")
def api() -> Api:
return Api()
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"""Contract behaviour over real HTTP (stand must be running). Lab 1 checks moved to Bearer + new lab 2 auth."""
from __future__ import annotations
import base64
import uuid
import pytest
from conftest import PASSWORD, basic
pytestmark = pytest.mark.stack
def key(item: dict) -> tuple[str, int]:
return item["created_at"], uuid.UUID(item["id"]).int
# ================================================================== registration & login
def test_register_never_returns_password_and_login_returns_bearer(api):
actor = api.register("alice", display_name="Алиса 👩‍💻")
assert set(actor["user"]) == {"id", "username", "display_name", "created_at"}
session = api.call("POST", "/api/v1/auth/sessions", 201,
headers={"Authorization": basic(actor["username"], PASSWORD)}, schema="Session").json()
assert session["token_type"] == "Bearer" and len(session["token"]) >= 43
assert actor["username"] not in session["token"] and actor["id"] not in session["token"]
assert api.call("GET", "/api/v1/users/me", 200, token=session["token"], schema="User").json() == actor["user"]
def test_duplicate_username_is_409(api):
actor = api.register("dup")
body = {"username": actor["username"], "display_name": "Другой", "password": PASSWORD}
assert api.call("POST", "/api/v1/users", 409, json_body=body).json()["error"]["code"] == "conflict"
@pytest.mark.parametrize("password", ["short-11ch", " " * 12, " \t \n " * 3, "я" * 129])
def test_bad_password_on_registration_is_400(api, password):
body = {"username": "pw_" + uuid.uuid4().hex[:10], "display_name": "x", "password": password}
api.call("POST", "/api/v1/users", 400, json_body=body)
@pytest.mark.parametrize("password", ["я" * 128, "with:colons:inside", "Twelve chars"])
def test_edge_passwords_register_and_login(api, password):
actor = api.user("edge", password=password)
api.call("GET", "/api/v1/users/me", 200, token=actor["token"])
def test_wrong_password_and_unknown_user_give_the_same_401(api):
actor = api.register("victim")
wrong = api.call("POST", "/api/v1/auth/sessions", 401, headers={"Authorization": basic(actor["username"], "Wrong-password-1")})
unknown = api.call("POST", "/api/v1/auth/sessions", 401, headers={"Authorization": basic("nobody_" + uuid.uuid4().hex[:8], PASSWORD)})
assert wrong.json()["error"]["message"] == unknown.json()["error"]["message"]
assert wrong.headers["www-authenticate"] == 'Basic realm="messenger", charset="UTF-8"'
@pytest.mark.parametrize("header", ["Basic é", "Basic !!!", "Basic " + base64.b64encode(b"no_colon").decode(),
"Basic " + base64.b64encode(b"\xff\xfe:x").decode(), "Bearer " + "a" * 43, ""])
def test_malformed_basic_is_401_not_500(api, header):
