#!/bin/sh # Creates local Docker secrets for a synthetic lab stand. # Existing files are never overwritten; values are never printed. set -eu dir="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd)/infra/secrets" mkdir -p "$dir" # Host access is limited by the directory mode; the files themselves must stay # readable by the non-root users inside containers (bind-mounted secrets). chmod 700 "$dir" 2>/dev/null || true random() { od -An -tx1 -N24 /dev/urandom | tr -d ' \n' } write_new() { if [ -f "$dir/$1" ]; then echo "keep infra/secrets/$1" else printf '%s' "$2" > "$dir/$1" chmod 644 "$dir/$1" 2>/dev/null || true echo "create infra/secrets/$1" fi } if [ ! -f "$dir/postgres_password.txt" ]; then write_new postgres_password.txt "$(random)" fi pg_password="$(cat "$dir/postgres_password.txt")" write_new database_url.txt "postgresql://messenger:${pg_password}@db:5432/messenger" if [ ! -f "$dir/valkey_password.txt" ]; then write_new valkey_password.txt "$(random)" fi valkey_password="$(cat "$dir/valkey_password.txt")" write_new cache_url.txt "redis://:${valkey_password}@valkey:6379/0" # Lab4: S3 (SeaweedFS). Admin credentials are used only by the s3-init # bootstrap; the API gets its own key pair restricted to one bucket. write_new s3_admin_access_key_id.txt "admin$(random | cut -c1-15)" write_new s3_admin_secret_access_key.txt "$(random)$(random)" write_new s3_access_key_id.txt "api$(random | cut -c1-17)" write_new s3_secret_access_key.txt "$(random)$(random)" # Lab5: RabbitMQ uses a separate local password. The URL is a Docker secret; # no credentials appear in compose.yaml or the report. if [ ! -f "$dir/broker_password.txt" ]; then write_new broker_password.txt "$(random)" fi broker_password="$(cat "$dir/broker_password.txt")" write_new broker_url.txt "amqp://messenger:${broker_password}@broker:5672/"