#!/usr/bin/env python3 """Grade-4 negative checks for the attachment path. The public smoke covers the happy path. This test adds the failure cases the assignment requires: an empty body, an oversized body, a corrupted image, a MIME spoof, a foreign attachment id and an attachment that belongs to another chat. Every client mistake must remain a 4xx response with the contract error envelope, not a 500. """ import argparse import hashlib import sys import uuid from pathlib import Path ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] sys.path.insert(0, str(ROOT / "tests")) from client import Client, check # noqa: E402 FIXTURE = ROOT / "tests" / "fixtures" / "sample.png" MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES = 10 * 1024 * 1024 def upload(client, actor, chat_id, raw, filename, content_type): headers = {} if content_type is None else {"Content-Type": content_type} return client.call( "POST", f"/api/v1/chats/{chat_id}/attachments?filename={filename}", expected=(201, 400, 404, 413, 415), actor=actor, raw=raw, headers=headers, ) def main(): parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__) parser.add_argument("--base-url", default="http://localhost:8080") parser.add_argument("--ca-file", default=None) args = parser.parse_args() c = Client(args.base_url, args.ca_file) alice, bob, eve, chat = c.bootstrap() png = FIXTURE.read_bytes() # Happy path first, so the negative checks can refer to a real attachment. good = c.attachment(alice, chat)[0] check(good["status"] == "ready", "valid upload is not ready") check(good["error_code"] is None, "ready attachment carries an error") # 1. One byte over the contract limit must be a 413, decided before decode. oversized = b"\x00" * (MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES + 1) response = upload(c, alice, chat["id"], oversized, "big.png", "image/png") check(response["status"] == 413, "oversized upload did not return 413") # 2. A file with a valid PNG signature but a broken body must be a 415. corrupt = png[:8] + b"\x00" * 64 response = upload(c, alice, chat["id"], corrupt, "broken.png", "image/png") check(response["status"] == 415, "corrupted image did not return 415") # 3. The declared type disagrees with the actual PNG bytes: MIME spoof. response = upload(c, alice, chat["id"], png, "spoof.jpg", "image/jpeg") check(response["status"] == 415, "MIME spoof did not return 415") # 4. A non-image content type is rejected without touching the decoder. response = upload(c, alice, chat["id"], b"hello", "file.txt", "text/plain") check(response["status"] == 415, "non-image Content-Type did not return 415") # 4b. An empty body is rejected before validation and leaves no metadata. response = upload(c, alice, chat["id"], b"", "empty.png", "image/png") check(response["status"] == 415, "empty upload did not return 415") # 5. Path separators in the display name are rejected before I/O. for bad_name in ("../escape.png", "dir/photo.png", "back\\slash.png"): response = upload(c, alice, chat["id"], png, bad_name, "image/png") check(response["status"] == 400, f"filename {bad_name!r} did not return 400") # 6. Eve is not a chat member: both metadata and bytes are hidden as 404. for suffix in ("", "/content"): response = c.call( "GET", f"/api/v1/attachments/{good['id']}{suffix}", expected=404, actor=eve ) check( response["json"]["error"]["code"] == "not_found", "foreign attachment error code mismatch", ) # 7. An attachment of another chat cannot be linked to this chat. other = c.call( "POST", "/api/v1/chats", 201, actor=alice, body={"title": "Другой чат", "member_ids": [alice["id"], bob["id"]]}, schema="Chat", )["json"] other_attachment = c.attachment(alice, other)[0] c.call( "POST", f"/api/v1/chats/{chat['id']}/messages", 404, actor=alice, body={"text": "wrong chat", "attachment_ids": [other_attachment["id"]]}, headers={"Idempotency-Key": "wrong-chat-" + uuid.uuid4().hex}, ) c.call( "POST", f"/api/v1/chats/{other['id']}/messages", 404, actor=alice, body={"text": "wrong chat", "attachment_ids": [good["id"]]}, headers={"Idempotency-Key": "wrong-chat-" + uuid.uuid4().hex}, ) # 8. Unknown ids, duplicates and an oversized list are cheap 400/404s. c.call( "POST", f"/api/v1/chats/{chat['id']}/messages", 404, actor=alice, body={"text": "unknown", "attachment_ids": [str(uuid.uuid4())]}, headers={"Idempotency-Key": "unknown-" + uuid.uuid4().hex}, ) c.call( "POST", f"/api/v1/chats/{chat['id']}/messages", 400, actor=alice, body={"text": "duplicate", "attachment_ids": [good["id"], good["id"]]}, headers={"Idempotency-Key": "duplicate-" + uuid.uuid4().hex}, ) c.call( "POST", f"/api/v1/chats/{chat['id']}/messages", 400, actor=alice, body={"text": "many", "attachment_ids": [str(uuid.uuid4())] * 11}, headers={"Idempotency-Key": "many-" + uuid.uuid4().hex}, ) # 9. Uploading into a chat the caller does not belong to is a 404, and the # response body must not become a 500 even though authorization wins # before the body is read. response = upload(c, eve, chat["id"], png, "foreign.png", "image/png") check(response["status"] == 404, "foreign-chat upload did not return 404") # 10. A valid image attached to a message is visible to the other member # with the exact original checksum, independently of the uploader. message = c.message(alice, chat, "", attachments=[good["id"]])["json"] check(message["attachment_ids"] == [good["id"]], "message lost attachment id") download = c.call( "GET", f"/api/v1/attachments/{good['id']}/content", actor=bob ) check(download["bytes"] == png, "member download differs from original") check( hashlib.sha256(download["bytes"]).hexdigest() == good["sha256"], "member download checksum mismatch", ) print( "PASS: graded negative cases (413/415/404/400), no 5xx, " "cross-member download checksum matches" ) if __name__ == "__main__": main()