# Raw UTF-8 bytes, as curl would send them (httpx refuses non-ASCII str headers).
api.call("POST", "/api/v1/auth/sessions", 401, headers={"Authorization": header.encode("utf-8")} if header else {})
def test_logout_revokes_only_this_token(api):
actor = api.user("logout")
second = api.login(actor)
api.call("DELETE", "/api/v1/auth/sessions/current", 204, token=actor["token"])
api.call("GET", "/api/v1/users/me", 401, token=actor["token"])
api.call("DELETE", "/api/v1/auth/sessions/current", 401, token=actor["token"])
api.call("GET", "/api/v1/users/me", 200, token=second) # other session of the same user survives
def test_x_user_id_basic_and_garbage_do_not_authenticate(api):
actor = api.user("hdr")
for headers in ({"X-User-Id": actor["id"]},
{"Authorization": basic(actor["username"], PASSWORD)},
{"Authorization": "Bearer " + "A" * 43},
{"Authorization": "Bearer"}):
api.call("GET", "/api/v1/users/me", 401, headers=headers)
me = api.call("GET", "/api/v1/users/me", 200, token=actor["token"], headers={"X-User-Id": str(uuid.uuid4())})
assert me.json()["id"] == actor["id"]
# ================================================================== validation / errors (from lab 1)
@pytest.mark.parametrize("raw", [b"{", b"", b"[]", b"null", b'{"username": "abc_def", "display_name": NaN, "password": "Twelve-chars"}',
b'{"username": "abc_def", "display_name": "x", "password": "Twelve-chars"}{"a": 1}',
b'{"username": "abc_def", "display_name": "\\ud800", "password": "Twelve-chars"}'])
def test_malformed_json_is_400(api, raw):
api.call("POST", "/api/v1/users", 400, raw=raw, headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"})
@pytest.mark.parametrize("body", [
{"username": "abc_def", "display_name": "x"}, # no password
{"username": "abc_def", "display_name": "x", "password": "Twelve-chars", "extra": 1},
{"username": "Abc_def", "display_name": "x", "password": "Twelve-chars"},
{"username": "abc_def", "display_name": " ", "password": "Twelve-chars"},
{"username": "abc_def", "display_name": "x" * 101, "password": "Twelve-chars"},
{"username": 5, "display_name": "x", "password": "Twelve-chars"},
])
def test_invalid_registration_fields_are_400(api, body):
api.call("POST", "/api/v1/users", 400, json_body=body)
def test_unicode_limits_are_code_points_and_nul_is_stored(api):
actor = api.user("uni", display_name="😀" * 100)
assert actor["user"]["display_name"] == "😀" * 100
nul = api.user("nul", display_name="A\u0000B")
assert api.call("GET", "/api/v1/users/me", 200, token=nul["token"]).json()["display_name"] == "A\u0000B"
chat = api.chat(actor, title="T\u0000itle")
assert chat["title"] == "T\u0000itle"
assert api.send(actor, chat, "hello\u0000world")["text"] == "hello\u0000world"
assert api.send(actor, chat, "🙂" * 4000)["text"] == "🙂" * 4000
api.call("POST", f"/api/v1/chats/{chat['id']}/messages", 400, token=actor["token"], json_body={"text": "я" * 4001})
texts = [m["text"] for m in api.history(actor, chat, 100)[0]]
assert texts == ["hello\u0000world", "🙂" * 4000]
def test_oversized_body_and_wrong_content_type(api):
api.call("POST", "/api/v1/users", 413, json_body={"username": "big_body", "display_name": "x" * 70_000, "password": PASSWORD})
api.call("POST", "/api/v1/users", 400, raw=b'{"username":"abc_def"}', headers={"Content-Type": "text/plain"})
# ================================================================== chats & membership
def test_chat_validation(api):
alice, bob = api.user("alice"), api.user("bob")
for body in ({"title": "x", "member_ids": [alice["id"], bob["id"], bob["id"]]},
{"title": "x", "member_ids": [alice["id"], str(uuid.uuid4())]},
{"title": "x", "member_ids": [bob["id"]]},
{"title": " ", "member_ids": [alice["id"]]},
{"title": "x", "member_ids": [alice["id"], "bob"]}):
api.call("POST", "/api/v1/chats", 400, token=alice["token"], json_body=body)
def test_foreign_chat_is_indistinguishable_from_missing(api):
alice, bob, eve = api.user("alice"), api.user("bob"), api.user("eve")
chat = api.chat(alice, bob)
for chat_id in (chat["id"], str(uuid.uuid4())):
base = f"/api/v1/chats/{chat_id}"
errors = [api.call("GET", base, 404, token=eve["token"]).json(),
api.call("GET", base + "/messages", 404, token=eve["token"]).json(),
