forked from mtusi2026/mtusi2026lab4
48 lines
1.9 KiB
Python
48 lines
1.9 KiB
Python
"""Validate compressed image bytes without trusting filename or HTTP Content-Type."""
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import os
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import threading
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import struct
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import zlib
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from PIL import Image, ImageFile, UnidentifiedImageError
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from .storage import MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS
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# Prevent unrestricted decompression of malicious image dimensions.
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Image.MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS = MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS
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ImageFile.LOAD_TRUNCATED_IMAGES = False
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_IMAGE_LOCK = threading.BoundedSemaphore(1)
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class InvalidImage(Exception):
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pass
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class TooManyPixels(Exception):
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pass
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def validate_image_file(file, declared_type: str) -> None:
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expected = {"image/png": "PNG", "image/jpeg": "JPEG"}.get(declared_type)
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if not expected:
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raise InvalidImage("unsupported image type")
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with _IMAGE_LOCK:
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try:
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file.seek(0)
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with Image.open(file) as probe:
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if probe.format != expected:
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raise InvalidImage("image MIME does not match its content")
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width, height = probe.size
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if width <= 0 or height <= 0:
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raise InvalidImage("image dimensions are invalid")
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if width * height > MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS:
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raise TooManyPixels("image dimensions exceed limit")
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probe.verify() # verify compressed structure
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file.seek(0)
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with Image.open(file) as loaded:
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loaded.load() # detect damaged truncated payloads
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except Image.DecompressionBombError as e:
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raise TooManyPixels("image dimensions exceed limit") from e
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except Image.DecompressionBombWarning as e:
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raise TooManyPixels("image dimensions exceed limit") from e
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except (UnidentifiedImageError, OSError, ValueError, SyntaxError, EOFError, struct.error, zlib.error) as e:
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raise InvalidImage("invalid or truncated PNG/JPEG") from e
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finally:
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file.seek(0)
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