Files
mtusi2026lab7/scripts/pki.sh
alenchha 861e7722b5 ЛР 7 — БВТ2301 — Курлова — на 4
Перенесён минимум lab6 (API без изменений), добавлена защита на границах доверия:
- внешний HTTPS; обязательный mTLS LB -> API с allowlist identity и отзывом по serial;
- TLS на всех связях: PostgreSQL verify-full, MinIO HTTPS, RabbitMQ AMQPS mTLS (EXTERNAL),
  Valkey TLS + ACL, Collector и хранилища телеметрии через mTLS с отдельными CA;
- OpenBao в server mode: cert auth, токены 15 мин, политики только на свой путь;
- роли БД, S3-политики и права брокера по принципу минимальных прав;
- Argon2id с замером, rehash, общий лимит входа, бюджет защиты от login DoS;
- hardening всех контейнеров, scan образов с разбором, модель угроз, матрица доверия;
- отрицательные тесты: TLS-аудит (135 проверок), ACL, ротации, sealed OpenBao.
2026-11-16 10:49:13 +03:00

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#!/bin/sh
# Local lab PKI (operator tool). Private keys stay in secrets/pki/ (git-ignored, never baked into images).
#
# scripts/pki.sh init create CAs and every leaf that does not exist yet (idempotent)
# scripts/pki.sh issue <leaf> (re)issue one leaf with a new key and serial (rotation)
# scripts/pki.sh revoke <leaf> add the CURRENT serial of <leaf> to secrets/pki/revoked-serials.txt
# scripts/pki.sh revoke-serial <hex> revoke a serial that is no longer the current one (after a rotation)
# scripts/pki.sh expired <leaf> test-only: an ALREADY EXPIRED copy of <leaf> (same identity) -> <leaf>-expired.*
# scripts/pki.sh serial <leaf> current serial of <leaf>
# scripts/pki.sh list leaf names, identities, serials and expiry (no key material)
#
# Trust layout (identity is checked by every server, not only the chain):
# root CA "Messenger Lab Root CA" signs every server certificate and the service client identities
# (lb, api, worker) used for LB->API, RabbitMQ (EXTERNAL = certificate CN) and OpenBao cert auth.
# ingest CA (intermediate) signs ONLY api-otel / worker-otel: the Collector trusts nothing else, so a
# root-signed certificate (e.g. the LB one) cannot push telemetry.
# telemetry CA (intermediate) signs ONLY collector-out / grafana-out / operator: Prometheus, Loki and Tempo
# accept only these clients.
# intruder root-signed, valid, but with an identity that no server allows (negative tests).
# foreign CA unrelated CA; foreign-client claims the lb/api/worker names (negative tests of chain checks).
# OpenSSL runs in a pinned container, so the host OpenSSL/LibreSSL version does not matter.
set -eu
cd "$(dirname "$0")/.."
DIR=secrets/pki
IMAGE="alpine/openssl:3.3.2@sha256:5008e829163320a6e8166883c03e68189e8925ade68cde36584dc2a41cfa5248"
LEAF_DAYS="${LEAF_DAYS:-90}"
CA_DAYS=825
# name | signer | usage | CN | DNS/IP SANs
LEAVES='
lb-server root server localhost localhost,nginx,IP:127.0.0.1
lb-client root client lb.client.messenger lb.client.messenger
api-1 root server api-1 api-1,api.internal
api-2 root server api-2 api-2,api.internal
api root client api.client.messenger api.client.messenger
worker root client worker.client.messenger worker.client.messenger
postgres root server postgres postgres
minio root server minio minio
rabbitmq root server rabbitmq rabbitmq
valkey root server valkey valkey
openbao root server openbao openbao,localhost,IP:127.0.0.1
otel-collector root server otel-collector otel-collector
prometheus root server prometheus prometheus,localhost,IP:127.0.0.1
loki root server loki loki,localhost,IP:127.0.0.1
tempo root server tempo tempo,localhost,IP:127.0.0.1
grafana root server grafana grafana,localhost,IP:127.0.0.1
api-otel ingest client api.otel.messenger api.otel.messenger