api.call("POST", base + "/messages", 404, token=eve["token"], json_body={"text": "чужое"}).json(),
api.call("GET", base + "/messages?cursor=garbage", 404, token=eve["token"]).json()]
assert len({e["error"]["message"] for e in errors}) == 1
api.call("GET", "/api/v1/chats/not-a-uuid", 401)
api.call("GET", "/api/v1/chats/not-a-uuid", 400, token=alice["token"])
api.call("GET", "/api/v1/chats/NOT-A-UUID/messages", 400, token=alice["token"])
def test_chat_list_order_pagination_and_isolation(api):
alice, bob, eve = api.user("alice"), api.user("bob"), api.user("eve")
created = [api.chat(alice, bob, title=f"Чат {i}") for i in range(5)]
api.chat(eve, title="Чат Евы")
walked, cursor = [], None
while True:
query = "?limit=2" + (f"&cursor={cursor}" if cursor else "")
page = api.call("GET", "/api/v1/chats" + query, 200, token=bob["token"], schema="ChatPage").json()
walked += page["items"]
cursor = page["next_cursor"]
if not cursor:
break
assert walked == created
first = api.call("GET", "/api/v1/chats?limit=1", 200, token=alice["token"]).json()["next_cursor"]
api.call("GET", f"/api/v1/chats?limit=1&cursor={first}", 400, token=bob["token"]) # cursor of another user
api.call("GET", "/api/v1/chats?limit=0", 400, token=bob["token"])
# ================================================================== messages & keyset pagination
def test_history_pages_without_loss_or_duplicates(api):
alice, bob = api.user("alice"), api.user("bob")
chat = api.chat(alice, bob)
sent = [api.send(alice if i % 2 else bob, chat, f"сообщение {i}") for i in range(25)]
items, pages = api.history(bob, chat, 7)
assert pages == 4 and items == sent and items == sorted(items, key=key)
assert sent[0]["sender_id"] == bob["id"] and sent[1]["sender_id"] == alice["id"]
@pytest.mark.parametrize("query", ["limit=0", "limit=101", "limit=abc", "limit=1&limit=2", "cursor=", "cursor=garbage",
"cursor=djF8bXx4fDF8Mg", "cursor=" + base64.urlsafe_b64encode(b"v1|m|x|99999999999999999999|y").decode()])
def test_bad_limit_or_cursor_is_400(api, query):
alice = api.user("alice")
chat = api.chat(alice)
api.call("GET", f"/api/v1/chats/{chat['id']}/messages?{query}", 400, token=alice["token"])
def test_cursor_bound_to_chat(api):
alice = api.user("alice")
a, b = api.chat(alice, title="A"), api.chat(alice, title="B")
for chat in (a, b):
api.send(alice, chat, "1")
api.send(alice, chat, "2")
cursor = api.call("GET", f"/api/v1/chats/{a['id']}/messages?limit=1", 200, token=alice["token"]).json()["next_cursor"]
api.call("GET", f"/api/v1/chats/{b['id']}/messages?cursor={cursor}", 400, token=alice["token"])
empty = api.chat(alice, title="Empty")
api.call("GET", f"/api/v1/chats/{empty['id']}/messages?cursor=garbage", 400, token=alice["token"])
def test_read_after_write(api):
alice, bob = api.user("alice"), api.user("bob")
chat = api.chat(alice, bob)
for i in range(5):
message = api.send(alice, chat, f"m{i}")
last = api.call("GET", f"/api/v1/chats/{chat['id']}/messages?limit=100", 200, token=bob["token"]).json()["items"][-1]
assert last == message
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"""Database-level guarantees, checked over HTTP and verified directly in PostgreSQL / Valkey."""
from __future__ import annotations
import threading
import time
import uuid
import pytest
from conftest import PASSWORD, Api, compose, psql
pytestmark = pytest.mark.stack
def run_concurrently(workers: int, target) -> list:
barrier = threading.Barrier(workers)
results: list = [None] * workers
def body(index: int) -> None:
local = Api() # one HTTP client (connection) per worker
barrier.wait() # all workers fire at the same moment
try:
results[index] = target(local, index)
except BaseException as exc: # noqa: BLE001 - reported by the test
results[index] = exc
threads = [threading.Thread(target=body, args=(i,)) for i in range(workers)]
for t in threads:
t.start()
for t in threads:
t.join()
return results
def test_registration_race_exactly_one_201_and_seven_409():
username = "race_" + uuid.uuid4().hex[:10]
def register(client: Api, _index: int) -> int:
body = {"username": username, "display_name": "Гонка", "password": PASSWORD}
response = client.client.post("/api/v1/users", json=body)
return response.status_code
statuses = run_concurrently(8, register)
