forked from mtusi2026/mtusi2026lab7
90 lines
4.9 KiB
Python
90 lines
4.9 KiB
Python
"""Grade-5 track 1: revoke a real worker, rotate DB secret/leaf, preserve tasks.
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Operator-only fault injection on a local synthetic workload. No public switch.
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All backups contain private material and stay under ignored secrets/operator.
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"""
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import hashlib
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import json
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from pathlib import Path
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import secrets
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import shutil
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import subprocess
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import sys
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import time
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ROOT=Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
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sys.path[:0]=[str(ROOT/'scripts'),str(ROOT/'tests')]
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import pki
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from bao_operator import request
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from database_operator import sql
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from client import Client
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def docker(*args,input=None):
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r=subprocess.run(['docker','compose',*args],cwd=ROOT,input=input,text=True,capture_output=True)
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if r.returncode:raise RuntimeError('Compose experiment step failed: '+args[0])
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return r.stdout.strip()
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def main():
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c=Client('https://127.0.0.1:8443',str(ROOT/'secrets/trust/ca.crt'))
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a,b,e,chat=c.bootstrap()
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baseline={'legacy_admin_can_read_sessions':int(sql('SELECT count(*) FROM sessions'))>0,
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'scoped_worker_denied':['sessions','password_hashes','messages','DDL','role_admin','foreign_S3_prefix','bucket_admin','queue_publish','queue_admin']}
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image_before=docker('images','-q','worker')
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root=json.loads((ROOT/'secrets/operator/bao-init.json').read_text())['root_token']
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identity=ROOT/'secrets/identities/worker'
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backup=ROOT/'secrets/operator/worker-before-rotation';backup.mkdir(exist_ok=True)
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for f in identity.iterdir():shutil.copy2(f,backup/f.name)
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old_serial=pki.x509.load_pem_x509_certificate((identity/'cert.pem').read_bytes()).serial_number
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start=time.monotonic()
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pki.revoke('worker')
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request('auth/cert/crls/operator',{'crl':(ROOT/'secrets/trust/revocations.pem').read_text()},root)
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deny="import sys;sys.path.insert(0,'/checks');from tls_matrix import rejected;assert rejected('db',8443,'worker');print('old worker TLS denied')"
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assert 'denied' in docker('run','--rm','--no-deps','security-check','python','-c',deny)
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# Terminate old already-authenticated DB sessions as part of containment.
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sql("SELECT pg_terminate_backend(pid) FROM pg_stat_activity WHERE usename='worker'")
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queued=[c.attachment(a,chat) for _ in range(3)]
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time.sleep(3)
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ids=','.join("'"+att['id']+"'" for att,_ in queued)
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assert sql(f"SELECT count(*) FROM attachments WHERE id IN ({ids}) AND status='queued'")=='3'
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# Cert auth must reject the old identity even though signed by our CA.
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rejection=docker('exec','-T','worker','python','-',input="from src.secret_agent import fetch\nfrom urllib.error import HTTPError\ntry: fetch()\nexcept HTTPError as e: assert e.code in (400,403); print('denied')\nelse: raise AssertionError('revoked worker got secrets')\n")
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assert rejection=='denied'
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cfg_path=ROOT/'secrets/operator/config.json';cfg=json.loads(cfg_path.read_text())
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old_url=cfg['service_credentials']['worker']['DATABASE_URL']
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password=secrets.token_hex(24)
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sql(f"ALTER ROLE worker PASSWORD '{password}'")
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cfg['database_passwords']['worker']=password
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cfg['service_credentials']['worker']['DATABASE_URL']=f'postgresql://worker:{password}@127.0.0.1:5432/messenger'
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cfg_path.write_text(json.dumps(cfg,indent=2));cfg_path.chmod(0o600)
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cert=pki.issue('worker')
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docker('run','--rm','--no-deps','secret-init')
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# New TLS identity + old database secret is denied by PostgreSQL itself.
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code="""import json,sys,psycopg
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url=json.load(sys.stdin)['url']
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try: psycopg.connect(url,connect_timeout=3)
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except psycopg.OperationalError as e:
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assert 'password authentication failed' in str(e);print('old password denied')
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else:raise AssertionError('old database secret still valid')
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"""
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check=docker('exec','-T','worker','python','-c',code,input=json.dumps({'url':old_url}))
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assert check=='old password denied'
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request('secret/data/worker',{'data':cfg['service_credentials']['worker']},root)
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for att,content in queued:
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c.wait_ready(a,att,wait_seconds=90)
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downloaded=c.call('GET','/api/v1/attachments/'+att['id']+'/content',actor=a)['bytes']
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assert hashlib.sha256(downloaded).digest()==hashlib.sha256(content).digest()
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assert sql(f"SELECT count(*) FROM jobs WHERE attachment_id IN ({ids}) AND status='done'")=='3'
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assert sql(f"SELECT count(*) FROM jobs WHERE attachment_id IN ({ids})")=='3'
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assert image_before==docker('images','-q','worker')
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result={'passed':True,'baseline':baseline,'revoked_serial':str(old_serial),'new_serial':str(cert.serial_number),
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'revoked_certificate_denied':True,'revoked_Bao_auth_denied':True,'rotated_old_DB_password_denied':True,
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'queued_during_revocation':3,'completed_after_rotation':3,'distinct_jobs':3,'content_SHA256_preserved':True,
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'image_unchanged':True,'total_seconds':round(time.monotonic()-start,2)}
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(ROOT/'evidence/compromised-worker.json').write_text(json.dumps(result,indent=2)+'\n')
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print('PASS: revoked worker -> queue preserved -> new cert/DB secret -> 3/3 jobs and hashes intact')
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if __name__=='__main__':main()
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