Files
mtusi2026lab4/src/images.py
T

48 lines
1.9 KiB
Python

"""Validate compressed image bytes without trusting filename or HTTP Content-Type."""
import os
import threading
import struct
import zlib
from PIL import Image, ImageFile, UnidentifiedImageError
from .storage import MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS
# Prevent unrestricted decompression of malicious image dimensions.
Image.MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS = MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS
ImageFile.LOAD_TRUNCATED_IMAGES = False
_IMAGE_LOCK = threading.BoundedSemaphore(1)
class InvalidImage(Exception):
pass
class TooManyPixels(Exception):
pass
def validate_image_file(file, declared_type: str) -> None:
expected = {"image/png": "PNG", "image/jpeg": "JPEG"}.get(declared_type)
if not expected:
raise InvalidImage("unsupported image type")
with _IMAGE_LOCK:
try:
file.seek(0)
with Image.open(file) as probe:
if probe.format != expected:
raise InvalidImage("image MIME does not match its content")
width, height = probe.size
if width <= 0 or height <= 0:
raise InvalidImage("image dimensions are invalid")
if width * height > MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS:
raise TooManyPixels("image dimensions exceed limit")
probe.verify() # verify compressed structure
file.seek(0)
with Image.open(file) as loaded:
loaded.load() # detect damaged truncated payloads
except Image.DecompressionBombError as e:
raise TooManyPixels("image dimensions exceed limit") from e
except Image.DecompressionBombWarning as e:
raise TooManyPixels("image dimensions exceed limit") from e
except (UnidentifiedImageError, OSError, ValueError, SyntaxError, EOFError, struct.error, zlib.error) as e:
raise InvalidImage("invalid or truncated PNG/JPEG") from e
finally:
file.seek(0)