# Real HTTP codes are compared: a timeout, 500 or exception fails the test instead of counting as 409.
assert sorted(statuses, key=str) == [201] + [409] * 7, statuses
assert psql(f"SELECT count(*) FROM users WHERE username = '{username}'") == "1"
def _ins_counter() -> int:
return int(psql("SELECT n_tup_ins FROM pg_stat_user_tables WHERE relname = 'chats'"))
def test_create_chat_rolls_back_after_the_chat_row_was_inserted(api):
"""The chat INSERT runs first; the unknown member then breaks the membership INSERT (FK).
Proof that the first INSERT really happened and was rolled back: PostgreSQL counts
attempted inserts in pg_stat_user_tables.n_tup_ins even for aborted transactions,
while the table contains no such chat and no new membership rows.
"""
alice = api.user("rollback")
title = "rollback-" + uuid.uuid4().hex
members_before = int(psql("SELECT count(*) FROM chat_members"))
attempts_before = _ins_counter()
error = api.call("POST", "/api/v1/chats", 400, token=alice["token"],
json_body={"title": title, "member_ids": [alice["id"], str(uuid.uuid4())]}).json()
assert "несуществующих" in error["error"]["message"]
deadline = time.monotonic() + 20 # statistics are flushed by the API backend asynchronously
while _ins_counter() == attempts_before and time.monotonic() < deadline:
time.sleep(0.5)
assert _ins_counter() > attempts_before, "the chat INSERT was never attempted"
assert psql(f"SELECT count(*) FROM chats WHERE title = convert_to('{title}', 'UTF8')") == "0"
assert int(psql("SELECT count(*) FROM chat_members")) == members_before
def test_migrations_rerun_is_a_noop():
users_before = psql("SELECT count(*) FROM users")
result = compose("run", "--rm", "--no-deps", "migrate")
assert "0001_init: already applied, skipped" in result.stdout
assert psql("SELECT count(*) FROM schema_migrations") == "1"
assert psql("SELECT count(*) FROM users") == users_before
def test_100_messages_from_10_clients_keep_order_and_cursor_walk(api):
clients = [api.user(f"w{i}") for i in range(10)]
chat = api.chat(clients[0], *clients[1:])
def writer(client: Api, index: int) -> list[dict]:
return [client.send(clients[index], chat, f"c{index}-m{j}") for j in range(10)]
results = run_concurrently(10, writer)
assert all(isinstance(r, list) for r in results), results
confirmed = [m for batch in results for m in batch]
history, pages = api.history(clients[5], chat, 7)
ids = [m["id"] for m in history]
assert len(confirmed) == 100 and len(history) == 100 and len(set(ids)) == 100 and pages == 15
assert set(ids) == {m["id"] for m in confirmed}
keys = [(m["created_at"], uuid.UUID(m["id"]).int) for m in history]
assert all(a < b for a, b in zip(keys, keys[1:])), "history is not strictly ordered"
stamps = [m["created_at"] for m in history]
assert len(set(stamps)) == 100, "per-chat clock must give unique timestamps"
for i, client in enumerate(clients):
own = [m["text"] for m in history if m["sender_id"] == client["id"]]
assert own == [f"c{i}-m{j}" for j in range(10)]
def test_secrets_are_not_stored_in_plain_text(api):
actor = api.user("store")
stored = psql(f"SELECT password_hash FROM users WHERE id = '{actor['id']}'")
assert stored.startswith("$argon2id$v=19$m=19456,t=2,p=1$") and PASSWORD not in stored
token_hex = actor["token"].encode().hex()
keys = compose("exec", "-T", "valkey", "sh", "-c",
'REDISCLI_AUTH="$(cat /run/secrets/valkey_password)" valkey-cli --scan --pattern "session:*"').stdout.split()
assert keys and all(len(k) == len("session:") + 64 for k in keys)
assert not any(actor["token"] in k or token_hex in k for k in keys)
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"""The history index really bounds the work of a late page (>= 10 000 messages, generic plan)."""