worker-otel ingest client worker.otel.messenger worker.otel.messenger
collector-out telemetry client collector.out.messenger collector.out.messenger
grafana-out telemetry client grafana.out.messenger grafana.out.messenger
operator telemetry client operator.messenger operator.messenger
intruder root client intruder.client.messenger intruder.client.messenger
'
ossl() { # quiet on success, the OpenSSL error on failure
out=$(docker run --rm -u "$(id -u):$(id -g)" -v "$PWD/$DIR:/pki" -w /pki "$IMAGE" "$@" 2>&1) || {
echo "openssl $1 failed: $out" >&2; exit 1; }
}
ca_init() { # ca_init <name> <subject> [parent]
[ -f "$DIR/$1.crt" ] && return 0
cat > "$DIR/.ext-$1" <<EOF
basicConstraints=critical,CA:true,pathlen:0
keyUsage=critical,keyCertSign,cRLSign
subjectKeyIdentifier=hash
authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid
EOF
ossl genpkey -algorithm EC -pkeyopt ec_paramgen_curve:P-256 -out "$1.key"
if [ $# -eq 2 ]; then
ossl req -x509 -new -key "$1.key" -subj "$2" -days "$CA_DAYS" -sha256 \
-addext "basicConstraints=critical,CA:true,pathlen:1" \
-addext "keyUsage=critical,keyCertSign,cRLSign" -out "$1.crt"
else
ossl req -new -key "$1.key" -subj "$2" -out "$1.csr"
ossl x509 -req -in "$1.csr" -CA "$3.crt" -CAkey "$3.key" -CAcreateserial -days "$CA_DAYS" -sha256 \
-extfile ".ext-$1" -out "$1.crt"
rm -f "$DIR/$1.csr"
fi
rm -f "$DIR/.ext-$1"
echo "created CA $1"
}
leaf_line() { echo "$LEAVES" | awk -v n="$1" '$1==n'; }
issue() { # issue <leaf>
line=$(leaf_line "$1")
[ -n "$line" ] || { echo "unknown leaf: $1" >&2; exit 2; }
set -- $line
name=$1 signer=$2 usage=$3 cn=$4 sans=$5
eku=serverAuth; [ "$usage" = client ] && eku=clientAuth
alt=$(echo "$sans" | tr ',' '\n' | awk '/^IP:/ {print; next} {print "DNS:" $0}' | paste -sd, -)
cat > "$DIR/.ext-$name" <<EOF
basicConstraints=critical,CA:false
keyUsage=critical,digitalSignature,keyEncipherment
extendedKeyUsage=$eku
subjectAltName=$alt
subjectKeyIdentifier=hash
authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid
EOF
ossl genpkey -algorithm EC -pkeyopt ec_paramgen_curve:P-256 -out "$name.key.new"
ossl req -new -key "$name.key.new" -subj "/O=Messenger Lab/CN=$cn" -out "$name.csr"
ossl x509 -req -in "$name.csr" -CA "$signer.crt" -CAkey "$signer.key" -CAcreateserial -days "$LEAF_DAYS" \
-sha256 -extfile ".ext-$name" -out "$name.crt.new"
# Leaf files carry the chain up to (not including) the root, so intermediates verify against ca.crt alone.
if [ -f "$DIR/$name.crt" ]; then cp "$DIR/$name.crt" "$DIR/$name.crt.previous"; cp "$DIR/$name.key" "$DIR/$name.key.previous"; fi
# Overwrite in place (cat >): the files are bind-mounted Docker secrets, a new inode would not be visible.
if [ "$signer" = root ]; then cat "$DIR/$name.crt.new" > "$DIR/$name.crt"; else cat "$DIR/$name.crt.new" "$DIR/$signer.crt" > "$DIR/$name.crt"; fi
cat "$DIR/$name.key.new" > "$DIR/$name.key"; rm -f "$DIR/$name.key.new"
rm -f "$DIR/$name.crt.new" "$DIR/$name.csr" "$DIR/.ext-$name"
echo "issued $name ($cn) serial=$(serial "$name") valid ${LEAF_DAYS}d"
}
foreign() { # an unrelated CA and a leaf that CLAIMS the LB/api/worker names: negative tests of chain checks
[ -f "$DIR/foreign-client.crt" ] && return 0
ca_init foreign "/O=Somebody Else/CN=Foreign CA"
printf '%s\n' "basicConstraints=critical,CA:false" "keyUsage=critical,digitalSignature,keyEncipherment" \
"extendedKeyUsage=clientAuth,serverAuth" \
"subjectAltName=DNS:lb.client.messenger,DNS:api.client.messenger,DNS:worker.client.messenger" \
> "$DIR/.ext-foreign-client"
ossl genpkey -algorithm EC -pkeyopt ec_paramgen_curve:P-256 -out foreign-client.key
ossl req -new -key foreign-client.key -subj "/O=Somebody Else/CN=lb.client.messenger" -out foreign-client.csr