from __future__ import annotations
import re
import sys
import pytest
from conftest import ROOT
pytestmark = pytest.mark.stack
sys.path.insert(0, str(ROOT / "scripts"))
import explain_history # noqa: E402
def section(text: str, number: int) -> str:
parts = re.split(r"^=== ", text, flags=re.M)
return next(p for p in parts if p.startswith(f"{number}."))
def buffers(plan: str) -> int:
return int(re.search(r"Buffers: shared hit=(\d+)", plan).group(1))
def test_late_page_uses_index_range_not_filter():
text = explain_history.run()
assert "20000" in text # the target chat holds 20 000 messages
app_late = section(text, 2)
assert "Index Cond: ((chat_id = $1) AND (ROW(created_at, id) > ROW($2, $3)))" in app_late
assert "Rows Removed by Filter" not in app_late and "Sort" not in app_late
rejected = section(text, 3)
assert "Rows Removed by Filter: 19950" in rejected
# The app query touches a handful of pages; the rejected variants touch the whole prefix.
assert buffers(app_late) <= 10 < buffers(rejected) and buffers(app_late) <= 10 < buffers(section(text, 4))
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"""Dependency failures with a VALID session: bounded 503, never anonymous access, recovery afterwards.
Every test stops/pauses a real container and restores it in `finally` (service_down).
Timing bounds: DB_TIMEOUT_SECONDS=3 (client deadline), CACHE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS=0.5.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import subprocess
import time
import pytest
from conftest import ROOT, restart_services, service_down
pytestmark = pytest.mark.stack
DB_BOUND = 3.6 # DB_TIMEOUT_SECONDS + network/HTTP overhead
CACHE_BOUND = 1.6 # 2 x CACHE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS + overhead
def timed(api, *args, **kwargs):
started = time.monotonic()
response = api.call(*args, **kwargs)
return response, time.monotonic() - started
@pytest.fixture
def prepared(api):
alice, bob = api.user("alice"), api.user("bob")
chat = api.chat(alice, bob)
message = api.send(alice, chat, "до отказа")
return alice, bob, chat, message
def check_intact(api, alice, bob, chat, message):
"""After recovery the SAME tokens work and confirmed data is unchanged."""
assert api.call("GET", "/api/v1/users/me", 200, token=alice["token"]).json() == alice["user"]
items = api.call("GET", f"/api/v1/chats/{chat['id']}/messages", 200, token=bob["token"]).json()["items"]
assert items == [message]
@pytest.mark.parametrize("how", ["stop", "pause"])
def test_valkey_failure(api, prepared, how):
alice, bob, chat, message = prepared
with service_down("valkey", how):
response, took = timed(api, "GET", "/api/v1/users/me", 503, token=alice["token"])
assert response.json()["error"]["code"] == "unavailable" and took < CACHE_BOUND, took
api.call("GET", f"/api/v1/chats/{chat['id']}/messages", 503, token=bob["token"])
api.call("GET", "/api/v1/users/me", 401) # anonymous is still rejected
api.call("GET", "/health/ready", 503)
api.call("GET", "/health/live", 200)
check_intact(api, alice, bob, chat, message)
@pytest.mark.parametrize("how", ["stop", "pause"])
def test_postgres_failure(api, prepared, how):
alice, bob, chat, message = prepared
with service_down("postgres", how):
for path in ("/api/v1/users/me", f"/api/v1/chats/{chat['id']}/messages", "/api/v1/chats"):
response, took = timed(api, "GET", path, 503, token=alice["token"])
assert response.json()["error"]["code"] == "unavailable", path
assert took < DB_BOUND, (path, took) # bounded even when PostgreSQL is frozen (pause)
api.call("GET", "/api/v1/users/me", 401) # anonymous is still rejected
api.call("GET", "/health/ready", 503)
api.call("GET", "/health/live", 200)
check_intact(api, alice, bob, chat, message)
def test_locked_table_gives_bounded_503(api, prepared):
"""A statement stuck behind a lock is stopped by lock_timeout, not after minutes."""
alice, bob, chat, message = prepared
locker = subprocess.Popen(
["docker", "compose", "exec", "-T", "postgres", "psql", "-U", "messenger", "-d", "messenger", "-c",
"BEGIN; LOCK TABLE messages IN ACCESS EXCLUSIVE MODE; SELECT pg_sleep(6); COMMIT;"],
cwd=ROOT, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL)
try:
time.sleep(1.5) # let the lock be taken
response, took = timed(api, "GET", f"/api/v1/chats/{chat['id']}/messages", 503, token=bob["token"])
assert response.json()["error"]["code"] == "unavailable" and took < DB_BOUND, took
finally:
locker.wait(timeout=30)
check_intact(api, alice, bob, chat, message)
def test_logout_during_valkey_outage_is_never_lost(api, prepared):
"""Valkey is the single source of truth for sessions, so a logout cannot be 'forgotten':
during the outage logout answers 503 (nothing revoked, the client knows it failed);
after recovery logout works, and the revocation survives a Valkey and API restart (AOF)."""
alice, bob, chat, message = prepared
with service_down("valkey", "stop"):
api.call("DELETE", "/api/v1/auth/sessions/current", 503, token=alice["token"])
api.call("GET", "/api/v1/users/me", 200, token=alice["token"]) # logout did not happen
api.call("DELETE", "/api/v1/auth/sessions/current", 204, token=alice["token"])
api.call("GET", "/api/v1/users/me", 401, token=alice["token"])
restart_services("valkey", "api")
for _ in range(10): # repeated checks: the revoked token must never come back
api.call("GET", "/api/v1/users/me", 401, token=alice["token"])
api.call("POST", f"/api/v1/chats/{chat['id']}/messages", 401, token=alice["token"], json_body={"text": "x"})
api.call("GET", "/api/v1/users/me", 200, token=bob["token"]) # other sessions survived the restart
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"""Session lifetime: expiry with a short SESSION_TTL_SECONDS, no extension by restarts,
and the alternative SESSION_STORE=postgres. The api container is recreated with the
override and ALWAYS recreated back with the normal configuration (api_with_env)."""
from __future__ import annotations
import datetime as dt
import time
import pytest
from conftest import api_env, api_with_env, restart_services, service_down
pytestmark = pytest.mark.stack
def seconds_left(expires_at: str) -> float:
moment = dt.datetime.fromisoformat(expires_at.replace("Z", "+00:00"))
return (moment - dt.datetime.now(dt.timezone.utc)).total_seconds()
def login_session(api, actor) -> dict:
from conftest import basic
return api.call("POST", "/api/v1/auth/sessions", 201,
headers={"Authorization": basic(actor["username"], actor["password"])}, schema="Session").json()
@pytest.mark.parametrize("store", ["valkey", "postgres"])
def test_short_ttl_expires(api, store):
with api_with_env(SESSION_TTL_SECONDS="2", SESSION_STORE=store):
assert api_env("SESSION_TTL_SECONDS") == "2" # the contract variable reaches the container
actor = api.register("ttl")
session = login_session(api, actor)
assert 1.0 < seconds_left(session["expires_at"]) <= 2.1
api.call("GET", "/api/v1/users/me", 200, token=session["token"])
time.sleep(max(0.0, seconds_left(session["expires_at"])) + 0.3)
api.call("GET", "/api/v1/users/me", 401, token=session["token"])
api.call("DELETE", "/api/v1/auth/sessions/current", 401, token=session["token"])
def test_restart_does_not_extend_ttl(api):
with api_with_env(SESSION_TTL_SECONDS="12"):
actor = api.register("ttlrestart")
session = login_session(api, actor)
restart_services("valkey", "api")
assert seconds_left(session["expires_at"]) > 0, "restart took longer than the TTL; increase it"
api.call("GET", "/api/v1/users/me", 200, token=session["token"])
time.sleep(max(0.0, seconds_left(session["expires_at"])) + 0.3)
api.call("GET", "/api/v1/users/me", 401, token=session["token"])
def test_postgres_session_store(api):
"""SESSION_STORE=postgres: sessions survive an API restart, logout revokes, and a DB outage
is 503 for a valid token (not 401 and not anonymous access)."""