ossl x509 -req -in foreign-client.csr -CA foreign.crt -CAkey foreign.key -CAcreateserial -days 30 -sha256 \
-extfile .ext-foreign-client -out foreign-client.crt
rm -f "$DIR/foreign-client.csr" "$DIR/.ext-foreign-client"
echo "created foreign CA + foreign-client (claims lb/api/worker identities, trusted nowhere)"
}
expired() { # same CN/SAN/EKU as <leaf>, validity in the past (openssl ca allows explicit dates)
line=$(leaf_line "$1"); [ -n "$line" ] || { echo "unknown leaf: $1" >&2; exit 2; }
set -- $line
name=$1 signer=$2 usage=$3 cn=$4 sans=$5
eku=serverAuth; [ "$usage" = client ] && eku=clientAuth
alt=$(echo "$sans" | tr ',' '\n' | awk '/^IP:/ {print; next} {print "DNS:" $0}' | paste -sd, -)
t="$DIR/.ca-$name"; rm -rf "$t"; mkdir -p "$t"; touch "$t/index.txt"; echo 01 > "$t/serial"
printf '%s\n' "[ca]" "default_ca=x" "[x]" "database=/pki/.ca-$name/index.txt" "serial=/pki/.ca-$name/serial" \
"new_certs_dir=/pki/.ca-$name" "default_md=sha256" "policy=p" "unique_subject=no" "[p]" "commonName=supplied" \
"[ext]" "basicConstraints=critical,CA:false" "keyUsage=critical,digitalSignature" "extendedKeyUsage=$eku" \
"subjectAltName=$alt" > "$t/ca.cnf"
ossl genpkey -algorithm EC -pkeyopt ec_paramgen_curve:P-256 -out "$name-expired.key"
ossl req -new -key "$name-expired.key" -subj "/O=Messenger Lab/CN=$cn" -out ".ca-$name/req.csr"
ossl ca -batch -config ".ca-$name/ca.cnf" -extensions ext -cert "$signer.crt" -keyfile "$signer.key" \
-startdate 20250101000000Z -enddate 20250102000000Z -in ".ca-$name/req.csr" -out "$name-expired.crt" -notext
rm -rf "$t"
echo "issued $name-expired ($cn), validity 2025-01-01..2025-01-02 (already expired, test only)"
}
serial() { docker run --rm -v "$PWD/$DIR:/pki" -w /pki "$IMAGE" x509 -in "$1.crt" -noout -serial | cut -d= -f2; }
finish() {
cp "$DIR/root.crt" "$DIR/ca.crt" # public CA bundle for clients (make test CA_FILE=...)
cat "$DIR/root.crt" "$DIR/ingest.crt" > "$DIR/ingest-bundle.crt"
cat "$DIR/root.crt" "$DIR/telemetry.crt" > "$DIR/telemetry-bundle.crt"
touch "$DIR/revoked-serials.txt"
# Containers run as other uids and read keys through Docker secrets: files readable, directory closed.
chmod 700 secrets "$DIR"
chmod 644 "$DIR"/*.crt "$DIR"/*.key "$DIR/revoked-serials.txt"
chmod 600 "$DIR"/*.previous 2>/dev/null || true
chmod 600 "$DIR"/root.key "$DIR"/ingest.key "$DIR"/telemetry.key "$DIR"/foreign.key
}
cmd="${1:-init}"
mkdir -p "$DIR"
case "$cmd" in
init)
ca_init root "/O=Messenger Lab/CN=Messenger Lab Root CA"
ca_init ingest "/O=Messenger Lab/CN=Messenger Telemetry Ingest CA" root
ca_init telemetry "/O=Messenger Lab/CN=Messenger Telemetry Clients CA" root
for name in $(echo "$LEAVES" | awk 'NF {print $1}'); do
[ -f "$DIR/$name.crt" ] || issue "$name"
done
foreign
finish ;;
issue) issue "$2"; finish ;;
revoke)
s=$(serial "$2"); grep -qx "$s" "$DIR/revoked-serials.txt" 2>/dev/null || echo "$s" >> "$DIR/revoked-serials.txt"
echo "revoked $2 serial=$s"; finish ;;
revoke-serial)
s=$(echo "$2" | tr 'a-f' 'A-F')
# append in place: the file is bind-mounted into the API containers (a new inode would not be seen)
grep -qx "$s" "$DIR/revoked-serials.txt" 2>/dev/null || echo "$s" >> "$DIR/revoked-serials.txt"
echo "revoked serial=$s" ;;
expired) expired "$2"; finish ;;
serial) serial "$2" ;;
list)
for name in $(echo "$LEAVES" | awk 'NF {print $1}'); do
printf '%-15s %-28s %s %s\n' "$name" "$(leaf_line "$name" | awk '{print $4}')" "$(serial "$name")" \
"$(docker run --rm -v "$PWD/$DIR:/pki" -w /pki "$IMAGE" x509 -in "$name.crt" -noout -enddate | cut -d= -f2)"
done ;;
*) echo "usage: $0 init|issue <leaf>|revoke <leaf>|revoke-serial <hex>|expired <leaf>|serial <leaf>|list" >&2; exit 2 ;;
esac