with api_with_env(SESSION_STORE="postgres"):
assert api_env("SESSION_STORE") == "postgres"
actor = api.user("pgstore")
restart_services("api")
api.call("GET", "/api/v1/users/me", 200, token=actor["token"])
with service_down("postgres", "stop"):
assert api.call("GET", "/api/v1/users/me", 503, token=actor["token"]).json()["error"]["code"] == "unavailable"
api.call("GET", "/api/v1/users/me", 401)
api.call("GET", "/api/v1/users/me", 200, token=actor["token"])
api.call("DELETE", "/api/v1/auth/sessions/current", 204, token=actor["token"])
api.call("GET", "/api/v1/users/me", 401, token=actor["token"])
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"""Pure functions, no services: validation, cursor, Authorization parsing, Argon2id, config."""
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
import base64
import datetime as dt
import pytest
from messenger import authhdr, cursor, passwords, validation
from messenger.config import ConfigError, Settings
from messenger.errors import InvalidRequest, Unauthorized
from messenger.timefmt import UTC, from_us, rfc3339, to_us
def b64(raw: bytes) -> str:
return base64.b64encode(raw).decode()
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ password rules
@pytest.mark.parametrize("password", ["Twelve-chars", "я" * 128, "пароль:с:двоеточиями", "😀" * 12, "a b c d e f g"])
def test_valid_passwords(password):
assert validation.password_field({"password": password}) == password
@pytest.mark.parametrize("password", ["short-11ch", "я" * 129, " " * 12, "\t\n " * 5, "\ud800" * 12, None, 123456789012])
def test_invalid_passwords(password):
with pytest.raises(InvalidRequest):
validation.password_field({"password": password})
def test_text_may_contain_nul_but_not_lone_surrogates():
assert validation.text_field({"t": "a\u0000b"}, "t", 10) == "a\u0000b"
with pytest.raises(InvalidRequest):
validation.text_field({"t": "a\ud800"}, "t", 10)
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ cursor
CHAT = "3f2c7a5e-0b7d-4a35-9a43-8d1f0f3b2c11"
def test_cursor_roundtrip_and_binding():
key = (to_us(dt.datetime(2026, 10, 12, 12, 0, 0, 123456, tzinfo=UTC)), "11111111-1111-4111-8111-111111111111")
token = cursor.encode(cursor.MESSAGES, CHAT, key)
assert cursor.decode(token, cursor.MESSAGES, CHAT) == key
with pytest.raises(InvalidRequest):
cursor.decode(token, cursor.MESSAGES, "00000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000000") # other chat
with pytest.raises(InvalidRequest):
cursor.decode(token, cursor.CHATS, CHAT) # other resource
@pytest.mark.parametrize("payload", [
b"v1|m|" + CHAT.encode() + b"|253402300800000000|11111111-1111-4111-8111-111111111111", # 1 us after 9999-12-31
b"v1|m|" + CHAT.encode() + b"|9999999999999999999|11111111-1111-4111-8111-111111111111", # int64 edge
b"v1|m|" + CHAT.encode() + b"|-1|11111111-1111-4111-8111-111111111111",
b"v1|m|" + CHAT.encode() + b"|1|not-a-uuid",
b"v1|m|" + CHAT.encode() + b"|1|11111111-1111-4111-8111-11111111111G",
b"v2|m|" + CHAT.encode() + b"|1|11111111-1111-4111-8111-111111111111",
])
def test_broken_cursors_are_400_not_500(payload):
token = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(payload).rstrip(b"=").decode()
with pytest.raises(InvalidRequest):
cursor.decode(token, cursor.MESSAGES, CHAT)
def test_time_helpers_are_exact():
moment = dt.datetime(2026, 2, 28, 23, 59, 59, 999999, tzinfo=UTC)
assert from_us(to_us(moment)) == moment
assert rfc3339(moment) == "2026-02-28T23:59:59.999999Z"
assert from_us(cursor.MAX_TS_US).year == 9999
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ Authorization header
def test_basic_is_parsed_and_password_may_contain_colons():
assert authhdr.parse_basic("Basic " + b64("alice:pa:ss:wörd".encode())) == ("alice", "pa:ss:wörd")
assert authhdr.parse_basic("basic " + b64(b"bob_1:x" * 1)) == ("bob_1", "x")
@pytest.mark.parametrize("header", [
None, "", "Basic", "Basic é", "Basic !!!!", "Basic " + b64(b"no-colon"), "Basic " + b64(b"\xff\xfe:pw"),
"Basic " + b64(b":password"), "Basic " + b64(b"alice:"), "Basic " + b64("Алиса:pw".encode()),
"Bearer " + "a" * 43, "Basic " + "A" * 2000,
])
def test_bad_basic_is_401_with_basic_challenge(header):
with pytest.raises(Unauthorized) as info:
authhdr.parse_basic(header)
assert info.value.headers["WWW-Authenticate"].startswith("Basic realm=\"messenger\"")
@pytest.mark.parametrize("header", [None, "", "Bearer", "Bearer short", "Bearer " + "a" * 43 + "!",
"Basic " + b64(b"alice:password-123"), "Token " + "a" * 43, "Bearer " + "é" * 43])
def test_bad_bearer_is_401_with_bearer_challenge(header):
with pytest.raises(Unauthorized) as info:
authhdr.parse_bearer(header)
assert info.value.headers["WWW-Authenticate"] == 'Bearer realm="messenger"'
def test_bearer_ok():
token = "A_b-" + "x" * 39
assert authhdr.parse_bearer("Bearer " + token) == token
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ Argon2id
def test_argon2id_hash_and_verify():
async def scenario():
stored = await passwords.hash_password("я" * 128)
assert stored.startswith("$argon2id$v=19$m=19456,t=2,p=1$")
assert await passwords.verify_password(stored, "я" * 128)
assert not await passwords.verify_password(stored, "я" * 127)
assert not await passwords.verify_password(None, "anything") # unknown user, dummy hash
assert not await passwords.verify_password("not-a-hash", "anything")
assert await passwords.hash_password("same password!") != await passwords.hash_password("same password!") # salt
asyncio.run(scenario())
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ config
def test_settings_read_secret_files_and_contract_names(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
url_file = tmp_path / "database_url"
url_file.write_text("postgresql://u:p@db/x\n", encoding="utf-8")
monkeypatch.setenv("DATABASE_URL_FILE", str(url_file))
monkeypatch.setenv("SESSION_STORE", "redis")
monkeypatch.setenv("CACHE_URL", "redis://:p@valkey:6379/0")
monkeypatch.setenv("SESSION_TTL_SECONDS", "2")
settings = Settings.from_env()
assert settings.database_url == "postgresql://u:p@db/x"
assert settings.session_store == "valkey" and settings.session_ttl_seconds == 2
monkeypatch.setenv("SESSION_TTL_SECONDS", "0")
with pytest.raises(ConfigError):
Settings.from_env()
monkeypatch.setenv("SESSION_TTL_SECONDS", "2")
monkeypatch.setenv("DATABASE_URL_FILE", str(tmp_path / "missing"))
with pytest.raises(ConfigError) as info:
Settings.from_env()
assert "u:p" not in str(info.value)